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Je	   crois	   qu’il	   existe	   de	   la	   raison	  dans	   l’humain,	  
du	   raisonnable	  et	  du	   rationnel	  dans	   les	  univers	  
sociaux,	   comme	   il	   existe	   des	   valeurs.	   Cette	  
raison	   comme	   ces	   valeurs	   sont	   toutefois	  
humaines.	  (Pestre	  2013)	  
	  
	  
Structure	  of	  Deliverable	  
	  
The	   following	   deliverable	   is	   focused	   on	   the	   scientific	   development	   of	   parameters	  
through	  which	  we	  can	  propose	  a	  reference	  grid	  for	  the	  empirical	  analysis.	  	  
This	  task	  will	  be	  accomplished	  through	  the	  accomplishment	  of	  several	  steps.	  
The	  discussion	  and	  analysis	  of	  the	  theoretical	  background	  depicted	  in	  Del.	  2.2	  will	  be	  
a	   first	   starting	   point.	   From	   there	  we	   should	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   a	   depiction	   of	   the	  
justifications	   connected	   with	   RRI,	   a	   discussion	   of	   the	   epistemology	   behind	   the	  
problem,	   through	  a	   set	  of	  analytical	   steps	  of	  defining	   the	  problem,	  and	   then	  a	   full	  
justification	   for	   the	   approach,	   explaining	   why	   current	   governance	   approaches	   are	  
limited	  in	  their	  relationship	  with	  RRI.	  	  
	  
Analytically	  speaking,	  we	  will	  provide:	  	  
• an	   introduction	   depicting	   the	   actual	   situation	   with	   regard	   to	   Responsible	  
Innovation	  in	  the	  EU.	  
• a	  definition	  of	  the	  problem(s)	  related	  to	  Responsible	  Innovation	  
• a	  discussion	  of	  the	  epistemology	  that	  cross-­‐cuts	  the	  problems	  and	  that	  opens	  
up	  the	  real	  problem	  
• a	  methodological	  path	  or	  justificatory	  explanation	  for	  our	  approach	  
• the	   parameters	   needed	   in	   order	   to	   collect	   empirical	   data	   and	   analyze	  
research	  according	  to	  our	  frame.	  
	  
The	  present	  deliverable	  has	   the	  aim	  of	  providing	   the	   criteria	  or,	  better	   to	   say,	   the	  
parameters	  necessary	  for	  processing	  applied	  approaches.	  To	  accomplish	  such	  a	  task	  
we	   will	   start	   by	   outlining	   what	   the	   problems	   are	   with	   regard	   to	   RRI,	   gaining	  
knowledge	   from	   the	   previous	   “Theoretical	   Landscape”,	   and	   from	   our	   partners	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understanding.	   From	   there	  we	  will	   try	   to	   shortly,	   but	   critically,	   assess	   the	   current	  
Responsible	  Innovation	  approaches.	  We	  will	  accomplish	  this	  task	  first	  by	  considering	  
RRI	   through	   its	   two	   sides,	   responsibility	   and	   innovation,	   and	   after	   the	   current	  
understandings	  of	  RRI	  itself.	  This	  should	  put	  in	  evidence	  that	  the	  main	  shortcomings	  
of	   RRI	   are	   represented	   by	   a	   reductive	   way	   in	   which	   norms	   are	   conceived	   and	  
constructed	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  context.	  Therefore,	  we	  will	  have	  to	  depict	  how	  this	  
particular	  matter	  is	  handled	  and	  how	  it	  could	  be	  differently	  managed.	  Consequently,	  
we	  will	  need	  to	  analyze	  the	  decision	  making	  process	   in	   its	  actual	  frame	  so	  to	  show	  
gaps	  and	  limits.	  From	  this	  stance	  we	  will	  then	  be	  able	  to	  offer	  parameters	  through	  an	  
analytical	  grid	  that	  will	  help	  the	  investigation	  in	  detecting	  similar	  shortcomings	  and	  
limitations	  in	  most	  of	  the	  EU	  research	  projects.	  	  
	  
It	   goes	   without	   saying,	   that	   the	   critical	   assessment	   of	   norms	   construction	   and	  
governance	   approaches	   stands	   on	   a	   precise	   methodological	   ground,	   one	   that	  
doesn’t	   intend	   to	   impose	   a	   single	   perspective	   but	   only	   to	   depict	   the	   logical	   and	  
ethical	  weak	   points	   of	   current	   scenarios.	   A	   normative	   core,	   a	   focused	   perspective	  
that	   stands	   necessary	   for	   every	   investigation,	   needs	   to	   be	   always	   highlighted	   and	  
justified.	  Throughout	  the	  entire	  deliverable	  then,	  we	  will	  provide,	  explicit	  or	  implicit,	  
logical	  and	  ethical,	  justifications	  to	  our	  perspective.	  Given	  the	  length	  of	  the	  issue	  at	  
stake	   perhaps	   some	   points	   or	   theoretical	   presupposition	   will	   be	   left	   implicit	   or	  
treated	  briefly.	  
	  
Accordingly,	  we	  need	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   challenges	  and	  difficulties	  outlined	   in	  Del.	  
2.2.	   In	  particular	   the	   following	  deliverable,	  namely	  “Analytical	  Grid”,	  will	   represent	  
the	   definitive	   formalization1 	  based	   on	   the	   results	   of	   the	   previous	   “Theoretical	  
Landscape”	  that	  will	  favor	  the	  subsequent	  empirical	  investigation.	  The	  precise	  aim	  is	  
thus	   to	   translate	   theoretical	   insights	   into	   a	   ‘language’	   useful	   for	   further	   empirical	  
inquiries,	   by	   providing	   a	   dynamic	   methodological	   analytical	   tool	   suitable	   for	   this	  
purpose.	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   in	   a	   second	   time,	   the	   results	   of	   the	   latter	  will	   feed	   the	   formal	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  With	   the	   term	   formalization	   we	   refer	   to	   the	   french	   ‘mise	   en	   forme’,	   that	   is,	   to	   give	   a	  
definite	   form	   or	   shape	   to	   something.	  We	   believe	   it	   will	   be	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   use	   the	  
insights	  coming	  from	  the	  theoretical	  landscape.	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1.	  Introduction	  	  
The	  EU	  seeks	   to	  become	  a	  genuine	   Innovation	  Union	   in	  2020	  striving	   for	  excellent	  
science,	  a	  competitive	  industry	  and	  a	  better	  society	  without	  compromising	  either	  on	  
sustainability	   goals	   or	   on	   ethically	   acceptable	   and	   socially	   desirable	   conditions.	  
Europe	   thus	   needs	   to	   develop	   a	   normative	   and	   comprehensive	   governance	  
framework	  for	  Responsible	  Research	  and	  Innovation	  (RRI).	  	  
However,	   this	   raises	   new	   questions	   regarding	   the	   relation	   between	   technical	  
development	   and	   society	   that	   are	   often	   hard	   to	   deal	   with.	   This	   matter	   has	   been	  
demonstrated	   by	   various	   cases	   in	   recent	   history,	   for	   instance,	   the	   research	   on	  
genetically	  modified	  organisms	  (GMO),	  where	  the	  resulting	  controversies	  and	  ethical	  
issues	  had	  a	  broad	  resonance	  in	  society	  and	  generated	  serious	  economical	  counter-­‐
effects.	  	  
Consequently,	  the	  societal	  challenges	  accompanying	  this	  kind	  of	  research	  cannot	  any	  
more	   be	   addressed	   only	   by	   the	   research	   community,	   but	   also	   need	   to	   include	   a	  
societal	   perspective.	   As	   stated	   by	   David	   Delpy	   “the	   challenge	  will	   be	   to	   define	   an	  
approach	   that	   promotes	   creativity	   and	   innovation	   in	   research	   underpinned	   by	   a	  
commitment	  to	  its	  responsible	  development”.	  What	  appears	  difficult	  on	  paper	  shows	  
to	  be	  even	  harder	  in	  practice.	  
	  
What	  are	  the	  main	  problems	  at	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  a	  target?	  Undoubtedly	  the	  issues	  at	  
stake	  are	  several	  and	  on	  different	  layers.	  	  
The	  first	  and	  most	  basic	  question	  regards	  exactly	  how	  to	  conceive	  a	  responsible	  kind	  
of	   innovation?	   As	   understood	   in	   the	   previous	   deliverable,	   responsible	   innovation	  
seems	   to	   be	   a	   paradoxical	   conception,	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   couple	   appears	   to	  
pertain	  to	  two	  different	  and	  opposite	  rational	  spheres2.	  	  
In	   fact,	   on	   the	  one	  hand	   innovation	   is	   usually	   intended	   as	   a	   flow	   running	   through	  
technological	   developments,	   based	   on	   a	   strategic	   approach	   to	   progress,	   aimed	   at	  
marketing	  or	  develop	  marketable	  products	  and	  processes3.	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  responsibility,	  although	  facing	  different	  ranges	  of	  understanding	  
given	  the	  polysemy	  of	  the	  term,	  is	  generally	  conceived	  as	  an	  ethical	  matter	  related	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  Referring	  to	  Habermas	  or	  Parsons.	  
3	  However,	  innovation	  encounters	  problems	  in	  its	  development	  as	  shown	  by	  the	  “Report	  on	  
Innovation”.	   The	   level	   of	   innovation	   in	   EU	   is	   much	   lower	   when	   compared	   with	   other	  
countries	   like	   the	   US	   or	   Japan.	   In	   this	   sense	   we	   will	   have	   to	   then	   develop	   some	   RRI	  
conceptions	  that	  manages	  not	  only	  to	  ‘responsibilize’	  innovation	  but	  also	  to	  help	  boosting	  its	  
trend.	  If	  the	  two	  operations	  are	  part	  of	  one	  same	  conception	  as	  we	  think,	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  in	  
the	  further	  pages.	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to	   the	   potential	   consequences	   that	   may	   occur	   with	   innovation.	   This	   implies	  
somehow	   that	   responsibility,	   and	   therefore	   ethics,	   tend	   to	   represent	   a	   limit	   to	  
innovation.	  The	  main	  difficulty	  stands	  then	  in	  conceiving	  an	  innovation	  process	  that	  
could	  be	  responsible	  in	  terms	  of	  consequences	  without	  hampering	  the	  marketization	  
or	  technological	  development.	  
	  
But	  this	  kind	  of	  problem	  could	  be	  immediately	  felt	  to	  represent	  only	  the	  superficial	  
layer	   of	   deeper	   questions	   and	  most	   of	   all	   an	   assent	   on	   those	   definitions.	   On	   the	  
contrary	  the	  supposed	  clash	  between	  responsibility	  and	  innovation	  represents	  only	  a	  
clear	   signal	   or	   evidence	   of	   more	   complex	   matters.	   Although	   they	   appear	   in	   a	  
different	  shape,	  the	  clashing	  terms	  are	  not	  new	  in	  their	  basic	  roots4,	  and	  this	  fact	  will	  
turn	  out	  to	  be	  a	  good	  indication	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  gaps	  and	  limits.	  
In	   fact,	  what	  we	  understood	   from	  deliverable	   2.2	   is	   that	   responsible	   research	   and	  
innovation	  is	  considered	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  necessary	  target	  and	  a	  paradox.	  But,	  if	  
we	   could	   easily	   agree	  on	   the	  necessity	   of	   a	   responsible	   innovation	   in	   research	   for	  
several	   reasons,	   would	   it	   be	   also	   really	   true	   that	   these	   two	   terms	   stand	   in	  
opposition?	  
We	  believe	  that	  in	  reality,	  although	  being	  different,	  they	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  general	  as	  
opposite,	  but	  that	  a	  reductive	  perspective	  on	  the	  question	  tends	  to	  places	  them	  into	  
a	   clash.	   On	   the	   contrary	   the	   mistake	   lies	   exactly	   in	   keeping	   this	   opposition	   alive	  
through	   different	   means.	   The	   current	   evaluation	   tools	   (e.g.,	   risk	   assessment),	   by	  
which	   responsibility	   is	   embedded	  more	   or	   less	   in	   research,	   tend	   to	   maintain	   this	  
opposition	  either	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly.	  	  
As	   we	   will	   see	   in	   the	   proceeding	   of	   our	   analysis,	   this	   opposition	   leads	   to	   several	  
effects	   not	   last	   the	   potential	   ineffectiveness	   of	   innovation	   especially	   in	   economic	  
terms.	  
We	  believe	  that	  keeping	  these	  two	  fields	  separated	  is	  a	  mistake	  from	  many	  points	  of	  
view	  and	  that	  it	  becomes	  quite	  evident	  at	  a	  political	  level.	  	  
There	  are	  three	  layers	  on	  which	  the	  current	  understanding	  of	  responsible	  innovation	  
shows	   its	   limits	  and	  they	  all	  can	  be	  re-­‐conducted	  and	  synthetized	  to	  their	  practical	  
concretion,	   that	   is	   how	   governance	  models	   and	  measures	   act	   in	   order	   to	  manage	  
and	  pursue	  specific	  issues.	  	  
	  
Furthermore,	   this	   problem	   reaches	   a	   different	   and	   much	   more	   evident	   difficulty	  
when	  it	  is	  transposed	  onto	  a	  political	  level	  that	  is	  always	  a	  plural	  one.	  How	  in	  fact,	  do	  
we	  manage	   to	  conjugate	  or	  merge	  different	  normative	   settings	  given	   the	   fact	   that	  
innovation	  involves	  different	  fields	  and	  actors?	  How	  do	  we	  conceive,	  in	  other	  words,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  counter	  position	  could	  be	  expressed	   in	   terms	  of	  science	  and	  ethics,	   laws	  and	  norms,	  
nature	  and	  culture.	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a	   collective	   action	   in	   terms	   of	   innovation	   outcomes?	   The	   current	   answer,	   as	   we	  
already	   understood	   from	   Del.	   2.2,	   is	   usually	   to	   recall	   a	  meta-­‐level	   justification.	   In	  
particular	  the	  agreement	  or	  choice	  is	  always	  to	  be	  found	  in	  some	  sort	  of	  rationalistic	  
or	  a	  priori	  schemes	  on	  which	  to	  refer.	  Although	  there	  are	  several	  different	  nuances	  
of	   which	   we	   will	   provide	   an	   analysis,	   the	   common	   trait	   of	   most	   of	   innovation	  
approaches	  in	  current	  research,	  lies	  in	  this	  aprioristic	  or	  top-­‐down	  understanding	  of	  
normativity,	  an	  attempt	  that	  we	  will	  call	  reductionist	  and	  that	  could	  be	  intended	  as	  a	  
mathematization	  of	   ‘life’.	  The	  risk	  here	   is	   represented	  by	  an	   instrumentalization	  of	  
RRI	  at	  the	  expenses	  of	  ethics.	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  our	  hypothesis	  we	  will	  proceed	  showing	  that	  is	  exactly	  this	  
reduction	   that	   makes	   emerge	   all	   the	   actual	   problems	   connected	   to	   innovation.	  
Furthermore	  we	  will	  highlight	  the	  different	  reasons	  for	  which	  we	  have	  to	  reject	  this	  
understanding	   and	   put	   in	   evidence	   how	   an	   ‘abstract’	   failure	   affects	   the	   ‘practical’	  
dimension	  in	  political	  terms.	  
	  
We	  will	  adopt	  such	  structure:	  
We	  should	  firstly	  highlight,	  following	  the	  hints	  and	  explanations	  of	  Del.	  2.2,	  we	  will	  
go	   into	   the	   two	   concepts	   of	   innovation	   and	   responsibility	   in	   order	   to	   offer	   an	  
alternative	  understanding	  of	   them.	  We	  will	   then	  tackle	  the	  political	   layer,	   trying	  to	  
show	  why	  and	  how	  a	  contradictory	  acception	  of	  RRI	  fails	  in	  its	  political	  management.	  
This	  part	  will	  be	  also	  based	  on	  a	  two	  folded	  explanation;	  a	  more	  theoretical	  stance,	  
focusing	  on	  how	  norms	   are	   conceived	   and	   constructed,	   and	   a	  more	  practical	   one,	  
that	   is,	   what	   are	   the	   governance	   forms	   by	   which	   normativity	   and	   therefore	  
responsibility	  is	  handled	  in	  innovation	  processes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  
In	  order	  to	  do	  this	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  what	  these	  perspectives	  are,	  why	  they	  are	  
all	  expressions	  of	  one	  same	  problem,	  and	  show	  the	  embedded	  contradiction	  in	  them.	  
Once	   we	   have	  made	   clear	   what	   lies	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   those	   contradictions,	   we	   will	  
propose	   our	   alternative	   conception.	   From	   there	   on	  we	  will	   then	   analyse	   how	   this	  
misunderstanding	  affects	   the	  current	  governance	  models	  and	  consequently	  offer	  a	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2.	  Critical	  assessment	  of	  Responsible	  Innovation	  in	  Research	  	  
As	   everyone	   can	   understand	   even	   at	   a	   first	   glance	   there	   are	   several	   aspects	   that	  
need	   to	   be	   treated	   if	   we	  want	   to	   develop	   an	   analysis	   on	   Responsible	   Innovation.	  
Furthermore	   there	   are	   different	   layers	   of	   understanding	   that	   lead	   us	   to	   the	  main	  
core	  of	  the	  problem,	  the	  relation	  between	  norms	  and	  context(s).	  
	  
From	  a	  practical	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  main	  starting	  problem,	  for	  everyone	  who	  wants	  
to	  develop	  a	  conception	  of	  RRI,	  comes	  across	  together	  with	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  
fact	   that	   innovation,	   and	   therefore	   responsible	   innovation,	   can	   occur	   both	   in	  
different	   fields	   or	   manners	   affecting	   a	   large	   number	   of	   contexts.	   Without	   the	  
necessity	   to	   provide	   an	   exhaustive	   enumeration	   of	   possible	   fields	   (technologies,	  
environment,	  medical,	  food)	  it	  is	  important	  to	  assess	  and	  keep	  in	  mind	  the	  variety	  of	  
different	   potential	   applications	   and	   regulations	   that	   characterize	   every	   specific	  
domain,	  and	  therefore	  the	   insufficiency	  to	  take	   into	  account	  only	  one	  of	   them.	  On	  
the	   contrary	   this	   ‘normative	   clash’	   calls	   in	   for	   a	  proposal	   that	   could	  be	   sufficiently	  
wide	  in	  order	  to	  be	  valid	  without	  loosing	  at	  the	  same	  time	  all	  the	  different	  normative	  
sets.	  	  
	  	  
Also	   on	   a	   theoretical	   stance,	   as	   it	   has	   be	   shown	   in	   Del.	   2.2,	   the	   concept	   of	  
responsible	  innovation	  involves	  a	  lot	  of	  different	  perspectives	  and	  “sub-­‐acceptions”	  
that	   renders	   hard	   to	   develop	   a	   common	   understanding.	   To	   be	   more	   precise,	  
responsible	   innovation	   is	   usually	   seen	   as	   the	   addition	   of	   two	   antithetic	   concepts,	  
innovation	   and	   responsibility,	   as	   mentioned	   previously.	   If	   the	   former	   is	   generally	  
more	  or	   less	  definable	   through	  a	   shared	  conception,	   the	   latter	  encounters	  a	   lot	  of	  
different	  perspectives	  due	  to	   its	  recent	  formation,	  etymological	  richness	  and	  width	  
range	  of	  application.	  (Hart,	  1968;	  Groves,	  2006;	  Bovens,	  2006).	  
	  
In	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  RRI	  we	  then	  need	  to	  see	  if,	  how	  and	  
where	   we	   could	   find	   indications	   that	   would	   be	   useful	   in	   order	   to	   go	   out	   from	   a	  
common	  understanding	  of	  it.	  We	  don’t	  need	  to	  recall	  all	  the	  possible	  options	  as	  this	  
has	  been	  exhaustively	  done	  by	  Del.	  2.2.	  We	  will	  just	  see	  if	  there	  are	  some	  indications	  
that	  could	  lead	  us	  on	  the	  right	  path,	  the	  one	  of	  a	  logically	  correct,	  ethically	  good	  and	  
practically	  effective	  conception	  of	  RRI.	  
	  
Lets	  shortly	  set	  a	  frame	  of	  what	  innovation	  could	  be	  and	  how	  we	  could	  handle	  it.	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2.1.	  Innovation	  	  
The	  main	  basic	  problem,	  as	  we	  hinted,	  is	  how	  to	  assess	  and	  prevent	  all	  the	  potential	  
consequences	  of	  an	  innovation	  process,	  considering	  the	  enormous	  range	  of	  possible	  
outcomes	   in	  different	   fields	  and	   from	  different	  perspectives?	  How,	   in	  other	   terms,	  
an	   innovation	  process	   could	  be	   successful	   considering	   that	  not	  only	   its	   scientificity	  
will	  represent	  the	  proof	  of	  it,	  but	  also	  that	  the	  context	  will	  judge	  it?	  If	  an	  innovation	  
aspires	   to	   be	   successful	   it	   needs	   to	   consider	   how	   to	   ‘offer’	   the	   result	   to	   potential	  
beneficiaries.	   Besides,	   as	   we	   will	   show,	   an	   innovation	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   its	  
economic	  impact	  in	  terms	  of	  profit	  but	  has	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  social	  benefits	  in	  
a	   broader	   sense.	   So,	   again,	   given	   that	   innovations	   could	   and	   potentially	   aims	   at	  
affecting	   different	   fields	   and	   perspectives,	   in	   which	   way	   we	   take	   into	   account	  
different	  normative	  settings?	  	  
	  
Although	   innovation	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  quite	   recent	  concept,	   in	   reality	  only	   its	  current	  
understanding	   in	   economical	   terms	   represents	   a	   novelty.	   Its	   origins	   are	   rooted	  
across	  a	  long	  tradition	  where	  the	  stress	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  the	  role	  and	  acceptions	  
of	   creativity5 .	   Along	   with	   the	   implementation	   of	   technology	   in	   the	   production	  
process,	   innovation	   has	   started	   to	   become	   conflated	   to	   developments	   for	   profit	  
purposes.	  As	  largely	  shown6,	  Schumpeter’s	  theory	  of	  economic	  cycles	  represents	  the	  
common	   reference	   for	   all	   those	   attempts	   of	   placing	   innovation	   into	   its	   market	  
dimension.	  But	  innovation	  seems	  to	  enclose	  a	  wider	  range	  of	  meanings	  coming	  from	  
different	  periods	  and	  according	  understandings.	  	  
Lets	  briefly	  analyse	  the	  genealogy	  of	  innovation	  in	  order	  to	  find	  useful	  issues	  for	  our	  
developments.	  
According	  to	  Benoit	  Godin7	  there	  are	  at	  least	  six	  main	  layers	  from	  which	  innovation	  
can	   be	   analysed.	   We	   could	   study	   “the	   words	   (or	   terms),	   their	   genesis	   and	  
transformation,	   and	   the	   cluster	   of	   concepts	   involved	   in	   speaking	  about	   innovation:	  
invention,	   ingenuity,	   imagination,	   creativity,	   etc”.	   We	   could	   have	   a	   look	   at	   its	  
meanings	  or	  the	  “discourses	  held	  in	  the	  name	  of	  the	  concepts”.	  The	  latter	  are	  usually	  
of	  three	  kinds:	  “innovation	  as	  a	  factor	  for	  change	  in	  society,	  innovation	  as	  progress,	  
and	  innovation	  for	  its	  own	  sake”.	  	  
If	  we	  would	  want	  to	  go	  deeper	  in	  our	  enquiry,	  and	  this	  particular	  side	  closely	  touches	  
our	   investigation,	  we	   could	   also	   analyse	   the	   norms	   on	  which	   innovation	   is	   based,	  
given	  the	   fact	   that	   it	  often	   implies	  a	  sort	  of	   tension	  between	  tradition	  and	  novelty	  
that	  raises	  conflicts	  and	  tensions.	  But	  there	  is	  also	  a	  fifth	  and	  sixth	  layer	  that	  should	  
be	  taken	  into	  account.	  The	  former	  being	  theories	  and	  conceptual	  models	  developed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo1.pdf	  
6	  See,	  Del.	  2.2	  
7	  http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo1.pdf	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to	  explain	  innovation	  and	  the	  latter	  “the	  study	  of	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  category	  
emerged:	   economic	   (trade),	   politics	   (the	   courts)	   and	   culture	   (expressiveness,	  
awareness	  of	  history)”.	  
It	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  it	  would	  be	  difficult	  to	  make	  a	  clear	  distinction	  between	  
these	   different	   sides	   of	   innovation	   and	   therefore	   it	   sounds	   more	   useful	   to	  
concentrate	   on	   different	   hints	   and	   the	   general	   main	   purpose	   of	   such	   a	   study:	   to	  
show	  how	  innovation	  embeds	  an	  excess	  of	  significance	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  unveiled.	  It	  
means	  how	  innovation	  carries	  many	  related	  meanings	  that	  are	  thicker	  than	  a	  simple	  
profit	  focused	  one.	  	  
	  
Until	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	   twentieth	   century	   innovation	  was	  a	   term	   that	  has	  been	  
extensively	  used	  only	   in	   two	  main	  circumstances.	  The	   first	   reference	   to	   innovation	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  Machiavelli’s	  Principe	  where	  he	  describes	  the	  role	  of	  innovation	  with	  
regard	   to	   the	   people.	   Machiavelli	   describes	   the	   reluctance	   of	   ‘contexts’	   to	  
innovations	  and,	  adopting	  the	  fox	  metaphor,	  describes	  the	  management	  of	  novelty	  
as	  a	  quality	  to	  be	  held	  by	  potential	  sovereigns.	  	  
In	  Bacon,	  the	  reference	  to	  innovation	  is	  even	  more	  evident	  although	  with	  a	  different	  
meaning.	  Bacon,	   that	   titles	  his	  work	  exactly	  “Of	   Innovations	   (1625)”,	  describes	   the	  
resistance	  of	  people	  to	  innovation8.	  
In	   history	   innovation	   has	   been	   always	   connected	   to	   novelty	   and	   therefore	   often	  
overlapped	   with	   invention	   or	   compared	   to	   imitation9.	   But	   a	   deeper	   theory	   on	  
innovation	   was	   produced	   in	   sociology	   only	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	  
with	  Gabriel	  Tarde10.	  The	  French	  philosopher	  attempted	  to	  explain	  social	  changes	  in	  
a	  broad	  sense	  and	  not	  at	  all	   limited	  to	   the	  market	  side	  of	   it.	  As	   recalled	  by	  Godin,	  
Tarde	   was	   interested	   in	   understanding	   social	   evolution	   with	   regard	   to	   “grammar,	  
language,	  religion,	  law,	  constitution,	  economic	  regime,	  industry	  and	  arts”.	  
But	  still	  in	  Tarde’s	  work	  as	  in	  many	  others’	  ones,	  innovation	  is	  still	  tightly	  connected	  
to	   invention	  and	  imitation.	  Whether	  the	   latter	   is	  conceived	  as	  a	  natural	  settlement	  
process	  after	   inventions,	   the	   former	  one	  was	  still	  assigned	  and	  embedded	   in	  great	  
personalities 11 	  or	   to	   some	   better-­‐developed	   people,	   nations,	   etc.,	   within	   an	  
evolutionary	   frame.12	  Also	   later	   general	   sociology	   and	   anthropology	   didn’t	   show	  
much	  interest	  in	  innovation	  as	  such	  but	  rather	  on	  imitation	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  evolution.	  
Only	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  technology	  and	  the	  consequent	  focus	  by	  sociology,	  innovation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Whitney	  (1986)	  
9	  For	  the	  history	  of	  the	  term	  see,	  http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/IntellectualNo1.pdf.	  
10	  Perhaps	  not	  a	  coincidence	  that	  came	  from	  a	  work	  called	  Les	  lois	  de	  l'imitation,	  Paris	  1890.	  
11	  In	   philosophy	  most	   of	   all	  we	   find	   a	   sort	   of	   romantic	   accent	   on	   the	   role	   of	   imagination,	  
inspiration	   etc.,	   later	   merged	   into	   a	   kind	   of	   metaphysical	   necessity	   and	   retrospectively	  
described	  as	  a	  psychological	  description.	  
12	  In	  anthropology,	  the	  ‘diffusion	  controversy’,	  (Smith	  et	  al.,	  1927).	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became	  a	  central	  topic.	  	  	  
Although	  it	  is	  true	  that	  a	  clear	  definition	  has	  not	  been	  provided	  by	  sociologists	  along	  
the	  twentieth	  century,	   it	   is	  also	  true	  that	  there	  was	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	   it	  
that	  appears	   to	  be	   interesting.	  W.	  F.	  Ogburn	  and	  S.	  C.	  Gilfillan	  were	   the	   first	  ones	  
who	  conceived	  technologies	  as	  a	  factor	  of	  social	  changes	  or	  cultural	  ones.	  If,	  one	  the	  
one	  hand,	  Ogburn	  focused	  more	  on	  the	  gap	  between	  material	  culture	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  
it	  occurred	  with	  the	  appearance	  of	  technology,	  Gilfillan	  (1935:	  6)	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  
stresses	  the	  social	  aspect	  of	  every	  technological	  development.	  For	  him	  technology	  is	  
a	   social	   process	   in	   at	   least	   three	   senses.	   The	   first	   one	   is	   the	   social	   forces	   or	  
conditions	  that	  made	  possible	  the	  development.	  A	  second	  one	  should	  be	  detected	  in	  
its	   cumulative	   aspect	   for	  which	   a	   new	   technology	   is	   always	   the	   result	   of	   previous	  
modifications,	  adaptations	  and	  similar	  small	  or	  big	  details	   that	  made	  that	  outcome	  
possible.	   Lastly,	   technology	   is	   a	   systematic	   process	   being	   developed	   in	   research	  
laboratories	  and	  structures	  specifically	  aimed	  at	  furthering	  the	  process.	  	  
If	  we	  could	  say	  that	  maybe	  Gilfillan	  forgot	  to	  mention	  explicitly	  a	  fourth	  sense,	  that	  is	  
the	   social	   outcomes	   of	   every	   technology,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   this	   statement	   was	  
probably	  omitted	  because	  it	  was	  considered	  to	  be	  obvious.	  As	  shown	  by	  Stern	  (1927),	  
Mulkay	   (1969,	   1972a,	   1972b)	   and	   to	   some	   extent	   Chaplin	   (1928)	   most	   of	   the	  
sociologists	   of	   that	   time	   agreed	   on	   implicitly	   conceiving	   innovations	   in	   technology	  
with	  regard	  to	  their	  use	  and	  the	  consequent	  social	  impact.	  Moreover,	  to	  sociologists,	  
“an	  innovator	  was	  not	  one	  who	  invents	  but	  adopts	  an	  invention	  for	  the	  first	  time”13	  
stressing	  the	  contextual	  side	  of	  every	  innovation.	  	  
Although,	  of	  course,	  there	  are	  important	  nuances	  between	  different	  thinkers,	  there	  
are	  two	  main	  aspects	  that	  appear	  peculiar	  for	  our	  investigation.	  	  
A	   first	   one	   is	   the	   social	   impact	   of	   an	   innovation	   that	   is	   considered	   to	   provoke	  
considered	  as	  cultural	  change.	  	  
A	  second	  one	   is	   the	  general	  understanding	  of	   innovation	  “as	  a	  process	  where	  both	  
the	  production	  of	  an	  invention	  and	  its	  use	  are	  discussed	  rather	  than	  contrasted”14.	  	  
To	  summarize,	  innovation	  had	  a	  wide	  understanding	  in	  terms	  of	  social	  impact	  and	  as	  
a	   cause	   of	   social	   evolution.	   And	   of	   course,	   social	   evolution,	   as	   foreseen	   by	  Marx,	  
passes	  also	  and	  mainly	  through	  economic	  progress.	  	  
	  
Economists	   made	   a	   slight	   but	   crucial	   change	   in	   the	   common	   understanding	   of	  
innovation	   conceiving	   it	   not	   simply	   as	   a	   contextualisation	  of	   an	   invention	  but	   as	   a	  
commercialization.	  
The	   relationship	  between	  economics	   and	   technology	   intended	   as	   a	   novelty	   carrier	  
could	   be	   seen	   as	   quite	   recent	   one.	   As	   noted	   by	   Godin,	   “the	   study	   of	   economic	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Godin,	  p.30.	  
14	  Op.	  cit.,	  p.	  31.	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change	   is	   not	   a	   fundamental	   concept	   in	   economics,	   as	   culture	   change	   is	   in	  
anthropology	  or	  as	  a	  social	  change	  is	  in	  sociology.	  Change	  really	  got	  into	  economics	  
with	  the	  study	  of	  technology	  as	  a	  cause	  of	  economic	  growth”15.	  	  
Although	  Schumpeter	  is	  the	  one	  usually	  indicated	  as	  the	  main	  father	  of	  innovation,	  it	  
is	  also	   true	   that	  most	  of	  his	  developments	  were	  achieved	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  previous	  
work,	  particularly	  the	  ones	  of	  Tarde	  and	  Maclaurin.	  Especially	  this	  last	  one	  defined	  in	  
specific	  terms	  the	  different	  stages	  of	  an	  innovation	  process	  from	  which	  Schumpeter	  
gained	  his	  hints.	  	  
From	   both	   these	   two	   authors,	   anyway,	   came	   the	   push	   that	   has	   driven	   innovation	  
through	   a	   mere	   economic	   track.	   Innovation	   shifted	   its	   attention	   from	   social	   and	  
cultural	   development	   coming	   from	   different	   sources,	   towards	   economic	   profit	  
depending	  on	  technological	  (initially	  also	  technical)	  progress	  at	  several	  stages	  of	  the	  
production	   process.	   From	   another	   perspective	   innovation	   passed	   from	   being	  
intended	   as	   an	   individual	   unpredictable	   talent	   to	   an	   organized,	   planned	   research	  
structure.	  	  
	  
Nowadays,	   for	   a	   series	  of	   reasons	   that	   go	  across	  economic	  developments,	   cultural	  
changes	  and	  specific	  policies,	  ”the	  measurement	  of	  innovation	  concerns	  innovation	  
in	  firms	  only”.	  Innovation	  in	  this	  sense	  goes	  along	  with	  a	  specific	  economic	  model,	  i.	  
e.	  neo-­‐liberalism,	  that	  defines	  its	  traits	  in	  a	  determined	  way.	  Innovation	  then	  is	  the	  
symbol	  of	  an	  era,	  or	  historical	  period,	  that	  focuses	  on	  efficiency	  in	  economic	  terms.	  
Paraphrasing	  Gramsci	  or	  Lukács,	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  production	  process	  model	  
of	   an	   historical	   period	   and	   its	   social	   (cultural)	   structure	   are	   always	   strictly	  
intertwined.	   As	   correctly	   shown	   by	   Schön,	   “innovation	   came	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   the	  
instrument	  of	  growth	  and	  growth	  as	  the	  occasion	  for	  and	  the	  object	  of	  innovation”16.	  	  	  
	  	  
All	   this	   historical	   investigation	   had	   two	  main	   aims.	   The	   first	   one	   to	   understand	   if	  
there	  were	   some	  other,	  wider	   or	   different,	   understandings	   of	   innovation,	   and	   the	  
second	  one	  to	  match	  the	  current	  developments	  of	  innovation	  with	  its	  original,	  better	  
say	  theoretical,	  intention.	  
The	   outcome	   seems	   to	   be	   quite	   clear.	   If	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   is	   possible	   to	   detect	  
throughout	   history	   a	   different	   and	   wider	   perspective	   on	   innovation,	   one	   that	  
enhances	   the	   social	   and	   cultural	   aspects	   and	   outcomes,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   we	  
manage	   to	   extrapolate	   a	   sort	   of	   key-­‐word	   underlying	   the	   recent	   economic	  
developments	  of	  innovation,	  the	  one	  of	  efficiency.	  
	  
At	  this	  point,	  considering	  these	  two	  aspects,	  and	  taking	  into	  account	  how	  innovation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  Op.	  cit.,	  p.	  32.	  
16	  Quoted	  in	  Maesschalck	  &	  Lenoble	  (2003).	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seems	   to	  be	  not	   efficient	   (in	   economic	   terms),	   to	  understand	  whether	  maybe	   it	   is	  
exactly	  that	  cultural	  side	  and	  an	  unbalanced	  relation	  with	  it	  that	  contributes	  to	  this	  
inefficiency.	  
	  	  
2.1.1.	  Current	  understanding	  and	  limits	  of	  innovation	  
	  
To	  speak	  about	  a	  general	  theory	  of	  innovation	  seems	  to	  make	  little	  sense	  for	  several	  
reasons	  as	  suggested	  by	  Moldaschl:	  “The	  primary	  objective	  here	  is	  not	  to	  explain	  the	  
drivers	  and	  logic	  of	  innovation	  (if	  such	  do	  exist),	  or	  to	  predict	  the	  course	  of	  technical,	  
social	   and	   socio-­‐technical	   change,	   but	   rather	   to	   grasp	   and	   explain	   the	   relative	  
capability	   and	   achievement	   of	   social	   entities	   (organizations,	   regions,	   countries,	  
persons)	  when	  dealing	  with	  drivers	  of	  change”	  	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   though,	   to	   describe	   and	   define	   a	   theory	   of	   specific	   innovations	  
doesn’t	   seem	   to	   go	   further	   for	   the	   same	   reasons.	   An	   innovation	   per	   se	   could	   be	  
embodied	  in	  so	  many	  different	  things	  that	  it	  results	  impossible	  to	  face	  them	  in	  one	  
same	  way.	  Innovation,	  as	  we	  seen,	  is	  about	  novelty,	  or	  as	  a	  definition	  would	  sound,	  
is	   about	  mixing	   different	   factors	   coming	   from	  different	   fields	   in	   a	   completely	   new	  
way.	   Besides,	   the	   level	   of	   combination	   and	   displacement	   contributes	   to	   define	   if	  
innovation	   could	   be	   considered	   radical	   (disruptive)	   or	   incremental.	   Accordingly	   to	  
define	   a	   theory	  of	   innovation	   seems	   to	  be	   too	   ambitious	   to	  be	   correct	   and	  at	   the	  
same	  time	  an	  analysis	  of	  all	  innovations	  appears	  an	  endless	  and	  ineffective	  operation.	  	  
What	   we	   could	   do	   instead,	   is	   maybe	   to	   draw	   the	   lines	   of	   innovation	   within	  
technological	  domain	  and	  connect	  it	  to	  the	  current	  understanding	  of	  it	  within	  RRI.	  
	  
All	   the	   previous	   analysis	   shows	   that	   nowadays	   innovation	   represents	   the	  
marketization	  of	  an	  already	  existing	  process	  or	  product17.	  Ironically	  we	  could	  say	  that	  
innovation	  represents	  itself	  an	  innovation,	  or	  at	  least	  a	  new	  understanding	  of	  it.	  	  
Thus,	   this	   simple	  consideration	  paves	   the	  way	  to	  many	   important	  consequences	   in	  
order	  to	  assess	  innovation	  and	  to	  propose	  some	  alternatives.	  A	  first	  one	  could	  be	  the	  
fact	   that	   innovation,	   as	   it	   is	   commonly	   conceived,	   represents	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	   a	  
larger	  frame.	  Being	  then	  considered	  as	  the	  only	  possible	  acception	  surely	  casts	  some	  
shadows	   in	   being	   genuinely	   addressed.	   However,	   without	   the	   need	   to	   reject	   this	  
market	   declination	   we	   could	   at	   the	   same	   time	   affirm	   the	   possibility	   of	   its	  
modification	  or	  enlargement.	  Innovation,	  though	  it	  appears	  to	  be	  strictly	  connected	  
to	   technological	   innovation,	   cannot	   be	   conflated	   to	   an	   understanding	   where	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  M.	   Moldaschl,	   ‘Why	   Innovation	   Theories	   Make	   no	   Sense’,	   Papers	   and	   Preprints	   of	   the	  
Department	   of	   Innovation	   Research	   and	   Sustainable	   Resource	   Management	   (BWL	   IX),	  
Chemnitz	   University	   of	   Technology	   No.	   9/2010.	  
http://www.csiic.ca/PDF/WP_2010_09InnoST_eng.pdf.	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technology	   is	   a	   product/process	   that	   must	   be	   only	   profitable.	   If	   a	   merely	   profit-­‐
driven	   innovation	   has	   shown	   to	   be	   potentially	   counterproductive	   is	   because	  
innovation	   has	   many	   different	   direct	   and	   indirect	   layers	   that	   require	   a	   larger	  
structure	  of	  development.	  We	  can’t	  further	  neither	  the	  discussion	  on	  the	  normative	  
basis	   of	   economies	   as	   layers	   directly	   connected	   to	   it,	   nor	   the	   multiple	   layers	   on	  
which	  an	  innovation	  could	  and	  should	  occur	  due	  to	  the	  objective	  of	  this	  document.	  It	  
is	  nevertheless	  important	  to	  understand	  how	  most	  of	  the	  problems	  with	  innovation	  
come	  not	  from	  the	  concept	  itself	  but	  from	  its	  reductive	  understanding	  that	  it	  also	  a	  
reductive	  understanding	  of	  economy	  itself.	  
	  
There	   are	   many	   other	   areas	   or	   frames	   where	   an	   innovation	   could	   occur	   and,	  
furthermore,	   an	   innovation,	   for	   to	  be	  efficient	   and	   therefore	   successful,	   has	   to	  be	  
conceived	   as	   a	   general	   development,	   not	   a	   single	   one.	   It’s	   not	   one	   side	   of	   the	  
normative	   structure	  on	  which	   societies	  are	  built	   that	   can	  be	  privileged	  against	   the	  
others,	  because	  other	  normativities	  will	  raise	  their	  claims	  against	  it.	  
Lets	  try	  to	  sustain	  our	  hypothesis	  through	  wider	  definitions	  and	  deeper	  depiction	  of	  
what	  innovation	  is.	  
	  
Although	   the	   acceptions	   provided	   in	   the	   last	   years	   on	   the	   concept	   of	   innovation,	  
without	   affecting	   the	   main	   core	   of	   a	   common	   understanding,	   are	   more	   or	   less	  
different	   just	   in	   terms	   of	   words,	   it	   is	   still	   important	   to	   briefly	   highlight	   some	  
implications	   contained	   in	   those	  definitions.	  One	  of	   the	  most	  articulated	   is	   the	  one	  
provided	   by	   Jeroen	   van	   den	   Hoven	  when	   he	   defines	   innovation	   as	   “an	   activity	   or	  
process	   which	   may	   lead	   to	   previously	   unknown	   designs	   pertaining	   either	   to	   the	  
physical	  world	   (e.g.,	   designs	   of	   buildings	   and	   infrastructure),	   the	   conceptual	  world	  
(social	  and	  legal	  institutions,	  procedures	  and	  organization)	  or	  combination	  of	  these,	  
which	  –	  when	  implemented	  –	  expand	  the	  set	  of	  relevant	  feasible	  options	  for	  action,	  
either	   physical	   or	   cognitive”18.	   This	   definition	   highlights	   the	   ‘multiverse’	   nature	   of	  
innovation	   in	   terms	   of	   products	   and	   areas.	   As	   correctly	   noted	   by	   van	   den	   Hoven,	  
although	   innovations	   usually	   “concern	   technical	   artifacts	   or	   technical	   system,	   […]	  
they	  are	  not	   limited	  to	   the	  material	  domain,	   -­‐	  and	  therefore	  they	  –	  allow	  us	   to	  do	  
things	  we	  could	  not	  do	  before,	  or	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  about	  things	  we	  have	  not	  thought	  
before”	  (Owen	  et	  al.,	  2013).	  
	  
It	  appears	  already	  interesting	  for	  the	  level	  at	  which	  it	  is	  going	  to	  affect	  a	  wide	  range	  
of	   people.	   If	   an	   innovation	   would	   have	   been	   something	   concerning	   only	   a	   mere	  
material	  object	   it	  could	  have	  been	  eventually	  bypassed.	  Some	  material	   innovations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  Owen	  et	  al.,	  (eds.)	  (2013),	  Responsible	  Innovation.	  Managing	  the	  Responsible	  
Emergence	  of	  Science	  and	  Innovation	  in	  Society,	  Chirchester,	  Wiley	  2013.	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haven’t	  changed	  our	   life	   in	  such	  a	  radical	  way	  to	  require	  a	  thicker	  embedment.	  An	  
innovation	   that	   changes	   our	   conceptual	   frame	   on	   the	   contrary,	   always	   calls	   into	  
question	   for	   an	   active	   participation	   by	   the	   largest	   number	   of	   people	   potentially	  
affected.	   But	   assuming	   a	   large	   participation	   doesn’t	   represents	   a	   condition	   of	  
legitimacy	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   participation	   has	   to	   be	   freed	   by	   potential	   ideological	  
stances	   and	   therefore	   requires	   a	   level	   of	   reflexivity	   that	   can	   provide	   not	   only	   its	  
necessity	   but	   also	   its	   sufficiency.	   In	   this	   sense	   the	   kind	   of	   participation	   that	   this	  
definition	   implies	   is	   a	   thick	   one.	   If	   an	   innovation,	   moreover,	   affects	   our	   actual	  
thinking	  framework	  then	  it	  will	  be	  exactly	  that	  frame	  that	  we	  will	  have	  to	  pass	  under	  
judgment.	  Following	  these	  two	  definitions	  and	  their	  implications	  we	  already	  see	  the	  
path	  we	  might	  need	  to	  follow.	  But	  lets	  not	  put	  the	  cart	  before	  the	  horses	  and	  lets	  try	  
to	  focus	  on	  the	  structure	  of	  innovation.	  
In	  order	  to	  connect	  these	  definitions	  of	   innovation	  to	  a	  broader	  and	  deeper	  frame,	  
we	   need	   to	   go	   further	   on	   analyzing	   the	   structure	   of	   innovation,	   to	   try	   and	  
understand	  its	  traits,	  tendencies	  and	  nature.	  
After	   that,	  we	   should	   be	   able	   to	   see	   if	   there	   is	   an	   intrinsic	  mistake	   or	   it’s	   just	   an	  
instrumental	  manipulation	  of	  innovation	  that	  makes	  it	  so	  specifically	  focused.	  
As	  described	  by	  Aygen	  Kurt	  &	  Penny	  Duquenoy19	  there	  are	  at	   least	   four	  different,	  
though	   interlaced,	   characteristics	   that	  we	   should	   keep	   in	  mind	  when	  we	   consider	  
innovation:	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• Systemic	  character	  of	  innovation.	  
• Collective	  roles	  innovation	  actors	  -­‐	   innovation	  activities	  in	  organisations	  (e.g.	  
firms)	  depend	  on	  external	  sources.	  
• Hence	   innovation	   activity	   occurs	   in	   a	   system	  where	   several	   different	   actors	  
play	  a	  role.	  
• Firm	   is	   the	   key	   innovator	   –	   its	   survival	   depends	   on	   its	   capacity	   to	   adapt	   to	  
changes	  in	  the	  external	  environment	  and	  to	  influence	  it	  (Freeman	  and	  Soete	  
1997).	  	  	  
	  
Table	  1.	  Innovation	  structure,	  Aygen	  Kurt	  &	  Penny	  Duquenoy	  
Innovation	  has	  a	  systemic	  character	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  occur	  on	  a	  regular	  
base.	   Therefore	   it	   requires	   a	   particular	   attention	   as	   a	   constant	   phenomenon.	   It	   is	  
also	   true	   that	   innovation	   affects	   a	   system	   composed	   by	   different	   actors	   and	  
therefore	  has,	  and	  has	  to	  be	  seen	  from,	  mostly	  a	  pluralistic	  point	  of	  view.	  Although	  it	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Presentation	  given	  at	  “ICT	  that	  makes	  the	  difference”,	  Bruxelles,	  November	  2009.	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has	  been	  lately	  reduced	  to	  this	  side	  of	  its	  implementation,	  we	  are	  not	  sure	  we	  could	  
agree	   in	   considering	   innovation	   in	   its	   ‘firm’	   reduction.	   Innovation	   is	   developed	   in	  
research	  of	  all	  kind	  and	  doesn’t	  have	   to	  be	   reduced	  to	  a	   firm.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   firms’	  
survival	  depends	  on	  their	  capacity	  to	  innovate	  but	  we	  could	  say	  that	  the	  other	  way	  
round	  is	  equally	  true.	  	  
	  
According	   to	   Kurt	   &	   Duquenoy,	   the	   structure	   of	   an	   innovation	   system	   is	   always	  
based	   on	   elements,	   relationships	   and	   processes,	   but	   these	   systems	   could	   vary	  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  INNOVATION	  
Structure	  (common)	   Operation	  (different)	  
Elements	   –	   institutions	   and	  
organisations	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  firms	  
Specialisation	  –	  what	  they	  do	  
Relationships	   –	   focus	   on	   inter-­‐
organisational	  networks	  
Institutions	   and	   routines	   –	   how	   they	  
operate	  
Processes	  –	  focus	  on	  interactive	  learning	   Mode	  of	  innovation	  –	  how	  they	  innovate	  
(e.g.	  integrated	  or	  isolated?)	  
	  
Table	  2.	  The	  structure	  and	  the	  operation	  of	  Innovation	  system	  
For	   the	   two	  authors	   then,	   a	   further	  division	  of	   innovation	   structures,	   according	   to	  
the	  institutional	  frame	  they	  are	  embedded	  in,	  could	  be	  provided,	  following	  Schoser	  
(1999):	  
	  
	   	  
Directly	  involved	  with	  the	  
innovation	  process	  
	  
Indirectly	   involved	   with	  
the	  innovation	  process	  
Informal	  institutions	   Informal	   cognitive	   and	  
behavioural	   patterns	   in	  
the	  innovation	  process	  
	  
Cultural	   and	   historical	  
factors	  
	  
Formal	  Institutions	   Innovation	   network	   in	   a	  
narrow	  sense	  
Formal	   institutions	   in	   the	  




Table	  3.	  Division	  of	  innovation	  structures	  according	  to	  institutional	  frame	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This	   is	   more	   or	   less	   the	   general	   structure	   of	   innovations,	   the	   way	   they	   generally	  
proceed	   and	   the	   frame	   in	   which	   they	   are	   embedded.	   This	   helps	   us	   a	   bit	   to	  
understand	   innovation	   in	   its	   structural	   frame	   but	   doesn’t	   still	   tell	   us	   a	   lot	   with	  
regards	  to	  its	  dynamics.	  We	  need	  then	  to	  understand	  in	  which	  way	  we	  should	  define	  
our	  enquiry	  not	  only	  in	  a	  spatial	  mode	  but	  also	  in	  a	  time	  one.	  	  	  
	  
The	  analysis	  provided	  by	   Jack	   Stilgoe	  on	   innovation20	  makes	  a	  bit	   clearer	  what	   the	  
most	  common	  questions	  in	  this	  sense	  could	  be,	  and	  why	  there	  is	  such	  a	  strong	  need	  
for	   framing	   innovation	   in	   a	   different	   way.	   The	   problem	   that	   often	   seems	   to	   be	  
connected	  with	  innovation,	  if	  we	  would	  like	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  in	  ontological	  terms	  is	  its	  
lack	  of	  reflexivity	  or,	  better	  say,	  its	  avoidance	  of	  ethical	  reflexivity.	  
Stilgoe	   lists	   the	   following	   ‘normative’	   issues	   in	   order	   to	   detect	   if	   an	   innovation	  
process	  is	  conducted	  through	  a	  reflexive	  attitude	  or,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  lacks	  it.	  
He	   divides	   innovation	   in	   three	   layers,	   namely	   the	   products	   of	   innovation,	   the	  
processes	  that	  are	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  are	  started.	  
	  
The	  questions	  are	  the	  following:	  
What	  are	  the	  products,	  the	  results	  of	  innovation?	  
How	  the	  research	  process	  is	  started	  and	  pursued?	  
What	  are	  the	  purposes	  of	  innovation?	  
	  




• What	   are	   the	   likely	   risks	  
and	  benefits?	  	  
• How	   will	   the	   risks	   and	  
benefits	  be	  distributed?	  
• What	   other	   impacts	   can	  
we	  predict?	  
• How	   might	   these	   change	  
in	  the	  future?	  
• What	   don’t	   we	   know	  
about?	  




• How	   should	   research	  
and	   innovation	   take	  
place?	  
• How	  should	  standards	  
be	   drawn	   up	   and	  
applied?	  	  
• How	   should	   risks	   and	  
benefits	   be	   defined	  
and	  measured?	  
• Who	  is	  in	  control?	  




• Why	   should	   this	  
research	   be	  
undertaken?	  
• Who	  will	  benefit?	  
• What	   are	   the	  
alternatives?	  
• Who	   gets	   to	  
decide?	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  Theoretical	   Workshop	   held	   in	   Paris,	   April	   2013.	   The	   PPT	   is	   avalaible	   at	   the	   following	  
address,	  http://www.great-­‐project.eu/.	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know	  about?	  
	  
responsibility	   if	  
things	  go	  wrong?	  
What	  if	  we	  are	  wrong?	  
	  
Table	  4.	  Layers	  of	  Innovation	  (Theoretical	  Workshop	  held	  in	  Paris,	  April	  2013,	  analysis	  provided	  by	  Jack	  Stilgoe	  
on	  innovation).	  
	  
All	  these	  questions	  (that	  we	  could	  call	  normative)	  should	  help,	  according	  to	  Stilgoe,	  
to	   understand	   the	   complexity	   of	   potential	   consequences	   implied	   by	   innovation.	  
Furthermore,	  they	  should	  provide	  an	  ideal,	  though	  starting,	  reflexive	  background	  in	  
order	   to	   define	   those	   same	   consequences	   and	  most	   of	   all	   the	   responsible	   actors.	  
What	   Stilgoe	   tries	   to	   bring	   to	   attention	   is	   exactly	   that	   normative	   side	   often	  
connected	  with	  innovation.	  	  
Although	  it	  provides	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  questions	  it	  seems	  a	  fundamental	  table	  in	  order	  
to	   unveil	   the	   structure	   of	   a	   research	   process	   and	   define	   how	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
process	  is	  managed.	  	  
Such	   a	   reflexive	   frame	   seems	   then	   to	   be	   a	   necessary	   condition	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	  
certain	   recurrent	   and	   endemic	   phenomena	   that	   could	   fossilize	   in	   to	   what	   Stilgoe	  
calls	  “pathologies”.	  
In	   fact,	   according	   to	   Stilgoe	   and	   to	   other	   authors	   that	   he	   cites,	   a	   series	   of	  
consequences	   are	   already	  embedded	   in	   innovation	   itself	  when	  not	  developed	   in	   a	  
‘reflexive’	  way.	  
	  
Pathologies	  of	  Innovation	   	  
– Late	  lessons	  from	  early	  warnings	  (EEA)	  
– The	  dilemma	  of	  control	  (David	  Collingridge)	  
– Systemic	  risk	  and	  normal	  accidents	  (Charles	  Perrow)	  
– Technological	  lock-­‐in	  (Paul	  David)	  
– Myths	  of	  techno-­‐fixes	  (Dan	  Sarewitz)	  
– Altered	  nature	  of	  human	  action	  (Hans	  Jonas)	  
– Organised	  irresponsibility	  (Ulrich	  Beck)	  
– Expectations	  and	  Imaginaries	  (Brown,	  Hedgecoe,	  Jasanoff,	  Wynne	  et	  
al.)	  
– Deficit	  models	  of	  publics	  (Brian	  Wynne)	  
– Society	  as	  a	  laboratory	  (Krohn	  and	  Weyer)	  
	  
Table	  5.	  Pathologies	  of	  Innovation	  
If	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  we	   could	   definitely	   agree	  with	   this	   list	   of	   pathologies	   and	  we	  
could	  also	  understand	  the	  importance	  of	  enacting	  a	  reflexive	  process	  in	  order	  to	  try	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to	   avoid	   them,	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  we	   are	   not	   sure	   that	  we	   could	   share	   the	   same	  
understanding	  of	  reflexivity	  that	  Stilgoe	  adopts.	  	  
Indeed,	   if	   he	   rightly	   point	   out	   the	   necessity	   of	   a	   reflexive	   process	   within	   and	   on	  
innovation,	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Stilgoe	   defines	   the	   reflexive	   frame	   of	   innovation	  
resembles	  a	  common	  understanding	  of	   it.	   Innovation	   is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  process	  
that	   should	  be	  warned	  or	   saved	   from	   risks	  and,	   accordingly,	   the	  kind	  of	   reflexivity	  
that	   is	   felt	   to	   be	   required	   is	   one	   on	   calculations	   of	   potential	   harms	   and	   eventual	  
responsibilities.	  This	  layer	  of	  question	  represents	  a	  fundamental	  one	  but	  at	  the	  same	  
it	  is	  only	  the	  basic	  one.	  To	  assess	  innovation	  consequences	  in	  terms	  of	  risk	  could	  lead	  
to	  the	  same	  point	  where	  most	  of	  the	  problems	  start,	  the	  one	  where	  responsibility	  is	  
reduced	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  risks	  and	  their	  eventual	  compensations.	  
	  
For	  now,	  what	  we	  understood	  and	  what	  assumes	  a	  fundamental	  role,	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  
innovation	   can	   be	   handled	   in	   an	   ethically	   free	   way	   or	   conceive	   ethics	   in	   a	   really	  
narrow	  way.	  Accordingly,	   the	   first	  step	   is	   to	  understand	  how	   innovation	  requires	  a	  
kind	  of	  reflexivity	  that	  implies	  logically	  a	  large	  participation.	  What	  is	  not	  clear	  is	  how	  
to	  enact	  this	  participative	  reflexivity	  and,	  most	  of	  all,	  what	  does	  it	  mean.	  	  
	  
To	  accomplish	  this	  ‘action	  side’	  of	  our	  investigation,	  the	  depiction	  provided	  by	  John	  
Bessant,	   (Owen	   et	   al.,	   2013)	   helps	   us	   in	   discovering	   four	   possible	   dimensions	   of	  
innovation	   on	  which	  we	   could	   act.	   According	   to	   Bessant,	   innovation	   is	   formed	  by,	  
and	   consequently	   we	   could	  modify,	   the	   product,	   the	   process,	   the	   position	   or	   the	  
paradigm.	   As	   explained	   by	   the	   table	   6,	   innovation	   is	   set	   in	   motion	   by	   means	   of	  
certain	   conditions	   (paradigm)	   that	   affect	   its	   process	   and	   consequently	   both	   the	  
products	  that	  will	  be	  offered	  as	  the	  place	  in	  which	  they	  will	  be	  offered.	  	  
We	  can’t	  change	  the	  products	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  are	  independent	  from	  guidance	  
as	  technique	  in	  itself.	  The	  context	  is	  the	  one	  giving	  the	  last	  word	  on	  innovation	  and	  
it’s	  usually	  rationalistic	  foreseen	  instead	  of	  being	  asked.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  INNOVATION	  
Product	   Changes	  in	  the	  things	  (products/services)	  that	  an	  organization	  
offers.	  
Process	   Changes	   in	   the	   ways	   in	   which	   products	   and	   services	   are	  
created	  and	  delivered.	  	  
Position	   Changes	   in	   the	   context	   in	   which	   the	   products/services	   are	  
introduced.	  
Paradigm	   Changes	   in	   the	   underlying	   mental	   (business)	   models	   which	  
frame	  what	  the	  organization	  does.	  
	  
Table	  6.	  Means	  of	  setting	  Innovation	  in	  motion.	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According	   to	   this	   table	  of	   innovation,	  wanting	   to	   change	   something	   in	   the	   current	  
innovation	  structure	   implies	  to	  act	  on	  one	  of	  these	   layers.	   If	  we	  look	  at	  them	  from	  
our	  perspective,	  one	  aiming	  at	  establishing	  an	  alternative	  conception	  of	  responsible	  
innovation,	  then	  the	  choice	  becomes	  much	  narrower.	  More	  precisely,	  we	  can	  easily	  
see	  how	  all	  these	  stages	  of	  an	  innovation	  process	  are	  strictly	  intertwined/connected	  
and	  therefore	  taking	  into	  account	  one	  implies	  to	  question	  also	  the	  others.	  And	  it	   is	  
also	  true	  that	  all	  these	  layers	  are	  not	  synchronic	  but	  rather	  diachronic.	  For	  it	  would	  
be	  more	  sensible	  to	  act	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  in	  order	  to	  influence	  the	  other	  points.	  It	  is	  
also	  true	  that	  they	  kind	  of	  assume	  a	  hierarchy	  due	  to	  their	  own	  purposes.	  As	  we	  will	  
see	  after,	  the	  position	  assumes	  a	  particular	  and	  illuminating	  role.	  
	  
This	   idea	   seems	   to	  be	   logical	   and	   therefore	   correct	   for	  many,	   connected,	   reasons.	  
Lets	   imagine,	   for	   instance,	   that	  we	  have	  an	   innovative	  product	   that	   can’t	  be	   really	  
described	   as	   an	   example	   of	   responsible	   innovation,	   a	   product	   that	   brought	   bad	  
consequences	   or	   turned	   out	   to	   have	   negative	   side	   effects.	   If	   we’d	   analyse	   the	  
product	  we	  would	  acquire	  only	   the	  existing	  outcomes	  and	  the	  only	   thing	  we	  could	  
detect	   is	  what	   the	  people	  have	   rejected.	  But	   the	  products	  would	  be	  already	   there	  
and	  the	  damage	  as	  well.	  Moreover	  a	  product,	  a	  technological	  product	  in	  our	  specific	  
case,	   often	   cannot	   be	   foreseen	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   technique	   and	   its	   development	  
cannot	  be	  predicted	  neither	  blocked.	  
	  
The	  GMO	  example	  shows	  us	  exactly	  how	  a	  rejection	  ex-­‐post	  facto,	  although	  helpful	  
to	   set	   in	  motion	   a	   reflexive	  process,	   doesn’t	   really	   solve	   the	  problem.	   This	  way	  of	  
coping	  with	  potential	  problems	  doesn’t	  tell	  us	  more	  than	  what	  we	  already	  can	  see,	  a	  
sort	  of	  tautological	  analysis.	  	  
At	  the	  same	  time	  analysing	  the	  product	  side	  of	  innovation	  doesn’t	  make	  us	  advance	  
in	  our	  investigation.	  It	  would	  be	  only	  a	  never-­‐ending	  quantitative	  data	  collection	  of	  
what	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  bad	  or	  what	  brought	  in	  actual	  terms	  negative	  side	  effects.	  It	  
represents	   a	   perfect	   starting	   point	   only	   to	   understand	   what	   is	   hiding	   behind	   the	  
success	  or	  failure	  of	  a	  product,	  and	  this	  leads	  us	  exactly	  to	  analyse	  a	  different	  stage	  
of	  innovation.	  	  
	  
What	  we	  can	  act	  on	  is	  not	  then	  the	  product	  itself,	  but	  what	  facilitates	  innovation,	  its	  
condition	  of	  possibility.	  
Going	  deeper	   in	  our	  understanding	  of	   innovation	  shows	  us	   in	   fact	   that	  analysing	  a	  
product	   implies	   automatically	   calling	   into	   question	   the	   entire	   process	   that	   made	  
possible	   to	   create	   such	  a	  product.	   This	  upgrade	  allows	  a	  more	  general	   analysis	  on	  
how	   the	   research	  process	   is	   conceived	   and	  managed	   in	  order	   to	  understand	  what	  
are	   the	   procedures	   that	   structure	   the	   product	   creation.	   Innovation	   will	   flow	   no	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matter	  what	  we	  do;	  the	  point	  is	  not	  to	  block	  it	  but	  to	  structure	  it.	  
And	  continuing	  along	  this	  path	   it	  make	  even	  more	  sense	  to	  analyse	  the	  underlying	  
paradigm	  that	  forge	  innovation	  processes.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  true	  that	  it	  is	  the	  process	  that	  
in	  practical	  terms	  contributes	  to	  define	  innovation	  according	  to	  certain	  criteria.	  But	  it	  
is	  also	  true	  that	  the	  process	  is	  already	  present	  in	  its	  complex	  structure.	  Therefore,	  it	  
doesn’t	  seem	  to	  be	  sufficient	  to	  act	  on	  one	  point	  within	  the	  process	  cause	  others	  will	  
stay	  the	  same	  creating	  only	  confusion	  when	  not	  even	  paving	  the	  way	  to	  ideological	  
exploitation	  of	  tools.	  Besides,	  the	  criteria	  according	  to	  which	  we	  could	  decide	  where	  
to	  act	  and	  in	  which	  way	  would	  appear	  at	  least	  arbitrary	  and	  potentially	  ineffective.	  
Accordingly,	  we	  need	  to	  go	  deeper	  and	  analyse	  the	  paradigm	  underlying	  innovations	  
This	  could	  be	  done	  only	  through	  means	  of	  a	  normative	  background	  against	  which	  we	  
could	  compare	  correspondences	  and	  discrepancies.	   It	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  this	  
normative	  background	   is	  not	  an	  arbitrary	   itself,	   but	   rather	   is	   inductively	   gained	  by	  
the	  current	  situation	  and	  some	  basic	  assumptions	  that	  are	  not	  at	  all	  narrowed	  in	  an	  
ethical	  dimension.	  As	  we	  showed	  before,	  an	  innovation	  that	  throws	  products	  on	  the	  
context	   quite	   probably	  will	   encounter	   several	   complicated	   problems.	   In	   this	   sense	  
our	   normative	   background	  will	   be	   one	   that	  won’t	   settle	   any	   precondition	   but	   the	  
one	  of	  opening	  the	  frame	  for	  new	  conditions.	  
	  
Without	   going	   to	   far	   in	   our	   analysis	   we	   could	   easily	   detect	   the	   differences	   in	  
paradigms,	   namely	   “the	   underlying	   mental	   models	   which	   frame	   what	   the	  
organization	   does”,	   according	   for	   example,	   if	   they	   proceed	   following	   avoidance	   of	  
risks	   or	   if	   they	   are	   more	   concerned	   on	   the	   social	   effects	   that	   can	   occur	   with	   an	  
innovation.	   Therefore,	   acting	   on	   those	   paradigms	   implies	   to	   set	   a	   different	  
development	   of	   innovation	   process	   and,	   consequently,	   but	   not	   necessarily,	   the	  
creation	  of	  products	  that	  could	  have	  at	  least	  less	  counter	  effects	  on	  the	  contexts.	  
	  
If	   it	   is	  clearer	  now	  why	   it	  would	  be	  more	  sensible	  to	  direct	  our	  efforts	  on	  one	  side	  
instead	  of	  the	  other	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  at	  all	  in	  which	  way	  we	  could	  or	  should	  do	  this.	  Our	  
idea	   is	   that	   the	  4	   layers	  of	   innovation,	  are	  different	  moments	  of	   the	  same	  process	  
and	  most	  of	  all	  the	  same	  frame.	  
As	  largely	  agreed	  (O’Sullivan	  2008,	  Godin	  2008),	  what	  innovation	  requires	  and	  what	  
makes	   it	   different	   from	   an	   invention,	   is	   surely	   its	   relation	   to	   a	   context	  where	   the	  
specific	  innovation	  will	  be	  adopted21.	  	  
Furthermore,	   an	   innovation,	   doesn’t	   assume	   a	   creation	   but	   simply	   an	   original	  
combination	   of	   existing	   materials,	   or	   the	   application	   of	   existing	   novelties,	   and	  
therefore	   can	   be	   better	   assessed	   and	   discussed	   than	   a	   completely	   new	   invention.	  
This	  could	  also	  mean	  that	  innovation	  can	  be	  changed	  and	  handled	  along	  a	  time	  line.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21	  D.	  O’Sullivan,	  L.	  Dooley,	  Applying	  Innovation,	  Sage	  2008	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But,	  being	   innovation	   strictly	   tied	   to	  a	   context	  where	   it	   founds	   life	  means	   that	   it’s	  
exactly	   from	   a	   context	   perspective	   that	   we	   should	   depart.	   The	   product	   of	   an	  
innovation	  tells	  us	  that	  the	  context	  is	  perfectly	  able	  to	  reject	  it	  or	  to	  accept	  it	  like	  it	  
happened	   with	   famous	   cases	   as	   GMO	   or	   nanotechnologies.	   The	   problem	   then	  
appears	   to	   give	   the	   context	   a	   stronger	   role	   in	   the	   innovation	   development.	  
Accordingly	   then,	   changing	  or	  modifying	   innovation	  means	   to	   radically	   change	  our	  
perspective.	   But	   the	   current	   perspective	   seems	   to	   take	   in	   little	   consideration	   the	  
context	   reaction	   to	   an	   innovation	   at	   least	   in	   planning	   terms.	   What	   is	   felt	   to	   be	  
necessary	   is	   just	  a	   technical	  or	  management	  exploitation	  of	   the	  process	   that	  could	  
lead	   innovation	   to	   be	  more	   and	  more	   profitable.	  What	   is	   actually	   pursued	   is	   the	  
development	  of	  a	  theory	  of	  innovation	  able	  to	  increase	  profits	  or	  technical	  progress.	  
But,	  as	   shown	  by	  Moldashl	   (Moldashl	  2010),	   to	   think	  about	  a	   theory	  of	   innovation	  
makes	  no	  sense.	   Innovation	   in	   itself	   involves	   too	  many	  different	  aspects	  and	   fields	  
that	   if	   conceived	   only	   in	   economic	   terms,	   it	   becomes	   impossible	   to	   develop	   a	  
common	   structure.	   Innovation,	   too	   often	   reduced	   to	   economic	   innovation	   in	  
Schumpeterian	   terms,	   implies	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   social	   progress	   that	   cannot	   be	  
conflated	   to	   an	   economic	   profit.	   What	   we	   need	   to	   think	   instead	   is,	   according	   to	  
Moldashl,	   the	   contextual	   primacy	   that	   every	   innovation	   involves	   and	   therefore	   its	  
normative	  outcomes.	  	  
In	  this	  sense	  we	  need	  to	  act	  on	  the	  innovation	  frame,	  on	  its	  paradigm	  and	  process,	  in	  
terms	  of	  enacting	  and	  enhancing	  the	  context	  participation.	  	  	  
	  
Applying	   this	   alternative	   understanding	   of	   innovation	   in	   research	   we	   can	   already	  
obtain	   a	   main	   methodological,	   though	   formal	   and	   just	   scratched,	   way	   of	   how	   to	  
proceed	   in	   our	   investigation.	   Innovation	   is	   too	   often	   reduced	   to	   its	   economic,	  
Schumpeterian	   acception	   and	   tends	   to	   ignore	   what	   the	   context	   or	   privilege	   the	  
acceptance	   of	   innovations	   instead	   of	   their	   acceptability.	   The	   latter	   implies	   a	  
normative	  stance	  that	  turns	  out	  to	  represent	  a	  key-­‐issue	  for	  innovation.	  In	  order	  to	  
then	  modify	   this	  understanding	  we	  need	  to	  act	  on	  the	  earlier	  phase	  of	   innovation,	  
the	  paradigm	  underlying	  its	  process	  and	  we	  need	  to	  do	  it	  in	  direction	  of	  the	  context.	  
This	  will	  help	  us	  to	  overcome	  the	  limits	   in	  terms	  of	   logic,	  ethics	  and	  practice	  under	  
which	  innovation	  seems	  to	  be	  caught.	  	  
But,	   in	  order	  to	  overcome	  those	  limits,	  we	  still	  need	  to	  consider	  and	  tackle	  a	  lot	  of	  
different	  aspects.	  In	  fact	  there	  could	  be	  several	  ways	  of	  taking	  into	  consideration	  the	  
context	  and	  be	  attentive	  to	  its	  normative	  dimension.	  That	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  they	  all	  
have	  to	  be	  good.	  We	  will	  see	  how	  problematic	  this	  could	  be.	  
	  
Before	  applying	  our	  hints	  to	  responsible	  innovation	  in	  research	  then,	  we	  need	  to	  fill	  
the	  form	  with	  some	  contents,	  or	  better	  said,	  to	  extract	  other	  core	  problems	  at	  the	  
heart	   of	   a	   new,	   effective	   conception	   of	   responsible	   innovation.	   We	   will	   try	   to	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accomplish	   this	   attempt	   by	   taking	   briefly	   into	   account	   responsibility	   and	   some	  
suggestions	   on	   how	   it	   could	   be	   conceived.	   Then	   we	   will	   delineate	   what	   is	   the	  
underlying	   problem	   that	   we	   should	   consider	   if	   we	   want	   to	   modify	   paradigms	   of	  
innovation	  in	  order	  to	  think	  of	  an	  alternative	  frame	  for	  RRI.	  




Although	   is	   often	   conceived	   and	   reduced	   to	   a	   single	   acception,	   responsibility	   is	   a	  
concept	   with	   a	   wide-­‐range	   of	   interpretations	   and	   acceptions,	   depending	   on	   the	  
context,	  historical	  period,	  and	  timeline	  we	  take	  into	  account.	  	  
We	   believe	   it	   is	   important	   to	   highlight	   some	   of	   them	   in	   order	   to	   draw	   out	   some	  
indications	  from	  specific	  understandings	  or	  misuses	  of	  the	  concept.	  
	  
Nicole	  Vincent,	  recalling	  Hart’s	  explanation,	  lists	  six	  different	  possible	  acceptions	  of	  
responsibility	   detectable	   in	   the	   actual	   scenario22.	  Capacity,	   causal,	   role,	   outcome,	  
virtue	   and	   liability	   exhaust,	   according	   to	   Vincent,	   the	   possible	   differentiations	   of	  
responsibility.	   This	   list	   appears	   interesting	   if	   we	   want	   to	   consider	   it	   from	   our	  
complex	  understanding	  of	  responsible	  innovation.	  
In	   fact,	   this	   shows	  us	   already	  how	   responsibility,	   far	   from	  being	  only	   a	   legal	   term,	  
turns	  out	  to	  be	  a	  complex	  matter	  implying	  several	  issues.	  It	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  simple	  
mechanical	  understanding	  of	  causes	  and	  effects.	  Or	  it	  could	  be	  intended	  as	  a	  matter	  
of	  role	  assumption	  or	  ascription.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  simple	  cases	  where	  
these	  two	  perspectives	  represent	  an	  unavoidable	  aspect	  of	  responsibility.	  Therefore	  
tools	   like	   risk	   assessment	   or	   technology	   assessment	   can	   still	   represent	   necessary	  
means	  in	  order	  to	  determine	  figures	  and	  facts.	  	  
But,	  beside	   those,	  we	   find	  also	  other	  deeper	  and	  ambiguous	   sides	  of	   the	   concept.	  
Although	  the	  understanding	  of	  virtue	  offered	  by	  Vincent	  seems	  to	  be	  reduced	  to	  the	  
mitigation	  or	  not	  in	  some	  ascription	  of	  fault	  and	  therefore	  still	  within	  a	  legal	  frame,	  
the	  ‘virtuous’	  acception	  of	  responsibility	  puts	  us	  on	  a	  complex	  but	  interesting	  path.	  
Virtue	  doesn’t	   seem	  to	  be	   reducible	   to	  some	  kind	  of	  clear	  measurement.	  How	  can	  
we	  in	  fact	  measure	  a	  virtue?	   It	  appears	  evident	  that	  forms	  of	   judgment	  other	  than	  
rationalistic	  ones	  should	  be	  considered.	  
	  
For	  Ibo	  Van	  de	  Poel	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  what	  is	  important	  to	  assess	  is	  the	  distinction	  
between	   a	   backward	   perspective	   and	   a	   forward	   perspective	   of	   responsibility	  
(Vincent	   et.	   al.	   2011).	   Here	   we	   find	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   how	   responsibility	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22	  Van	  de	  Poel,	  Ibo,	  Nicole	  Vincent	  and	  Jeroen	  van	  den	  Hoven	  (eds.),	  2011,	  Moral	  
responsibility,	  beyond	  free	  will	  &	  determinism,	  Dordrecht,	  NL,	  Springer.	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changes	   according	   to	   the	   time	   it	   involves/affects.	   This	   points	   out	   at	   the	   width	   of	  
consequences	   of	   innovation	   and	   therefore	   asks	   for	   an	   enlargement	   of	   potential	  
actors	  affected	  and	  that	  need	  to	  be	  accordingly	  involved.	  
However,	   if	   we	   connect	   it	   to	   the	   knowledge	   level	   of	   risks	   we	   see	   how	   this	  
differentiation	   could	   be	   implemented.	   First	   of	   all,	   it	   appears	   difficult	   to	   clearly	  
distinguish	   between	   a	   backward	   and	   forward	   perspective	   as	   this	   means	   putting	  
together	  different	  kinds	  of	  responsibility.	  An	  insurance-­‐based	  model	  that	  might	  focus	  
on	   the	   future,	   trying	   to	   quantify	   consequences	   appears	   to	   be	   different	   from	   a	  
reflexive	  one	  that	  still	  concentrates	  itself	  on	  the	  future.	  Although	  they	  share	  a	  kind	  
of	  attention	  towards	  the	  future,	  they	  don’t	  seem	  to	  be	  equivalent.	  	  
Anyway,	   this	   takes	   in	   an	   articulation	   of	   epistemic	   tools	   in	   connection	   with	   risk	  
knowledge	  that	  will	  be	  faced	  in	  a	  further	  moment.	  
	  
In	   general	   terms,	   every	   dualistic	   conception	   that	   divides	   spheres	   of	   responsibility	  
tends	   to	   fall	   in	   the	   same	   conceptual	   mistake	   that	   we	   underlined	   previously.	  
Responsibility	   has	   several	   layers	  with	  different	   depths.	   To	   isolate	   them	  could	  be	   a	  
theoretical	  exercise	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  or	  define	  traits,	  but	  it	  cannot	  neither	  be	  
extended	   or	   crystallized	   in	   a	  wider	   proposition,	   nor	   applied	   in	   a	   practical	   domain.	  
Instead	   of	   dividing	   spheres	   of	   responsibility	   we	   shall	   think	   of	   understanding	   how	  
they	   are	   all	   part	   of	   one,	   wider	   conception.	   This	   statement	   is	   clearly	   shown	   by	  
Gorgoni	  when	  he	  traces	  the	  history	  of	  underlying	  principles	  within	  responsibility.	  	  
If	   we	   consider	   his	   depiction,	   responsibility	   could	   be	   understand	   as	   a	   concept	  
differently	  shaped	  according	  to	  a	  leading	  principle	  underlying	  its	  history	  throughout	  
the	  last	  two	  centuries.	  
He	  manages	  to	  depict	  a	  summary	  of	  different	  acceptions	  of	  responsibility	  that	  turns	  	  















	   	  	  

















Figure	  1:	  Responsibility	  :	  paradigms	  (G.	  Gorgoni	  GREAT	  “Kick-­‐off	  Meeting”	  Brussels)	  
	  
This	  table	  shows	  us	  a	  perfect	  example	  of	  how	  responsibility	  should	  not	  be	  too	  strictly	  
tied	  to	  one	  context	  failing	  in	  being	  useful	  for	  all	  the	  others.	  What	  is	  highlighted	  here	  
is	   how	   responsibility	   has	   been	   conceived	   according	   to	   historical	   developments	   in	  
terms	   of	   guiding	   principle,	   epistemic	   tool,	   orientation	   in	   time	   and	   dimension.	   This	  
last	  one	  adds	  to	  van	  der	  Poel’s	  time-­‐focus	  a	  space	  side	  that	  appears	  really	  interesting.	  
Responsibility,	  according	  to	  a	  generic	  understanding,	  can	  be	  seen	  and	  developed	  as	  
an	   individual	  matter,	   where	   one	   is	   responsible	   for	   x,	   and/or	   thought	   in	   collective	  
terms	  where	  ‘we’	  is	   intended	  as	  some	  kind	  of	  general	  entity.	  Gorgoni	  explains	  how	  
the	   usage	   and	   understanding	   of	   responsibility	   has	   changed	   according	   to	   the	  
historical	  period.	  Although	  we	  could	  move	  some	  objections	  on	  some	  of	  his	  matches,	  
we	  largely	  agree	  on	  the	  shifts	  occurred	  and	  the	  consequential	  developments.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  connected	  aspects	  that	  we	  consider	  to	  be	   interesting	  and	  prove	  our	  
hints.	   The	   first	   concerns	   the	  mean	   of	   realisation	   for	   that	   RRI	   requires	   an	   effort	   in	  
enlarging	  participation.	  In	  order	  to	  assume	  a	  responsibility	  process	  we	  need	  to	  favor	  
participation.	  Of	  course	  the	  question	  on	  how	  to	  promote	  this	  aspect	  and	  most	  of	  all	  
how	  to	  assign	  it	  the	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  thickness	  is	  a	  matter	  that	  we	  will	  face	  at	  
a	  later	  stage.	  
At	   the	   same	   time,	   and	   this	   is	   the	   second	   consequent	   aspect,	   the	   dimension	   of	  
Responsibility: paradigms 
Coexisting paradigms of responsibility: accumulation and not 
substitution (both from a theoretical and historical perspective) 
Scheme inspired to Ewald (1996, 2001) 
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responsibility	   expands	   also	   into	   a	   collective	   one	   (environment,	   globalization,	   etc.).	  
Although	  we	  do	  agree	  on	  this	  evolution	  and	  its	  complementarity,	  we	  still	  believe	  that	  
a	  plural	  perspective	  could/should	  be	  more	  taken	  into	  account.	  What	  individual	  and	  
collective	  responsibilities	  seem	  to	   lack,	  given	  some	  kind	  of	  emptiness	  embedded	  in	  
both	  alternatives,	  is	  a	  strong	  reference	  to	  differences	  in	  normative	  sets.	  If	  on	  the	  one	  
hand	  individual	  responsibility	  is	  for	  obvious	  reasons	  reduced	  to	  an	  ascription	  of	  fault,	  
on	  the	  other	  collective	  responsibilities	  appears	  as	  an	  empty	  frame.	  They	  both	  share	  
some	   sort	   of	   universalism	   where	   the	   former	   one	   is	   based	   on	   a	   rationalistic	  
perspective	  on	  human	  intentionality,	  and	  the	  latter	  one	  to	  a	  universalistic	  perception	  
of	  human	  ends.	  
	  
	  One	   of	   the	   most	   tackling	   issues	   in	   the	   responsibility	   frame	   is	   exactly	   the	   one	   of	  
finding	   a	   shared	   platform	   for	   clashing	   views	   and	   normative	   backgrounds	   and	   this	  
cannot	  be	  associated	  neither	  with	  a	  mere	  individualistic	  perspective	  nor	  to	  a	  generic	  
collective	  one.	  	  
	  
If	  we	  match	   these	   two	   aspects	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   responsibility	   then	   has	   to	   be	  
considered	   under	   a	   pluralistic	   light,	   taking	   into	   account	   all	   the	   different	   actors	  
potentially	  involved.	  It	  means	  also	  that	  the	  only	  mean	  by	  which	  we	  can	  and	  we	  must	  
develop	  RRI	  is	  participation.	  What	  is	  explicit	  also	  in	  Gorgoni’s	  explanation	  is	  the	  fact	  
that	   these	   sides	   are,	   and	   should	   be,	   considered	   as	   an	   accumulation	   and	   not	   as	   a	  
substitution.	  As	  stated	  previously,	  we	  agree	  with	   this	  conclusion	  although	   it	  has	   to	  
be	  better	  defined	  and	  articulated.	  	  
	  
However,	  Gorgoni	  doesn’t	  offer	  more	  than	  this	  interesting	  depiction.	  He	  doesn’t	  tell	  
us	  more	  on	  practical	  solutions	  in	  order	  to	  achieve	  this	  state	  of	  things,	  and	  he	  doesn’t	  
define	   the	   problems	   connected	   with	   a	   formal	   development	   of	   responsibility.	   It	   is	  
true	  that	  principles	  could	  and	  should	  be	  conceived	  in	  a	  complementary	  way,	  but	  at	  
the	  same	  time	  they	  cannot	  be	  adopted	  freely	  according	  to	  some	  casual	  choice.	  They	  
have	  to	  be	  structured	  in	  a	  logical	  frame	  that	  determines	  the	  right	  tool	  for	  the	  right	  
issue.	  Moreover	   we	   need	   to	   act	   a	   more	   radical	   reconsideration	   of	   future	   looking	  
responsibility	  and	  not	  to	  reduce	  it	  to	  a	  probabilities	  calculation.	  
Besides,	  the	  problem	  of	  effectiveness	  related	  to	  means	  and	  tools	   is	  not	  sufficiently	  
developed.	   The	   only	   fact	   to	   conceive	   participation	  within	   research	   as	   a	   necessary	  
condition	   doesn’t	   guarantee	   in	   itself	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   that	   participation,	   as	   it	  
could	  be	  just	  placed	  in	  a	  research	  process	  as	  smoke	  and	  mirrors23.	  Furthermore,	  we	  
will	  see	  how	  is	  exactly	  this	  kind	  of	  ideological	  exploitation	  of	  ethics	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  We	  will	  engage	  later	  this	  particular	  aspect	  of	  “thick	  participation”	  connected	  to	  ideological	  
manipulation.	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detected	  and	  contrasted.	  
	  	  
Armin	   Grunwald	   is	   perhaps	   the	   one,	   together	   with	   Jack	   Stilgoe,	   who	   provides	   a	  
more	   articulated	   and	   interesting	   analysis	   of	   responsibility.	   Although	   a	   real	  
philosophical	   explanation	   and	   normative	   justification	   is	   still	   lacking,	   we	   find	  
interesting	   hints	   for	   our	   construction.	   According	   to	   Grunwald	   we	   have	   three	  
constitutive	  layers	  of	  responsibility:	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Constitutive dimensions of responsibility 
! Empirical dimension of the actor constellation: who ascribes 
reponsibility, who is made responsible? Distribution of responsibility, 
relation to the „governance“ of the respective field, stakeholders, people 
concerned or affected. Questions of power and exerting influence. 
! Ethical dimension of the criteria what is regarded responsible: Criteria 
of responsible action, solving moral conflicts by ethical reflection, 
reconstruction of ethical patterns of justification and argumentation (e.g. 
ethics of responsibility by Hans Jonas) 
! Epistemological dimension: what is known about the respective field 
(chances, risks etc.) and what can be said about the quality and 
reliability of the knowledge? Knowledge, uncertainties, possible 
scenarios of future development, possible risks 
	  
Figure	  2:	  Constitutive	  dimensions	  of	  responsibility	  (the	  “Methodological	  Meeting”	  Paris)	  
	  
This	  last	  understanding	  resembles	  the	  analysis	  we	  tried	  to	  offer	  previously.	  Without	  
functioning	  as	  an	  explicit	   critique	  of	  current	  models	  of	  RRI,	   it	   tries	   to	  offer	  a	  more	  
descriptive	  distinction	  of	  issues	  related	  to	  RRI.	  In	  this	  manner,	  it	  puts	  us	  on	  the	  way	  
of	   intending	   how	   responsible	   innovation	   implies	   a	   pluralistic	   dimension	   where	  
different	  normative	  settings	  and	   interlaced	   influences	  come	  across.	  As	  we	  can	  see,	  
the	   tree	   layers	   have	   in	   common	   the	   same	   basic	   issue.	   How	   shall	  we	   conceive	   RRI	  
considering	  that	  we	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  different	  normative	  settings?	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Grunwald’s	  descriptive	  perspective	  seems	  to	   imply	  that	  a	   top-­‐down,	  rationalistic,	  a	  
priori	   approach	   is	   the	   main	   polemic	   reference	   if	   we	   want	   to	   develop	   an	  
epistemologically	  correct,	  ethically	  right	  and	  practically	  effective	  structure	  of	  RRI.	  
However,	   it	   doesn’t	   seem	   to	   push	   the	   analysis	   further,	   describing	   or	   proposing	   in	  
deeper	   terms	   what	   a	   solution	   could	   be.	   Besides,	   his	   empirical	   domain	   seems	   to	  
comprehend	  many	  issues	  that	  should	  maybe	  be	  placed	  or	  tackled	  separately.	  
This	   apparent	   confusion	   and	   the	   consequent	   lack	   of	   proposals	   suggests	   a	   wider	  
though	  blurry	  underlying	  critique.	  What	  Grunwald	  seems	  to	  be	   interested	   in	   is	   the	  
possibility	  always	  present	  of	  exploiting	  responsibility	  within	  innovation	  processes	  by	  
power-­‐holders.	   The	   empirical,	   ethical	   and	   epistemological	   layers	   are	   all	   clearly	  
targeting	  power	  and	   its	  manipulation	  effects	   from	  different	  sides.	   If	   this	  evident	   in	  
the	  Empirical	  dimension	  when	  he	  highlights	   the	   role	  of	  power	  and	   influences,	   it	   is	  
also	  present	  in	  the	  other	  two	  where	  he	  questions	  the	  authority	  of	  criteria	  selection	  
and	   knowledge	   reliability.	   In	   other	  words,	   Grunwald	   is	  mainly	   concerned	  with	   the	  
veil	  of	   ideological	  exploitation	  that	  ethical	  matters	  always	  carry	  especially	   if	  strictly	  
related	  to	  economic	  issues.	  And	  we	  think	  he	  is	  right	  in	  focusing	  our	  attention	  on	  this	  
fundamental	  aspect	  inherent	  in	  responsible	  innovation.	  	  
These	  questions	  pose	  us	  in	  front	  of	  an	  issue	  that	  we	  shall	  be	  able	  to	  connect	  to	  what	  
already	  previously	  suggested,	  that	  is,	  how	  can	  we	  settle	  a	  dimension	  of	  participation	  
that	  can	  be	  considered	  not	  ideologically	  exploited?	  
	  
What	   we	   have	   understood	   from	   this	   brief	   reconstruction	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   even	   if	  
responsibility	   is	   basically	   handled	   as	   an	   external	   monolithic	   object	   that	   could	   be	  
ascribed	  and	  assigned,	  there	  are	  different	  and	  more	  complex	  layers	  within	  the	  single	  
concept.	   Responsibility,	   far	   from	   being	   reducible	   to	   its	   legal	   or	   economic	   frame,	  
contains	  several	  different	  nuances	  according	  to	  its	  time	  line,	  its	  space	  matrix	  and	  the	  
capability	   of	   being	   humanly	   understood.	  We	   saw	   that	   a	   clear	   distinction	   between	  
these	   layers	   cannot	   be	   drawn	   unless	   specific,	   small	   cases.	   It	   was	   automatic	   to	  
assume	   that	   responsibility	   involves	   a	   greater	   participation,	   as	   it	   seems	   to	   involve	  
different	  dimensions	  and	  actors.	  We	  also	  highlighted	  that	  intending	  responsibility	  in	  
participatory,	  pluralistic	  terms	  doesn’t	  represent	  a	  sufficiently	  developed	  conception	  
because	   it	   could	   always	   incur	   in	   the	   danger	   of	   being	   exploited	   by	   some	   power	  
influences.	  
	  
What	  we	  need	  now	   is	   to	  understand	  what	   are	   the	   reasons	  underlying	   the	   current	  
reduction	  of	  responsibility	  in	  order	  to	  search	  for	  an	  alternative.	  	  	  
	  
Lets	  then	  pass	  to	  a	  more	  theoretical	  layer	  in	  order	  to	  look	  for	  a	  potential	  alternative	  
understanding	  of	   responsibility	   that	  could	  merge	  with	  what	  we	  already	  highlighted	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and	  that	  could	  engage	  with	  a	  reductive	  concept	  of	  it.	  	  
2.2.1.	  Accountability	  or	  Responsibility?	  	  
If	   we	   want	   to	   understand	   what	   a	   common	   presupposition	   underlying	   all	   these	  
different	   acceptions	   of	   responsibility	   is,	   and	   how	  we	   could	   develop	   an	   alternative	  
one,	  we	  need	  to	  briefly	  recall	  what	  Paul	  Ricoeur	  has	  lucidly	  depict	  as	  a	  puzzling	  and	  
therefore	  interesting	  conception.	  
According	  to	  Ricoeur24,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  the	  concept	  of	  responsibility	  “is	  well	  fixed	  in	  
the	   classical	   juridical	   tradition.	   In	   civil	   law	   responsibility	   is	   intended	   as	   the	   duty	   to	  
repair	  a	  damage,	  caused	  by	  someone’s	  own	  fault	  and	   in	   the	   terms	   foreseen	  by	   the	  
law.	  In	  penal	  law	  the	  duty	  becomes	  the	  on	  standing	  the	  punition”	  (Ricoeur	  2007).	  On	  
the	   other	   hand,	   the	   proliferation	   and	   dispersion	   of	   acceptions	   in	   its	   actual	  
understanding	   make	   responsibility	   a	   wider	   conception	   taking	   into	   account	   a	   grey	  
area	  that	  calls	  for	  issues	  far	  beyond	  the	  mere	  juridical	  frame.	  	  
However,	   Ricoeur	   show	   us	   how	   the	   ancestor	   of	   responsibility,	   imputability,	   has	  
played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   the	   recent	   developments.	   Thus,	   imputability	   has	   in	   its	  
understanding	   and	   definition	   the	   reference	   to	   a	   bad	   action,	   a	   fault,	   for	   which	  
someone	  is	  accounted.	  But	  what	  was	  still	  present	  in	  the	  18th	  century	  and	  that	  plays	  a	  
fundamental	   role	   in	  our	  analysis	   is	   the	   fact	   that	  at	   that	   time	   imputation	  preserved	  
the	  other	  acception	  of	  attribution	  to	  an	  agent.	  This	  second	  one	  calls	  in	  for	  all	  those	  
kind	   of	   actions	   that	   are	   not	   directly	   sanctionable	   or	   punishable.	   What	   happened	  
after,	   considering	   that	   still	   Kant	   up	   to	   a	   certain	   point	   kept	   them	   together	  
(antinomically),	   is	   well	   explained	   by	   Ricoeur.	   He	   put	   in	   evidence	   the	   slight	   but	  
decisive	  shift	  that	  has	  occurred	  first	  with	  Kant	  and	  his	  ‘critiques’	  and	  later	  with	  their	  
interpretations	   by	   Kelsen,	   where	   the	   strict	   connection	   between	   a	   more	  
epistemological	  or	  cosmological	  attribution	  of	  an	  action	  to	  a	  specific	  subject,	  and	  the	  
juridical	  moralized	  one,	  where	  the	  action	  is	  accounted	  on	  a	  subject,	  was	  lost	  in	  favor	  
of	  a	  conflation	  of	  the	  former	  on	  the	  latter.	  
“This	  process	  of	  disposal,	  basing	   itself	  only	  on	  Critique	  of	  Practical	  Reason,	   falls,	   in	  
Kelsen,	   for	   instance	   in	   his	   “Pure	   Theory	   of	   Law”,	   in	   a	   total	   moralization	   and	  
juridicalization	  of	  imputation.	  At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  process,	  we	  can	  affirm	  that	  the	  idea	  
of	  accountability	  (of	  a	  fault)	  has	  supplanted	  the	  one	  of	  attribution	  (of	  an	  action	  to	  its	  
agent)”	  (Ricoeur	  2007).	  
Ricoeur	  goes	  on	  explaining	  how	  a	  different	  path	  has	  been	  taken	  by	  several	  authors,	  
following	  Strawson’s	  ascription	  theory.	  The	  most	  known	  in	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  RRI	  
is	  surely	  Hart’s	  one.	  	  
However,	   Ricoeur	   is	   extremely	   lucid	   in	   describing	   the	   developments	   and	   the	  
potential	   implications	   hidden	   in	   an	   understanding	   of	   responsibility	   in	   terms	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24	  Ricoeur,	  P.,	  (2007).	  Reflections	  on	  the	  just.	  Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press.	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accountability.	   Taking	   into	   account	   civil	   law,	   Ricoeur	   shows	   that	   speaking	   of	  
responsibility	   as	   the	   duty	   to	   repair	   the	   damage	   paves	   implicitly	   the	   way	   to	   a	  
responsibility	   without	   fault.	   The	   latter	   has	   been	   thus	   replaced	   by	   concepts	   like	  
“solidarity,	   security	   and	   (most	   of	   all)	   risk,	   that	   tend	   to	   occupy	   the	  place	  previously	  
held	   by	   fault”	   (Ricoeur	   2007).	   This	   replacement	   that	   at	   a	   first	   glance	   seems	   to	  
represent	   a	   positive	   development	   of	   responsibility,	   hides	   in	   reality	   a	   deeper	   shift	  
that	  occurred	  already	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  The	  law	  promulgated	  in	  1898	  in	  
France	   over	   work	   accidents	   was	   probably	   the	   first	   official	   document	   where	   the	  
accent	   has	   been	   shifted	   “from	   an	   individual	   management	   of	   fault	   to	   a	   social	  
management	  of	   risk”	   (Ricoeur	  2007).	  What	  was	   crucial	  was	  exactly	  how	   the	   stress	  
placed	  previously	  on	  the	  agent	  causing	  the	  damage	  was	  then	  put	  on	  the	  victim	  and	  
on	   the	   consequent	   damage	   that	   needed	   to	   be	   refunded.	   “The	   settlement	   of	   a	  
compensation	  system,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  automatic	  and	  forfeit,	  translates	  the	  need	  of	  
having	   insured	   a	   compensation	   in	   absence	   of	   a	   blameworthy	   behavior”	   (Ricoeur	  
2007).	  The	  displacement	  of	  responsibility	  as	  an	  ascription	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  calculation	  
of	  risks	  changes	  also	  the	  time	  frame	  in	  which	  responsibility	  is	  then	  placed.	  All	  these	  
factors	  taken	  together	  create	  a	  really	  dangerous	  situation	  where	  the	  absence	  of	  fault	  
transforms	   responsibility	   from	   the	   ethical	   company	   of	   every	   decision	  made	   by	   an	  
agent	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  solidarity	  to	  a	  fatal	  and	  anonymous	  event	  that	  could	  endanger	  
the	   security	   maintenance.	   “If	   the	   victimization	   is	   aleatory,	   also	   its	   origin	   tends	   to	  
become	   it,	   according	   to	   the	   probability	   calculation	   that	   situates	   every	   occurrence	  
under	   the	   sign	   of	   fate.	   Once	   disconnected	   from	   the	   problem	   of	   decision	   even	   the	  
action	  can	  be	  seen	  under	  the	  sign	  of	  fate,	  that	  is	  the	  exact	  opposite	  of	  responsibility”	  
(Ricoeur	  2007).	  
It	   is	   not	   solidarity	   the	  main	   frame	   in	  which	   responsibility	   or	   accountability	   is	   then	  
placed	   but	   rather	   the	   one	   of	   security	   ending	   with	   conflating	   responsibility	   to	  
accountability	  and	  this	  to	  an	  economic	  calculation	  of	  risks	  and	  damages.	   	  “At	  most,	  
at	  the	  end	  of	  an	  evolution	  in	  which	  the	  idea	  of	  risk	  may	  conquer	  the	  entire	  the	  entire	  
space	   of	   right	   of	   responsibility,	   it	   would	   subsist	   simply	   one	   obligation,	   the	   one	   of	  
insuring	  from	  every	  risk!”	  (Ricoeur	  2007).	  
We	   won’t	   go	   on	   explaining	   the	   different	   possibilities	   useful	   to	   modify	   such	   a	  
reductive	  and	  distorted	  understanding	  of	  responsibility	  as	  here	  its	  importance	  has	  to	  
be	   seen	  under	   the	   light	   of	   our	   specific	   issue,	   the	   one	  of	   responsible	   innovation	   in	  
research.	   However,	   it’s	   important	   to	   underline	   how	   responsibility	   is	   currently	  
reduced	  to	  accountability	  and	  what	  are	  the	  tools	  used	  to	  enhance	  this	  understanding	  
and	  the	  problems	  that	  we	  need	  to	  face.	  
Reducing	   responsibility	   to	   its	   legal	   or	   economical	   side	  means	   to	   remain	   in	   a	   one-­‐
sided	  dimension	   of	   normativity,	   either	   the	   legal	   or	   the	   economical	   one.	   Therefore	  
the	   norm	   and	   its	   construction	   are	   still	   somehow	   imposed	   through	   means	   of	  
evacuation	   of	   contents	   and	   accordingly,	   context.	   Furthermore	   the	   entire	   process	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connected	  to	  accountability	  avoids	  any	  reflexive	  turn	  as	  well	  as	  a	  free	  participation.	  
	  
The	  problem	  here	  appears	  the	  one	  of	  tying	  the	  question	  to	  a	  compulsory	  approach	  
that	  remains	  still	  in	  what	  we	  might	  call	  a	  top-­‐down	  approach.	  If	  we	  take	  into	  account	  
the	  GMO	  problem	  that	  puzzled	   (and	  still	   is	  at	   stage)	  EU	   in	   the	   last	  years,	   it	  will	  be	  
easy	   to	  understand	  how	   limited	   could	  be	  an	  approach	   that	   tend	   to	   solve	   issues	   in	  
such	   a	   way.	   All	   the	   main	   difficulties	   rose	   exactly	   from	   those	   areas	   which	   let	   no	  
possibility	   to	   be	   formalized	   in	   legal	   terms	   but	   that	   still	   reveals	   themselves	   to	   be	  
fundamental	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  and	  promote	  autonomy	  within	  societies.	  
If	  we	  have	  to	  delineate	  in	  current	  terms	  what	  already	  suggested	  in	  theoretical	  terms	  
on	   responsibility,	   it	  would	   be	   important	   to	   go	  beyond	   all	   these	  useful	   and	   correct	  
taxonomies	   and	   reduce	   the	   main	   distinction	   criteria	   to	   a	   negative/positive	  
perspective.	  
Briefly,	  a	  perspective	  we	  think	  could	  suit	  the	  assessment	  of	  current	  practices,	  is	  one	  
that	   conflates	   responsibility	   onto	   some	   sort	   of	   risk	   assessment	   and	   that	   therefore	  
assumes	  a	  negative	  perception	  for	  researchers	  or	  actors	  who	  are	  supposed	  to	  take	  
on	  responsibility.	  Accordingly,	  if	  we	  consider	  responsibility	  as	  an	  add-­‐on	  load	  that	  we	  
will	  place	  as	  a	  safety	  harness,	  the	  whole	  project	  of	  building	  an	  effective	  conception	  
of	   responsible	   innovation	   would	   be	   vain.	   In	   fact,	   the	   actual	   widespread	   risk-­‐
assessment	  acception	  reduces	  responsibility	  to	  its	  legal	  frame.	  
“The	  main	  objections	  voiced	  about	  the	  principles	  in	  the	  European	  Code	  related	  to	  the	  
language	  of	  ‘accountability’.	  It	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  unrealistic	  and	  unfair	  obligation	  to	  
place	  upon	  researchers	  and	  ill-­‐suited	  to	  a	  spirit	  of	  open-­‐minded	  and	  creative	  inquiry	  
through	  research.	   Interestingly,	   the	  objection	   in	  certain	  countries,	  such	  as	  Germany	  
and	  France,	  was	  that	  the	  term	  accountability	  was	  close	  to	  the	  juridical	  idea	  of	  liability,	  
which	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  being	  charged	  with	  a	  legal	  obligation	  that	  might	  be	  enforced	  
by	   private	   or	   public	   law”	   (Robert	   Lee,	   ‘Adaptive	   Governance	   for	   Responsible	  
Innovation’,	  2013	  p.	  148).	  
	  The	  current	  developments	  pointing	  towards	  economical	  compensations	  don’t	  seem	  
to	   really	   go	  out	   from	   the	   same	  conceptual	   frame.	  What	   is	   it	   important	   is	   to	   avoid	  
consequences	  through	  a	  process	  of	  delegation	  of	  responsibility	  to	  external	  and	  often	  
anonymous	  actors,	   that	   in	   the	  end	  will	  make	  responsibility	  a	  mere	  mechanical	  and	  
quantitative	  factor.	  According	  to	  this	  perspective,	  responsibility	  has	  to	  be	  conceived	  
as	  an	  external	  object	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  allocated	  as	  far	  as	  possible.	  
	  
But,	   for	   instance:	   “The	   International	   Risk	   Governance	   Council	   (IRGC)	   (IRGC	   2009)	  
through	   multiple	   case	   studies	   usefully	   summarizes	   10	   deficits	   in	   risk	   assessment,	  
encompassing	   difficulties	   around	   the	   gathering	   and	   interpretation	   of	   knowledge	  
about	  risks	  and	  perception	  of	  risks,	  combined	  with	  disputed	  or	  potentially	  biased	  or	  
subjective	   knowledge,	   and	  with	   deficits	   of	   knowledge	   related	   to	   systems	   and	   their	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complexities.	   The	   answers	   delivered	   in	   risk	   assessment	   typically	   depend	   on	   the	  
framing	   of	   the	   analysis	   –	   not	   just	   “what”	   informs	   the	   framing	   but	   importantly	  
“who”25.	   In	  other	  words,	   “there	   is	  a	  demand	   for	  more	   than	   risk	  management,	  at	  a	  
much	  earlier	  intersection	  with	  the	  innovation	  ecosystem.	  The	  argument	  therefore	  to	  
go	   “upstream”	   in	   terms	   of	   deliberation	   and	   public	   engagement	   has	   become	   loud”	  
(Lee	  2013).	  
	  
Consequently,	  considering	  responsibility	  in	  this	  way	  doesn’t	  manage	  to	  be	  effective	  
in	  all	  those	  grey	  areas	  of	  the	  actual	  conception.	  Reducing	  responsibility	  to	  a	  matter	  
of	   legal	   nature	   it’s	   an	   operation	   that	   avoids	   exactly	   the	   capacity	   and	  possibility	   to	  
take	   into	  account	   the	  ethical	  nature	  of	   it,	   a	  nature	   that	   goes	  beyond	  a	  mere	   legal	  
frame.	  
However,	  we	  think	  that	   the	   legal	  side	  of	   responsibility	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  expelled	  
from	  RRI.	  What	  we	  believe	  it	  would	  be	  necessary	  it’s	  to	  start	  thinking	  and	  developing	  
a	  conception	  of	  responsibility	  that	  is	  carried	  on	  under	  a	  positive	  light.	  Responsibility	  
has	  to	  be	  conceived	  and	  understand	  as	  something	  positive,	  that	  an	  actor	  freely	  and	  
enjoyably	  wants	  to	  take,	  something	  that	  accompany	  every	  attempt	  of	  innovation	  he	  
could	  bring	  to	  the	  society.	  Furthermore,	  responsibility	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  process	  of	  
reflection,	  consultation,	  and	  deliberation	  within	  a	  co-­‐constructive	  framework.	  What	  
we	  would	   like	   to	   reach	   is	   a	   stage	  where	   actors	   in	   general,	   and	   researchers	   in	   the	  
specific,	  will	  be	  worried,	  concerned	  about	  their	  ‘environment’.	  	  
As	   wished	   by	   Lee,	   “It	   would	   have	   been	   better	   to	   have	   adopted	   notions	   of	  
responsibility	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   requiring	   some	   reflection	   by	   the	   researcher	   in	  
unwelcome	   possibilities	   over	   time,	   and	   wider	   debate	   and	   engagement	   on	   these	  
issues	   in	  order	   to	  engender	  a	   sense	  of	   care	  and	   responsiveness.	   This	  doesn’t	  mean	  
that	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  accountability”	  (Lee,	  2013).	  
	  
The	  fact	  that	  all	  consequences	  cannot	  be	  foreseen	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  we	  don’t	  have	  
to	   still	   try	   through	  enacting	  procedures	  able	   to	  enlarge	  our	   shared	  knowledge	  and	  
therefore	  the	  level	  and	  quality	  of	  participation.	  “Thus	  a	  researcher	  may	  be	  some	  way	  
far	  from	  envisioning	  the	  technological	  end	  use	  of	  an	  innovative	  breakthrough,	  but	  is	  
not	  absolved	   from	  responsibility	   for	   reflecting	  on	  where	   the	   findings	  might	   lead,	  or	  
from	  a	  degree	  of	  stewardship	  over	  the	  research	  that	  reflects	  that	  trust	  that	  scientists	  
might	   wish	   society	   to	   place	   in	   them”.	   […]	   Certainly,	   as	   science	   has	   become	  
increasingly	  connected	  with	  application	  […]	  questions	  of	  responsibility	  have	  become	  
much	  harder	  to	  ignore”	  (Lee,	  2013).	  
However,	  as	  we	  said,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  not	  only	  the	  quantitative	  side	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25	  R.	  Lee,	  J.	  Petts,	  ‘Adaptive	  Governance	  for	  Responsible	  Innovation’,	  in	  R.	  Owen,	  J.	  Bessant,	  
M.	  Heintz,	  (Eds.),	  Responsible	  Innovation,	  Wiley	  2013.	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participation	  but	  also	  the	  qualitative	  one,	   in	  order	   to	  avoid	  certain	  kind	  of	  political	  
traps.	  The	   issue	  of	  participation,	  although	  a	   fundamental	  one,	  might	   turn	  up	   to	  be	  
not	   sufficient	   in	   order	   to	   reach	   a	   reflective	   and	   effective	   process	   of	   responsible	  
innovation.	  As	  noted	  by	  Lee,	   in	   the	  UK,	  governmental	   views	  of	   this	  have	   still	   often	  
been	  restricted	  to	  promoting	  understanding	  and	  debating	  fears	  around	  a	  potentially	  
controversial	  technology	  in	  advance	  of	  significant	  application.	  […]	  It	  is	  still	  about	  risk	  
regulation,	   rather	   than	   a	   more	   vital	   discussion	   about	   science,	   values,	   and	   what	  
society	  expects	  from	  technology-­‐based	  innovation”	  (Lee,	  2013).	  
However,	   on	   the	   other	   side	  we	   have	   the	   core	   problem	  of	   efficiency	   that	   is	   raised	  
every	   time	  we	   think	   about	   the	   application	   of	   RRI.	   One	   of	   the	   biggest	   problematic	  
accordingly	  “is	  around	  understanding	  how,	  when,	  and	  with	  what	  purpose	  to	  engage	  
multiple	  stakeholders	  and	  the	  public.	  While	  the	  “deliberative	  turn”	  has	  now	  captured	  
policy	  attention,	  certainly	  in	  the	  UK	  government	  narratives	  have	  too	  often	  seemed	  to	  
focus	   on	   the	   instrumental	   idea	   of	   “gaining	   public	   confidence”	   around	   new	  
technologies	   (e.g.,	   HM	   Government,	   2005)	   as	   opposed	   to	   processes	   of	   collective	  
reflection	   around	   notions	   of	   care	   and	   responsiveness.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   public	  
engagement	   when	   done	   well	   (i.e.,	   when	   it	   is	   inclusive	   of	   all	   key	   interests,	   is	  
representative	  of	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  views,	  is	  well	  informed,	  allows	  for	  challenge	  of	  
stated	  views	  and	  evidence,	  and	   is	  done	  early	  enough	   that	   the	  outcomes	   can	  effect	  
decisions)	   can	   be	   time	   consuming	   (over	   weeks	   and	  months)	   and	   expensive.”	   (Lee,	  
2013).	  	  
	  
Considering	  what	  we	  briefly	  showed	  before	  in	  regard	  to	  innovation,	  and	  connecting	  
it	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   responsibility,	   we	   see	   that	   the	   two	   sides	   cannot	   be	  
conceived	  and	  developed	  separately.	  What	  we	  should	  do	  then	  is	  build	  an	  entire	  new	  
framework,	  one	  that	   reads	   the	  entire	  process	  at	  stake	   in	  a	  process	  of	  hypothetical	  
responsible	  innovation	  in	  research.	  	  
“Importantly,	  taking	  care	  has	  to	  be	  a	  collective	  responsibility	  given	  the	  understanding	  
of	   innovation	  as	   involving	  a	  network	  of	  actors	  and	  actions.	   It	   is	  as	  much	  about	   the	  
process	  of	  doing	  science	  and	  innovation	  as	  their	  products.	  What	  motivates	  a	  scientist,	  
and	  with	  what	  purpose	   they	  embark	  on	  particular	   research	   is	  as	   important	  as	  how	  
they	  do	  their	  work”	  (Stilgoe	  2010,	  Lee	  2013).	  
	  
2.3.	  Responsible	  Innovation	  	  	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  from	  the	  previous	  deliverable	  and	  from	  our	  analysis,	  societies	  are	  
nowadays	   entangled	   with	   an	   acceleration	   of	   technological	   development	   that	  
requires	   some	   sort	   of	   structure	   in	   order	   to	   not	   loose	   the	   grip	   on	   it.	   Innovation,	  
development	   and	   progress	   are	   increasingly	   and	  massively	  modifying	   our	   lives	   and	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our	   cultural	   framing.	   This	   general	   development	   has	   been	   changing	   its	   shape	   in	  
accordance	   to	   specific	   mutations	   of	   different	   orders	   and	   cannot	   be	   anymore	  
understood	  through	  categories	  that	  were	  built	  and	  drawn	  in	  a	  completely	  different	  
time	   and	   context.	   Therefore	  we	  need	   to	  develop	  new	   frames,	   new	  ways	   and	  new	  
structures	  by	  which	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  actual	  scenario.	  
In	  order	  to	  proceed	  towards	  this	  target	  we	  then	  need	  to	  follow	  two	  main	  steps.	  The	  
first	   one	   is	   to	   try	   and	   depict	   what	   is	   the	   current	   situation	   and	   after	   attempt	   to	  
eventually	  modify	  its	  ideologies	  through	  means	  of	  a	  critical	  analysis.	  If	  the	  first	  step	  
has	  been	  accomplished	  through	  the	  theoretical	  landscape	  that	  described	  the	  lines	  of	  
responsible	  innovation	  in	  research,	  and	  through	  the	  more	  evident	  depiction	  of	  what	  
innovation	  means	  and	  implies,	  the	  second	  step	  needs	  to	  move	  towards	  the	  core	  of	  
that	   cultural	   legitimation	   that	   every	   innovation	   process	   in	   research	   requires	   as	   a	  
necessary	  condition.	  
The	   speed	   of	   technological	   innovation,	   as	   we	   seen,	   renders	   quite	   impossible	   to	  
determine	   all	   the	   potential	   outcomes	   that	   are	   going	   to	   affect	   societies	   in	   a	   large	  
scale	   of	   space	   and	   time.	   Furthermore,	   innovation	   in	   itself	   calls	   for	   continuous	  
adaptations	  and	  shifts	  across	  different	  fields	  becoming	  too	  wide	  and	  disparate	  to	  be	  
foreseen.	   Besides,	   innovation	   in	   research	   needs	   to	   maintain	   this	   unpredictable	  
nature	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  its	  main	  progressive	  role	  for	  societies.	  	  
As	   stated	   previously	   though,	   innovation	   tend	   to	   be	   reduced	   to	   its	   capacity	   of	  
producing	  profit	   in	  mere	  economic	   terms	  and	  ends	  up	  by	   forgetting	  all	   the	  several	  
other	  implications	  that	  it	  carries	  with.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  doesn’t	  appear	  strange	  that	  
the	  legitimation	  structure	  built	  around	  it	  tend	  to	  be	  also	  quite	  reductive.	  The	  ethical	  
but	   most	   of	   all	   political	   legitimation	   structure	   is	   in	   fact	   often	   conflated	   to	   some	  
hyper-­‐rationalistic	   justification	   that	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   a	   risk	   prediction	   and	  
cost/benefit	   assessment.	  We	  understood	  how	  a	  negative,	  defensive	  understanding	  
of	   responsibility	   represents	   the	   tool	  by	  which	   innovation	   is	   framed	  and	   the	  ethical	  
responsibility	  is	  defined.	  It’s	  hard	  to	  find	  any	  attempt	  to	  reach	  any	  target	  inspired	  by	  
the	   spirit	   of	   a	   common	   good	   and	   how	   this,	   consequently,	   affects	   the	   legitimation	  
structure	  built	  on	  innovation.	  	  
The	  shift	  from	  social	  struggles	  based	  on	  groups	  or	  classes	  and	  specific	  normative	  or	  
determined	   claims	   towards	   improvements	   to	   a	   global	   scenario	  where	   everyone	   is	  
potentially	  affected	  by	  an	  obscure	  and	  sinister	  future.	  The	  passage	  from	  an	  ethic	  of	  
the	  future	  intended	  as	  a	  common	  good,	  although	  seen	  from	  different	  perspectives,	  
to	  safety	   (either	   legal,	  economic	  or	  medical)	  where	  future	   is	   risky	  and	  danger.	  This	  
change	  in	  the	  structures	  and	  superstructures	  has	  been	  clearly	  stated	  by	  Ulrich	  Beck	  
in	  his	  masterwork	  on	  risk	  society26.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26	  Beck,	  U.	  (1992).	  Risk	  Society:	  Towards	  a	  New	  Modernity.	  Transl.	  by	  M.	  Ritter,	  London:	  Sage.	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“Class	   societies	   remain	   related	   to	   the	   ideal	   of	   equality	   in	   their	   developmental	  
dynamics	   (in	   its	   various	   formulations	   from	   equal	   opportunity	   to	   the	   variants	   of	  
socialist	   models	   of	   society).	   Not	   so	   the	   risk	   society.	   Its	   normative	   counter-­‐project,	  
which	   is	   its	   basis	   and	   motive	   force,	   is	   safety.	   The	   place	   of	   the	   value	   system	   of	  
‘unequal’	   society	   is	   taken	  by	   the	  value	   system	  of	   the	   ‘unsafe’	   society.	  Whereas	   the	  
utopia	  of	  equality	  contains	  a	  wealth	  of	  substantial	  and	  positive	  goals	  of	  social	  change,	  
the	   utopia	   of	   the	   risk	   society	   remains	   peculiarly	   negative	   and	   defensive.	   Basically,	  
one	   is	   no	   longer	   concerned	   with	   attaining	   something	   ‘good’,	   but	   rather	   with	  
preventing	   the	  worst;	   self-­‐limitation	   is	   the	  goal	  which	  emerges.	  The	  dream	  of	  class	  
society	  is	  that	  everyone	  wants	  and	  ought	  to	  have	  a	  share	  of	  the	  pie.	  The	  utopia	  of	  the	  
risk	  society	  is	  that	  everyone	  should	  be	  spared	  from	  poisoning”	  (Beck	  1992).	  
	  
How	  this	  situation	  came	  to	  be	  has	  been	  exhaustively	  narrated	  and	  we	  don’t	  need	  to	  
repeat	   it	  once	  more.	  What	  has	   to	  be	  highlighted	  again	   is	   the	  width	  underlying	  this	  
understanding.	  Because	  it	  is	  true	  that	  these	  tools	  find	  their	  historical	  and	  conceptual	  
roots	  within	  the	  fields	  of	   law	  and	  economics.	  “The	  law,	  in	  the	  moment	  that	  invents	  
the	  professional	  risk	  and	  the	  accidents	  without	  neither	  fault	  nor	  responsibility,	  in	  the	  
moment	   it	   invents	   the	   systemic	   risk,	   […]	   it	   (the	   law)	   renders	   accidents	   and	   their	  
human	  costs,	  to	  say	  it	  cynically,	  a	  part	  of	  the	  general	  expenses”	  (Beck	  1992).	  And	  it	  is	  
also	   true	   that	   this	   relation	   is	   unbalanced	   pending	   towards	   economic	   stances.	   By	  
substituting	  the	  individual	  foresight	  with	  general	  insurance	  guarantees,	  by	  replacing	  
responsibility	  with	  statistics	  the	  risks	  are	  enclosed	  more	  in	  a	  commercial	  dimension.	  
But	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that,	  how	  stated	  by	  Pestre,	  this	  shift	  and	  its	  legitimation	  have	  been	  
sustained	  by	  general	  theoretical	  tools.	  The	  tools	  developed	  inside	  these	  new	  spaces	  
are	  at	  the	  same	  time	  conceptual	  and	  general,	  and	  therefore	  easily	  transposable	  and	  
translatable	  in	  concrete	  devices”27.	  That’s	  because	  the	  question	  here	  is	  not	  the	  one	  
of	  assessing	  a	  specific	  technology	  and	  its	  risks	  but	  how	  the	  management	  of	  specific	  
issues	   refers	   to	   an	   underlying	   ordering	   scheme	   of	   the	   world.	   “This	   principle	   of	  
rationality	   is	   a	   principle	   of	   world	   performativity,	   a	   moral	   technology	   and	   control,	  
transform	  the	  unlucky	  accident	   in	  a	  regularity	  […]	  that	  defines	  a	  new	  conception	  of	  
living	  together,	  a	  new	  unit	  of	  social	  that	  refuses	  to	  refuse	  progress”(Pestre	  2013).	  	  
And	   it’s	   easy	   to	   detect	   these	   tools	   in	   concepts	   like	   system	   analysis	   or	   rational	  
decision,	  all	  tools	  of	  a	  greater	  mathematization	  of	  life.	  System	  analysis	  for	  instance,	  
“extends	   the	   practices	   of	   operational	   research	   and	   sees	   efficiency	   through	   the	  
deconstruction	   of	   actions	   in	   all	   their	   pertinent	   parameters,	   through	   statistic	  
compilation,	  modeling	  and	  game	  theory”	  (Pestre	  2013).	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27	  Pestre,	  D.	  (2013),	  À	  contre-­‐science.	  Paris:	  Seuil,	  p.131.	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All	   the	   main	   references	   to	   the	   societal	   outcomes	   and	   normative	   acceptability	   of	  
innovation	   are	   narrowed	   into	   social	   desirability	   and	   acceptance.	   It	   doesn’t	   appear	  
then	  unpredictable	  that	  in	  such	  a	  way	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  so	  called	  context	  can	  
be	  often	  be	  intended	  as	  a	  risk	  information	  or	  to	  say	  it	  in	  other	  words,	  a	  mere	  form	  of	  
communication.	  
And	  it	  is	  exactly	  when	  we	  analyse	  the	  conception	  of	  responsible	  innovation	  in	  itself	  
that	  we	  note	  how	  a	  reductive	  understanding	  of	  both	   innovation	  and	  responsibility,	  
can	  negatively	  affect	  even	  positive	  attempts	  to	  frame	  ethically	  innovation.	  
We	  will	  have	   to	  develop	  a	  RRI	   structure	   that	   could	  be	   fit	   to	  overcome	   the	  current	  
limitations	   embedded	   in	   a	   risk	   society	   mode.	   But	   to	   do	   so	   we	   first	   need	   to	  
understand	  how	  this	  finds	  its	  concretion	  in	  the	  actual	  developments	  of	  RRI	  and	  try	  to	  
see	   if	   there	  some	  of	  them	  that	  could	  help	  us	   in	  this	  attempt.	  So	  the	  first	  next	  step	  
will	  be	  to	  depict	  a	  scenario	  of	  RRI	  as	  such	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  ‘new	  versions	  of	  the	  
same	  mistake’,	  but	  also	  to	  extrapolate	  elements	  that	  could	  be	  fruitful	  for	  a	  different	  
development.	  
	  
2.3.1.	  The	  problem	  of	  definitions	  	  
Apparently	  all	  the	  most	  known	  conceptions	  of	  RRI	  tend	  or	  to	  refer	  to	  some	  definition	  
or	  to	  produce	  one	  in	  order	  to	  offer	  a	  model	  of	  reference	  for	  every	  RRI	  case.	  	  	  
All	   these	   definition	   aspire	   to	   include	   traits	   that	   are	   commonly	   perceived	   as	  
fundamental	  within	  RRI.	  Therefore	  we	  find	  in	  literature	  many	  examples	  on	  how	  a	  RRI	  
conception	  is	  or	  better	  say,	  should	  be.	  	  
In	  this	  sense	  we	  find	  definitions	  that	  although	  being	  quite	  different	  in	  their	  specific	  
traits,	  tend	  to	  reach	  the	  same	  aim,	  offering	  a	  final,	  schematized	  position	  to	  which	  to	  
refer.	  	  So	  if	  von	  Schomberg’s	  one	  highlights	  that	  RRI	  is	  (or	  should	  be)	  a	  “transparent,	  
interactive	   process	   by	   which	   societal	   actors	   and	   innovators	   become	   mutually	  
responsive	  to	  each	  other	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  (ethical)	  acceptability,	  sustainability	  and	  
societal	   desirability	   of	   the	   innovation	   process	   and	   its	   marketable	   products”.	   (von	  
Schomberg	   2012).	   Hilary	   Sutcliffe	   thinks	   that	   RRI	   implies	   “trying	   to	   get	   better	   at	  
anticipating	   problems,	   taking	   into	   account	  wider	   social,	   ethical	   and	   environmental	  	  
issues	   and	   being	   able	   to	   create	   flexible	   and	   adaptive	   systems	   to	   deal	   with	   these	  
unintended	   consequences”.	   (Sutcliffe).	   And	   Jeroen	   van	   den	   Hoven	   believes	   that,	  
“Innovation	   is	  an	  activity	  or	  process	  which	  may	   lead	  to	  previously	  unknown	  design,	  
pertaining	  either	  to	  the	  physical	  world,	  the	  conceptual	  world,	  the	  institutional	  world	  
or	   combination	   of	   these,	  which	   –	  when	   implemented	   –	   expand	   the	   set	   of	   relevant	  
feasible	  options	  for	  action,	  either	  physical	  or	  cognitive”	  (van	  den	  Hoven	  2013).	  
Every	  definition	  seems	  to	  be	  complete	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  characterizes	  RRI	  and	  
how	   to	   distinguish	   RRI	   from	   something	   else.	   We	   can	   note	   that	   their	   normative	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backgrounds	  are	  explicated	  clearly	  in	  their	  statements.	  While	  von	  Schomberg	  seems	  
to	   be	   focused	   on	   the	   political	   and	   communicative	   structure	   basing	   his	   definition	  
mainly	  on	  freedom	  given	  by	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  public	  discourse,	  Sutcliffe	  tends	  to	  
enlarge	   the	   reign	   of	   assessment	   bringing	   in	   all	   those	   social,	   ethical	   and	  
environmental	   issues	   that	   accordingly	   should	  be	   lacking	   in	   a	  mere	   risk	   assessment	  
procedure.	   So	   here	   the	   stress	   is	   placed	   on	   a	   common	   good	   that	   has	   to	   be	   pre-­‐
established.	  Van	  den	  Hoven,	  lastly,	  seems	  to	  maintain	  a	  descriptive	  definition	  of	  RRI.	  
Of	   course,	   a	   description	   implying	   that	   specific	   and	   new	   framing	  will	   be	   produced,	  
assessing	  somehow	  the	  difficulty	  in	  predicting	  them	  before.	  
All	   three	   represent	   a	   precious	   contribution	   for	   indicating	  what	   are	  main	   issues	   at	  
stake	   with	   RRI.	   They	   all	   more	   or	   less,	   stress	   the	   fact	   that	   innovation	   can	   procure	  
unexpected	  consequences,	  consequences	  that	  at	  the	  actual	  stage,	  with	  the	  current	  
tools,	  cannot	  be	  determined.	  Therefore	  they	  all	  seem	  to	  agree	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  
need	  to	  implement	  the	  current	  cognitive	  and	  political	  frame	  of	  RRI.	  If	  van	  den	  Hoven	  
implicitly	   admits	   the	   current	   impossibility	   of	   modifications,	   indicating	   only	   that	  
something	  will	   have	   to	  be	  done,	   and	  giving	   a	   good	  hint	  on	  how	   to	   start	   intending	  
innovation	   differently,	   Sutcliffe	   suggests	   concentrating	   on	   that	   cultural	   or	   ethical	  
side	   that	   is	   actually	   excluded	   from	   analysis	   of	   costs/benefits.	   Von	   Schomberg	  
believes	   is	   the	   access	   to	   the	   discourse	   that	   will	   solve	   the	   problems	   currently	  
experienced	  by	  innovation	  processes.	  
	  
However,	  we	   believe	   that	   they	   all	   represent	   only	   a	   partial	   contribution	   to	   the	   RRI	  
problematic	  and	  that,	  eventually,	  they	  could	  even	  represent	  a	  slippery	  whether	  not	  
dangerous	   development	   of	   RRI	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   supporting	   existing	   ideologies.	   This	  
perspective	  is	  justified	  according	  to	  a	  general	  normative	  frame	  and	  can	  be	  divided	  in	  
two	  main	  sub-­‐criticisms.	  	  
The	   first	   sub-­‐criticism	   is	   a	   detailed	   one,	   understanding	   the	   weak	   points	   of	   each	  
position.	  The	  second	  one	  would	  show	  that	  a	  problem	  relies	  also	  and	  especially	  in	  the	  
attempt	  of	  providing	  a	  definition	   (literally	   to	  set	  borders),	  operation	  that	  closes	  up	  
for	   context-­‐based	  contributions	  or	  novelties	   (conditions	   in	   there	  are	  necessary	  but	  
not	  sufficient).	  The	  three	  perspectives	  are	  then	  combined	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  spur	  
from	   the	   same	   understanding	   of	   norms	   construction	   and	   from	   a	   rationalistic	  
[(Apriori/top-­‐down)	  to	  settle	  a	  priori	  the	  conditions	  means	  also	  to	  adopt	  a	  top-­‐down	  
approach	  to	  the	  future	  and	  especially	  to	  life	  in	  its	  variety,	  in	  its	  unpredictability.	  
	  
Van	   den	   Hoven’s	   definition	   is	   perhaps	   the	   less	   ambitious	   of	   the	   three	   but	   at	   the	  
same	  time	  the	  more	  realistic.	  What	  is	  hinting	  at	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  is	  not	  really	  possible	  
to	   predict	   outcomes	   of	   innovations	   and	   therefore	   the	   maximum	   we	   can	   do	   is	   to	  
prepare	   to	   the	   enlargement	   of	   potential	   actions	   to	   take	   or	   even	   the	   novelty	   of	  
possibilities.	  Although	   it	   is	   interesting	  the	  connection	  he	  make	  between	   innovation	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as	   product	   and	   innovation	   as	   a	   cognitive	   framing,	   he	   doesn’t	   seem	   to	   offer	  more	  
than	  what	  we	  already	  know.	   Innovation	   is	  about	  novelty	  and	   its	   consequences	  are	  
hard	  whether	  to	  some	  extent	   impossible	  to	  determine	   in	  advance.	  As	  we	  said,	   this	  
indication	  assumes	  a	  crucial	  importance	  as	  an	  implicit	  criticism	  to	  current	  paradigms	  
but	  it	  doesn’t	  indicate	  any	  feasible	  or	  practical	  solution.	  
Hilary	   Sutcliffe’s	   one	   (trying	   to	   get	   better	   at	   anticipating	   problems,	   taking	   into	  
account	   wider	   social,	   ethical	   and	   environmental	   issues	   and	   being	   able	   to	   create	  
flexible	  and	  adaptive	  systems	  to	  deal	  with	  these	  unintended	  consequences”),	  seems	  
to	   focus	  on	   the	  enlargement	  of	  normative	   stands	  particularly	   stressing	  ethical	   and	  
environmental	  issues.	  As	  we	  highlighted,	  this	  enlightenment	  appears	  a	  good	  path	  to	  
take	  into	  account	  whether	  not	  a	  necessary	  one	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  conception	  of	  
RRI	   diverse	   from	   the	   leading	   ones.	   However,	   the	   language	   or	   the	   underlying	  
paradigm	   doesn’t	   appear	   that	   different.	   Firstly,	   she	   talks	   about	   anticipating	  
problems	  giving	  the	  hint	  that	  the	  crucial	  side	  of	  the	  entire	  process	  is	  not	  to	  invert	  the	  
tendency	  of	  mathematically	  assessing	  reality	  and	  the	  future,	  but	  rather	  trying	  to	  get	  
better	  at	   it.	   This	   impression	   finds	   a	   further	   ground	  when	   she	  defines	   the	  practical	  
task	  connected	  to	  it,	  that	   is,	  creating	  flexible	  and	  adaptive	  systems.	   It	   is	  quite	  clear	  
that	  this	  system	  could	  and	  should	  be	  created	  post-­‐factum	  in	  case	  we	  didn’t	  manage	  
to	  foreseen	  unintended	  consequences	  in	  order	  to	  deal	  with	  them.	  The	  entire	  picture	  
emerges	  as	  management	  of	  risks	  and	  negative	  consequences	  instead	  of	  indicating	  a	  
structural	  way	  of	  constructing	  the	  process	  of	  innovation.	  It	  ends	  up	  in	  showing	  that	  
innovation	   can	   be	   controlled	   either	   before,	   through	  means	   of	   risk	   assessment,	   or	  
after	  by	  systems	  that	  can	  paper	  over	  the	  cracks.	  
There	   is	   also	   another	   passage	   in	   this	   definition	   that	   indicates	   a	   deeper	   concern.	  
Sutcliffe	   divides	   ethics	   from	   environment	   as	   if	   they	   were	   two	   different	   things	   or	  
fields.	  Given	  that	  environment	  needs	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  a	  specific	  domain	  in	  order	  
to	   be	   carefully	   handled,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   why	   it	   shouldn’t	   be	   considered	   an	   ethical	  
problem,	  or	  the	  other	  way	  round,	  why	  ethics	  is	  not	  affected	  by	  environmental	  issues.	  
This	  understanding,	  reducing	  the	  space	  of	  ethics	  to	  (we	  suppose)	  humans,	  confuses	  
ethics	  with	  morality	  (although	  morality	  cannot	  be	  really	  confined	  to	  human-­‐beings,	  
in	  a	  certain	  way	  we	  imagine	  this	  is	  the	  sense	  Sutcliffe	  assigned	  to	  it).	  But	  in	  this	  way,	  
the	   environment,	   nature,	   assumes	   the	   traits	   of	   a	   mere	   object	   that	   we	   have	   to	  
preserve	  in	  order	  to	  survive.	  It	  goes	  without	  saying	  that	  this	  demarcation	  goes	  along	  
with	   the	  exploitation	  of	  nature	   for	  human	  scopes	   that	   finds	   its	   theoretical	   roots	   in	  
the	   Marxian	   tradition	   of	   production	   development.	   However,	   to	   consider	   human	  
beings	   as	   detached	   in	   some	   ways	   from	   the	   environment,	   to	   believe	   that	   human	  
beings	  are	  not	  the	  ‘Environment’	  themselves	  and	  therefore	  to	  make	  a	  demarcation	  
between	   ethics	   and	   the	   environment	   means	   to	   miss	   the	   crucial	   point	   about	  
responsible	   innovation	  and	  to	  remain	   in	  the	  same	  paradigm	  of	  mathematization	  of	  
life.	  	  Ethics	  is	  exactly	  about	  the	  connections	  not	  between	  a	  subject	  and	  an	  object,	  but	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between	  the	  different	  layers	  of	  the	  subjects.	  We	  can’t	  go	  here	  into	  an	  explanation	  of	  
ethics,	  but	  it	  will	  emerge	  along	  the	  development	  of	  our	  deliverable.	  
	  
Von	   Schomberg	   surely	   provided	   the	   most	   articulated	   and	   dense	   definition.	   This	  
density	  makes	   it	   at	   the	   same	   time	   really	   difficult	   and	   really	   easy	   to	   criticize.	   Von	  
Schomberg	  (“transparent,	  interactive	  process	  by	  which	  societal	  actors	  and	  innovators	  
become	  mutually	  responsive	  to	  each	  other	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  (ethical)	  acceptability,	  
sustainability	  and	   societal	  desirability	  of	   the	   innovation	  process	  and	   its	  marketable	  
products”)	   defining	   RRI	   as	   a	   process	   where	   two	   different	   subjects	   (societal	   actors	  
and	   innovators)	   increasingly	   become	   (responsive),	   settles	   it	   on	   a	   interesting	   path.	  
The	  dimension	  to	  be	  highlighted	  has	  to	  be	  a	  communicative	  one	  along	  a	  process	  that	  
makes	   actors	   increasingly	   closer	   to	   each	   other.	   Von	   Schomberg	   chooses	   the	  
responsive	   side	   of	   responsibility	   showing	   how	   responsibility	   embeds	   this	  
communication	  significance,	  this	  enacting	  device	  in	  order	  to	  coordinate	  the	  process	  
of	   innovation.	   However,	   the	   transparency	   of	   the	   process	   could	   create	   some	  
difficulties	   if	   taken	   in	   its	   fully	   ontological	   sense.	   To	   be	   transparent	   in	   fact	   could	  
seriously	  affect	  complex	  processes	  of	  research	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  information.	  But	  also	  
transparency	  has	  etymologically	  a	  double	  meaning,	  the	  one	  of	   letting	  someone	  see	  
and	  the	  other	  of	  adopting	  a	  perspective,	  a	  filter	  to	  see.	  It	   is	  not	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  
that	  then	  transparency	  could	  be	  considered	  not	  simply	  neutral.	  	  
Besides,	  and	  here	  rise	  the	  difficulty	  connected	  with	  density	  of	   the	  definition,	   if	   the	  
process	  has	  to	  also	  keep	  an	  eye	  on	  marketization	  (that	   is	  also	  an	  important	  side	  of	  
every	   innovation)	   how	   could	   it	   be	   completely	   transparent?	   There	   are	   certain	  
sensitive	  data	  that	  can’t	  be	  made	  public	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  competition	  and	  most	  
of	  all	  labs,	  companies,	  and	  industries	  simply	  don’t	  want	  to.	  	  
Also	   the	   social	   desirability	   appears	   to	   be	   a	   vague	   and	   therefore	   slippery	   concept,	  
especially	  when	  connected	  to	  transparency.	  To	  consider	  RRI	   in	  its	  social	  desirability	  
could	   mean	   different	   things.	   It	   could	   imply	   a	   discussion,	   a	   co-­‐construction,	   but	   it	  
could	   also	   signifies	   that	   innovations	   (!)	   should	   stick	   to	  what	   it	   is	   considered	   to	   be	  
appealable	   (or	   sellable)	   to	   the	   people.	   But	   what	   if	   the	   transparency	   at	   an	   earlier	  
stage	  makes	  a	  prototype	  not	  appealing	  enough	  cause	  all	  the	  developments	  are	  not	  
understood?	  And	  what,	  on	  the	  other	  side,	  if	  a	  research	  process	  is	  socially	  desirable	  at	  
an	  earlier	  stage	  but	  it	  is	  not	  at	  a	  later	  one?	  Moreover	  what	  should	  the	  consequences	  
be	   if	  something	   is	  considered	  to	  be	  not	  socially	  desirable?	  Perhaps,	   it	  could	  be	  the	  
case	   that	   certain	   kind	   of	   projects	   or	   fields	   won’t	   be	   able	   to	   receive	   funds	   and	  
therefore	  entire	  sectors	  of	  knowledge	  could	  go	  lost.	  
All	  these	  minor	  questions	  raise	  some	  deeper	  concerns,	   in	  particular	  three.	  The	  first	  
one	  is	  the	  time	  dimension	  that	  seems	  to	  be	  lacking	  in	  this	  definition.	  There’s	  no	  hint	  
or	  suggestion	  about	  the	  different	  timing	  that	  an	  innovation	  process	  faces	  and	  with	  it	  
all	   the	  related	   interactions.	  These	   last	  ones	  cannot	  be	  considered	   in	   the	  same	  way	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without	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  research	  phase.	  It	  is	  quite	  reasonable	  to	  affirm	  that	  
the	   further	   the	   research	   process	   goes	   the	   stronger	   the	   co-­‐construction	   should	   be.	  
And	   at	   the	   same	   time,	   at	   a	   really	   early	   stage	   of	   the	   process,	   the	   creative	   one,	  
innovation	  should	  be	  better	  left	  in	  its	  own	  free	  dimension.	  	  
A	   second	   layer	   is	   a	   political	   one.	   What	   seems	   to	   be	   stressed	   here	   is	   the	  
communication	   side	   of	   research.	   Communication	   and	   access	   to	   information	  
represent	   a	   sufficient	   and	   necessary	   condition	   for	   innovation	   to	   be	   considered	  
responsible.	  But	  the	  questions	  would	  then	  be	  several:	  who	  provides	  the	  information,	  
in	  which	  way	  and	  with	  what	  aim?	  The	  criticisms	  of	  discourse	  regimes	  and	  ideologies	  
have	  been	   carried	  out	   extensively	   enough	   for	   needing	   a	   resume28.	   But	   assembling	  
ethics,	   market	   and	   communication	   requires	   more	   than	   a	   simple	   omni-­‐
comprehensive	  sentence.	  We	  need	  to	  define	  what	  are	  the	  structures,	  the	  aims,	  and	  
the	  normative	  background	  would	  be	  required.	  	  
And	   this	   last	   point	   leads	   us	   directly	   to	   the	   second	   perspective	   from	   which	   these	  
definitions	  could	  be	  questioned	  for	  the	  reason	  that	  every	  definition	  could	  be	  as	  well.	  	  
A	  definition	  is	  a	  predetermined	  sum	  of	  characteristics	  that	  (pre)	  de-­‐fines	  what	  could	  
be	  labelled	  as	  such.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  RRI,	  to	  provide	  a	  definition	  means	  to	  not	  take	  into	  
account	  the	  dynamic	  and	  dialectic	  nature	  of	  RRI.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  particularly	  in	  von	  
Schomberg’s	  definition	  the	  time	   line	   is	  completely	  absent	  and	  this	   implies	   that	   the	  
criteria	   are	   already	   settled.	   But	   this	   raises	   many	   doubts	   concerning	   the	   strict	  
demarcation	   of	   what	   stays	   out	   and	   what	   stays	   in	   from	   the	   RRI	   label	   in	   terms	   of	  
internal	   time	  of	  an	   innovation.	  But	  also,	  and	  most	  of	  all,	   implies	   that	   the	  different	  
normativities	  are	  tackled	  in	  a	  mere	  procedural	  way.	  The	  different	  issues	  at	  stake	  in	  
one	   definition	   (ethics,	   economy,	   law,	   etc.)	   could	   be	   clashing	   ones	   and	   a	   simple	  
procedural	   structure	   could	   represent	   an	   inefficacious	   whether	   not	   ideological	  
manner	  to	  cope	  with	  them.	  Besides,	  how	  can	  we	  define	  what	  is	  ethical,	  desirable,	  etc.	  
a	   priori?	   All	   these	   difficulties	   make	   us	   understand	   that	   the	   proceduralism	  
crosscutting	  every	  definition	  relies	  on	  a	  rationalistic	  understanding	  of	  normativity.	  If	  
the	  different	  normative	   settings	   are	  already	  pre-­‐established	  and	   ranked,	  or	   if	   they	  
are	  neutralized	   in	   their	   vital	  energy	  by	  a	  proceduralist	   structure,	   then	  we	   loose	  all	  
the	   significance	   that	   a	   norm	   embeds.	   Its	   power	   goes	   far	   beyond	   a	   mere	   rational	  
compromise	  or	  adherence	  to	  rules,	  and	  that	   is	  exactly	  the	  difficulty	  that	  rises	  from	  
the	  entire	  responsible	  innovation	  attempt.	  
	  
One	  of	   the	  perspectives	   from	  which	  we	  could	  define	   the	  problematic	  outcomes	  of	  
current	  manners	  of	   coping	  with	   responsibility	   in	   innovation	  processes	   is	  exactly	  by	  
highlighting	  the	  relation	  between	  rationality	  and	  normativity.	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It	   is	  quite	  clear	  that	   in	  both,	  actual	  management	  of	   innovation	  within	  research	  and	  
current	  attempt	  to	  overcome	  those	  limits,	  we	  find	  an	  unbalanced	  relation	  between	  
rationality	  and	  normativity.	  There	  are	  two	  main	  sub-­‐sets	  of	  this	  disequilibrium	  that	  
indicates	  the	  very	  nature	  of	  this	  distortion	  and	  its	  limits.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  we	  could	  
find	   the	   preference	   of	   only	   one	   normative	   set	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   others.	   For	  
instance,	  and	  this	   is	  the	  actual	  tendency,	  we	  could	  find	  reasoning	  on	  an	  innovation	  
only	   in	   terms	  of	   costs/benefits	   or	  maybe	   reduce	   it	   to	   legal	   terms.	   In	   this	  way	  one	  
priority	   is	   established,	   either	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   and	   decisions	   are	  made	  within	  
that	   single	   normative	   sets.	   So,	   even	   if	   some	   clashes	   are	   still	   possible,	   being	   the	  
objective	   quite	   clear	   and	   the	   normative	   preferences	   more	   or	   less	   uniform,	   the	  
agreement	  is	  easier	  to	  reach.	  	  
But,	  if	  preferring	  one	  normative	  set	  could	  be	  sometimes	  acceptable	  for	  specific	  cases,	  
i.e.	  we	  could	  use	  the	  legal	  terms	  to	  determine	  legal	  responsibilities	  in	  some	  kind	  of	  
innovation	  processes,	   it	   seems	   to	  create	  some	  difficulties	   in	   some	  other	  cases.	  For	  
instance	   if	  we	   consider	  bigger	   innovations	  or	   the	   so-­‐called	   radical	  or	  disruptive	   (in	  
Schumpeterian	   terms)	  ones.	   In	   this	   case	   the	   range	  of	  potential	   consequences	   is	   so	  
wide	   that	   taking	   into	   account	   or	   preferring	   only	   one	   side	   of	   the	   question	   doesn’t	  
seem	  to	  be	  simply	  enough.	  Given	  the	  example	  of	  GMO,	  the	  considerations	  for	  legal	  
matters	  or	  economic	  benefits	  for	  certain	  purposes	  don’t	  imply	  the	  understanding	  of	  
other	  side	  effects	  that	  were	  shown	  to	  be	  ignoring	  different	  normative	  claims.	  	  
	  
On	  the	  other	  hand	  we	  could	  take	  into	  account	  different	  normative	  perspectives	  and	  
therefore	  understand	  one	   issue	  from	  many	   layers.	  But	  still,	   the	  problem	  rises	   from	  
the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  obvious	  clashes	  are	  then	  managed.	  The	  tendency	   in	  this	  case	  
seems	   to	   be	   the	   one	   of	   relying	   on	   rationalistic	   presuppositions	   where	   the	   right	  
decision,	  or	   the	   last	  one,	  will	  be	   taken	  and	  accepted	  because	   rationally	  valid.	   “The	  
main	   words	   are	   operational	   research	   and	   system	   analysis,	   mathematization	   and	  
rational	  choice,	  optimization	  of	  resources	  and	  help	  to	  decision”	  (Pestre	  2013).	  
This	   shows	   us	   that	   the	   common	  methodology	   by	   which	   innovation	   is	   tackled	   is	   a	  
rationalistic	   one,	   either	   we	   find	   it	   in	   explicitly	   preferring	   specific	   (rationalistic)	  
normative	   sets	   like	   the	  economic	  one,	  either	   it	   emerges	   from	   the	  decision	  making	  
process	   that	   adopts	   a	   rationalistic	   justificatory	  met-­‐level.	   The	   two	   layers	   find	   their	  
common	  root	   in	  their	  way	  of	  handling	  norms	  as	   if	   they	  were	  objects	   that	  could	  be	  
assessed,	  placed,	  displaced	  and	  dismissed.	  	  
We	   need	   to	   briefly	   explain	   why	   we	   believe	   that	   such	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	  
relation	   between	   rationality	   and	   normativity	   turns	   out	   to	   be	  weak	   from	   a	   logical,	  
ethical	  and	  political	  perspective.	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2.3.2.	  Three	  layers	  of	  analysis	  of	  RRI:	  Logical,	  Ethical	  and	  Political	  
	  
If	  we	  focus	  on	  RRI	  this	  hypothesis	  becomes	  quite	  clear.	  As	  we	  said,	  one	  the	  common	  
problems	  with	   RRI	   is	   how	   to	  merge	   responsibility	  with	   innovation	   given	   that	   they	  
seems	  to	  be	  antithetic	  concept.	  This	  is	  because	  responsibility,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  tends	  
to	  be	  conflated	  to	  its	  objective	  and	  rational	  understanding.	  	  
One	  of	   the	   commonalities	   of	   quite	   all	   the	   approaches	   to	   responsible	   innovation	   is	  
the	  fact	  that	  responsibility	  is	  understood	  as	  an	  object,	  external,	  that	  can	  be	  assigned,	  
moved	  or	  removed.	  Being	  considered	  in	  such	  a	  way	  implies	  that	  responsibility	  can	  be	  
delimitated	  and	  therefore	  measured.	  To	  be	  responsible	   is	  then	  intended	  as:	  who	  is	  
going	  to	  compensate	  the	  negative	  outcomes	  if	  something	  goes	  wrong?	  Therefore,	  it	  
is	  not	  by	  chance	  that	  responsibility	  is	  nowadays	  intended	  as	  a	  negative	  factor	  merely	  
connected	  to	  some	  legal	  or	  economical	  compensation	  (something	  we	  could	  say	  that	  
might	  put	  us	  in	  the	  position	  to	  incur	  some	  debts)	  and,	  accordingly,	  is	  conceived	  as	  a	  
factor	  to	  escape	  from,	  or	  to	  delegate	  to	  some	  anonymous	   institutions.	   In	  this	  way,	  
responsibility	  is	  believed	  to	  be	  easily	  determined,	  assessed	  and	  assigned.	  	  
If	  only	  one	  single	  normative	  set	  is	  chosen,	  the	  legal	  one	  for	  instance,	  it	  becomes	  easy	  
to	  determine	  the	  margins	  of	  risk	  and	  compensation	  enough	  for	  innovation	  to	  appear	  
safe	  in	  its	  outcomes.	  Also	  from	  a	  pluralistic	  perspective,	  one	  that	  takes	  into	  account	  
different	  normative	  settings,	  the	  capacity	  of	  rationally	  establishing	  costs	  and	  benefits	  
appears	   to	   be	   the	   perfect	   solution	   in	   order	   to	   merge	   different	   aspects	   together	  
through	   a	   comparative	   quantitative	   approach	   (if	   the	   legal	   normative	   side	   is	  
respected	   and	   quantified	   in	   x	   and	   the	   profits	   are	   foreseen	   to	   be	   y,	   then	   the	  
innovation	  should	  proceed).	  	  	  
This	   latter	   level	   of	   justification	   is	   usually	   pursued	   through	   means	   of	   rationalistic	  
foresight	  or	  assessment.	  In	  other	  words,	  someone	  decides	  these	  proportions	  and	  the	  
overall	   calculation	   determining	   before	   all	   the	   potential	   outcomes.	   The	   actors	  who	  
will	  be	  subjected	  to	  those	  consequences	  will	  accept	  them	  being	  foreseen	  according	  
to	  some	  rationalistic	  justification.	  
This	   kind	   of	   methodology	   doesn’t	   seem	   to	   represent	   an	   optimal	   condition	   for	  
responsible	   innovation	   given	   that	   in	  most	   of	   the	   cases	   doesn’t	   help	   in	   solving	   the	  
knots	  related	  to	  negative	  outcomes.	  	  
This	  means	  that	  this	  way	  of	  coping	  with	  ethical	  issues,	  in	  the	  end	  responsibility	  has	  a	  
strong	  ethical	  ground,	  doesn’t	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  most	  effective	  one.	  
We	  believe	  that	  there	  are	  three	  main	  sides	  from	  which	  we	  could	  detect	  mistakes	  in	  
considering	  responsibility	  as	  a	  mere	  risk	  assessment	  procedure.	  	  
Analysing	  it	  from	  a	  logical	  perspective,	  we	  can	  detect	  the	  attempt	  to	  determine	  the	  
unknown	  as	  paradoxical.	  From	  and	  ethic	  perspective	  confusion	  between	  subjective	  
and	  objective	  understanding	  of	  responsibility	  creates	  undesired	  counter	  effects.	  And	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thirdly,	  from	  a	  political	  perspective,	  the	  rationalization	  of	  normativities	  turns	  out	  to	  
be	  ineffective.	  Lets	  explain	  further	  these	  assumptions.	  
	  	  	  
Stated	   that	   responsibility	   is	   in	   the	  end	  an	  ethical	   issue,	  measuring	  and	  quantifying	  
responsibility	  means	  to	  reduce	  ethics	  to	  a	  sort	  of	  mathematical	  object.	  As	  stated	  by	  
Pestre,	  nowadays	  “the	  debate	  […]	  is	  still	  being	  conducted	  exclusively	  or	  dominantly	  in	  
the	  terms	  and	  formulas	  of	  natural	  science”	  (Pestre	  2013).	  
And	  this	  sort	  of	  methodology	  generates	  some	  problems	  from	  a	   logical	  perspective,	  
when	  we	  try	  to	  understand	  how	  to	  insert	  in	  the	  ‘calculation’	  unforeseen	  factors.	  	  
If	  we	  admit	   the	  possibility	  of	  operating	  a	  calculation	  of	  potential	  consequences	  we	  
have	  to	  presuppose	  also	  that	  the	  unknown	  is	  knowable	  a	  priori.	  But	  this	  appears	  to	  
be	  a	   contradiction	   in	  principles.	  How	  could	  we	   think	   the	  calculability	  of	   something	  
that	  we	  don’t	  know,	  the	  rationalization	  of	  the	  irrational?	  Maybe	  with	  an	  x	  that	  could	  
contain	  all	  the	  options.	  But	  is	  it	  really	  possible	  to	  determine	  exhaustively	  the	  value	  of	  
an	   x?	   Either	   we	   consider	   that	   the	   future	   embedded	   in	   responsibility	   can	   be	   fully	  
determined	  and	  therefore	  reducible	  to	  some	  sort	  of	  risk	  assessment	  or	  we	  have	  to	  
believe	   that	   there	   is	   a	   sphere	   that	   stays	   out	   of	   this	   assessment.	   If	  we	   choose	   this	  
second	   option,	   given	   that	   the	   first	   already	   showed	   practical	   limits,	   we	   can	   easily	  
understand	  that	  having	  an	  unknown	  external	  space,	  means	  that	  also	  the	  size	  of	  this	  
space	   is	  unknown	  and	  accordingly	   could	  be	  even	  much	  bigger	   than	   the	   size	  of	   the	  
known	  one.	  
We	   don’t	   want	   to	   deny	   the	   importance	   of	   compensation	   coming	   out	   from	   a	   risk	  
assessment	   or	   similar,	   either	   they	   are	   expressed	   in	   backward	   or	   forward	   terms,	  
either	   economic	   or	   juridical.	   Justice	   and	   law	   restrictions	   are	   the	   main	   basis	   of	   a	  
society,	  no	  matters	  what	  kind	  of	  modern	  society	  we	  are	  looking	  at.	  As	  suggested	  by	  
von	  Neumann,	  “every	  behaviour	  that	  is	  unambiguously	  describable	  in	  a	  finite	  number	  
of	  words	   is	   computable	  by	  a	  network	  of	   formal	  neurons”29.	  But,	   at	   the	   same	   time,	  
could	  we	  affirm	  that	  a	  space	  exists	  that	  falls	  out	  of	  those	  assessments	  and	  cannot	  be	  
known	  a	  priori,	  and	  consequently	  cannot	  be	  assimilated	  or	  neutralized.	  Or	   in	  other	  
words,	   “is	   it	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   as	   a	   practical	   matter	   that	   our	   most	   complex	  
behaviours	  are	  describable	  in	  their	  totality,	  without	  ambiguity,	  using	  a	  finite	  number	  
of	  words?”.30	  Although	  we	  could	  surely	  say	  that	  it	  depends	  on	  the	  specificity	  of	  the	  
case	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that	   on	   the	   other	   side	   this	   state	   of	   things	   tend	   to	   reduce	   the	  
complexity	  of	  the	  context	  to	  manageable	  issues.	  	  “The	  dimensions	  of	  the	  hazard	  are	  
limited	  from	  the	  very	  beginning	  to	  technical	  manageability.	  In	  some	  circles	  it	   is	  said	  
that	   risks	   which	   are	   not	   yet	   technically	  manageable	   do	   not	   exist	   –	   at	   least	   not	   in	  
scientific	  calculation	  or	  jurisdictional	  judgment.	  These	  incalculable	  threats	  add	  up	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  Dupuy	  &	  Grinbaum	  (2005)	  
30	  Ibid.	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an	   unknown	   residual	   risk	   which	   becomes	   the	   industrial	   endowment	   for	   everyone	  
everywhere”31.	  
	  Even	  more,	  it	  doesn’t	  appear	  wrong	  to	  affirm	  that	  the	  main	  problem	  connected	  with	  
responsible	  innovation	  lies	  exactly	  in	  this	  obscure	  area.	  In	  fact,	  if	  responsibility	  could	  
be	   calculated,	   it	  wouldn’t	   be	   such	   a	   problem	  defining	   a	   conception	   of	   responsible	  
innovation.	  But	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  a	  problem,	  and	  a	  complex	  one,	  persists	  exactly	  for	  
the	  fact	  that	  not	  everything	  can	  be	  foreseen.	  	  
	  
From	   another	   perspective,	   an	  ethical	   one,	   being	   objectivized	  means	   that	   ethics	   is	  
deprived	   of	   its	   subjective	   connotations	   and	   relegated	   to	   an	   understandable	   and	  
knowledgeable	  issue	  (for	  the	  sake	  of	  transparency?).	  But	  then,	  all	  the	  other	  spheres	  
that	   are	   implied	   in	   every	   ethical	   decision	   end	   up	   by	   being	   ignored	   with	   all	   the	  
potential	   dangers	   of	   such	   a	   reductive	   conception.	   “It	   remains	   unrecognized	   that	   a	  
social,	   cultural	   and	   political	   meaning	   is	   inherent	   in	   such	   scientific	   ‘immiseration	  
formulas’.	   There	   exists	   accordingly	   a	   danger	   that	   an	   environmental	   discussion	  
conducted	   exclusively	   in	   chemical,	   biological	   and	   technological	   terms	   will	  
inadvertently	   include	   human	   beings	   in	   the	   picture	   only	   as	   organic	  material”	   (Beck	  
1992).	  	  	  
But	   are	   we	   really	   sure	   that	   ethically	   speaking	   we	   can	   reduce	   responsibility	   to	   its	  
rational	   justification	   considering	   that	   “the	   social	   effect	   of	   risk	   definitions	   is	   not	  
dependent	   on	   their	   scientific	   validity”32?	   Are	   we	   sure	   that	   the	   tribunal	   of	   reason	  
represents	  a	  necessary	  and	  also	  sufficient	  condition	  to	  exhausts	   the	  ethic	   layers	  of	  
an	   innovation?	  Because,	  objectifying	   responsibility,	   shaping	   it,	  means	   to	   shape	   the	  
future,	   signifies	   to	   pretend	   to	   enclose	   all	   the	   energy,	   the	   power,	   coming	   from	   life	  
itself	   and	   its	   unpredictable	   manifestations	   and	   combinations,	   in	   one	   narrow	   box.	  
This	  implies	  that,	  all	  the	  processes	  connected	  with	  responsible	  innovation,	  that	  tend	  
to	  have	   sooner	  or	   later	   repercussions	  on	   the	   subject	   (in	   the	  end	   it	  wouldn’t	  make	  
much	  sense	  to	  speak	  of	  responsibility	  if	  actors	  weren’t	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  involved,	  
in	  this	  sense	  the	  etymology	  of	  the	  word	  could	  tell	  us	  a	  lot	  about	  it),	  can	  be	  conceived	  
in	  mere	   terms	  of	   compensation.	   But	   then,	   if	  we	   accept	   this,	   and	   given	   that	   ethics	  
appears	  to	  embed	  more	  than	  its	  objective	  side,	  the	  effects	  of	  those	  same	  processes,	  
of	  innovation	  to	  make	  it	  clear,	  will	  manifest	  themselves	  reifying	  subjective	  matters,	  
or	  even	  ignoring	  completely	  them.	  As	  showed	  quite	  clearly	  by	  many	  authors	  (Adorno	  
&	  Horkheimer,	  the	  Marxian	  tradition	  going	  from	  Lukács	  to	  Honneth,	  and	  last	  but	  not	  
least	  Foucault),	   if	  we	  treat	  nature	  only	  with	   the	  aim	  of	  dominating	  her/it,	   then	  we	  
are	  prosecuting	  a	  dominion	  on	  human	  beings	  themselves,	  given	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  are	  
not	   only	   subjects	   on	   nature	   but	   also	   objects	   of	   nature.	   The	   interconnections	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  Beck,	  p.29.	  
32	  Beck,	  p.32.	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between	  subject	  and	  object,	  nature	  and	  culture,	  science	  and	  ethics,	  life	  and	  strategy,	  
can’t	  never	  be	  fully	  distinguished	  or	  isolated.	  	  
According	   to	   Dupuy	   &	   Grinbaum	   (2005)	   this	   drift	   can	   be	   understood	   also	   as	   the	  
reduction	  of	  the	  conception	  of	  nature	  that	  has	  been	  undergoing	  within	  some	  natural	  
sciences,	  especially	  in	  the	  NBIC	  convergence.	  The	  believe	  that	  this	  process	  could	  be	  
exemplified	   on	   two	   main	   scores.	   “Firstly,	   the	   ambition	   to	   (re)make	   nature	   is	   an	  
important	   dimension	   of	   the	   metaphysical	   underpinnings	   of	   the	   field.	   If	   the	   NBIC	  
converging	  technologies	  purport	  to	  take	  over	  Nature’s	  and	  Life’s	  job	  and	  become	  the	  
engineers	   of	   evolution,	   it	   is	   because	   they	   have	   redefined	  Nature	   and	   Life	   in	   terms	  
that	  belong	  to	  the	  realm	  of	  artifacts”33.	  
But	   this	   will	   lead	   to	   a	   situation	   that	   the	   two	   authors	   describe,	   following	   von	  
Neumann,	  as	  such:	  “it	  will	  be	  an	  inevitable	  temptation,	  not	  to	  say	  a	  task	  or	  a	  duty,	  
for	  the	  nanotechnologists	  of	  the	  future	  to	  set	  off	  processes	  upon	  which	  they	  have	  no	  
control.	  The	  sorcerer’s	  apprentice	  myth	  must	  be	  updated:	  it	  is	  neither	  by	  error	  nor	  by	  
terror	  that	  Man	  will	  be	  dispossessed	  of	  his	  own	  creations	  but	  by	  design”34.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  This	   aspect	   rises	   also	   if	  we	   take	   into	  account	  potential	   cross	   cutting	  outcomes	  of	  
innovation.	   The	   possibility	   of	   a	   comparative	   assessment	   makes	   sense	   only	   if	   we	  
forget	  that	  norms	  and	  normative	  settings	  have	  a	  personal	  binding	  power	  that	  cannot	  
be	  reduced	  to	  a	  formula.	   Ignoring	  the	  subjective	   importance	  of	  norms	  produce	  the	  
belief	  that	  different	  normative	  structures	  could	  be	  put	  in	  comparison	  and	  ranked.	  It	  
implies	   furthermore	   that	   those	   same	  actors	   involved	   in	   this	   calculation	  will	   accept	  
and	   agree	   with	   it.	   But	   this	   means	   that	   normative	   settings	   are	   nothing	   else	   that	  
rationally	   chosen	   beliefs	   that	   could	   be	   replaced	   or	   dismissed	   at	   every	  moment	   in	  
favour	   of	   another,	   potentially	   clashing	   or	   self-­‐destructive	   one.	   And,	  we	   know	   that	  
rationality	  doesn’t	  contain	  in	  itself	  the	  conditions	  for	  its	  application	  
Conceived	  in	  these	  terms,	  responsibility	  seems	  to	  loose	  all	  the	  potential	  benefits	  and,	  
besides,	  all	   the	  positive	   importance	   that	   it	  usually	  assumes,	  not	   to	   talk	  of	  any	   real	  
effectiveness.	   If	   responsible	   innovation	   is	   reduced	   to	   a	   simple	   calculation	   of	  
objective	  harms	  without	   taking	   into	  account	   the	   fact	   that	  not	  every	  value	  or	  norm	  
can	   be	   calculated	   and	   predetermined,	   then	   what	   we	   have	   is	   something	   different	  
from	  an	  ethical	  stance.	  
	  
But	  there	  is	  also	  another	  aspect	  connected	  to	  the	  ethical	  and	  logical	  insufficiency	  of	  
a	  reductive	  understanding	  of	  responsible	  innovation	  and	  it’s	  the	  political	  side.	  If	  we	  
can	   say	   that	   it	   is	   ethically	   wrong	   and	   logically	   a	   contradiction	   or	   a	   paradox,	   what	  
about	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   such	  a	   reductive	  approach?	  Does	   it	  work	   in	   real	   terms?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Ibid.	  
34	  Ibid.	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Are	  the	  governance	  approaches	  managing	   innovation	  processes	   in	  a	  correct	  way	   in	  
terms	  of	  reaching	  some	  kind	  of	  objective?	  
Because,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  innovation	  analysis,	  the	  main	  aim	  of	  an	  innovation,	  
even	  when	  considered	  only	  in	  economic	  terms,	  is	  its	  capacity	  of	  improving	  efficiency.	  
On	   the	   acceptions	   and	   significance	   of	   this	   term	  we	   could	   discuss,	   but	   still	   can	  we	  
detect	  efficiency	  in	  general	  terms?	  	  	  
Unfortunately,	   according	   to	   recent	   experiences	   those	   kinds	   of	   approaches	   don’t	  
seem	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  context	  in	  which	  the	  innovation	  has	  been	  
thrown	  often	  rejected	  it	  for	  ethical	  reasons.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  innovation	  have	  been	  conceived	  and	  justified	  in	  rational	  terms	  turned	  
out	   to	   not	   be	   a	   sufficient	   condition	   for	   to	   be	   accepted	   by	   the	   context.	  
Nanotechnologies	   or	   GMOs	   are	   only	   the	   two	  most	   evident	   examples	   of	   what	   we	  
mean	  here.	  This	  spurs	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  prevision	  could	  be	  not	  only	   insufficient	   in	  
terms	  of	  potential	  unknown	  outcomes,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  side	  of	  the	  context	  applying	  
those	   same	   analysis	   and	   criteria	   of	   acceptability.	   A	   rational	   choice	   of	   a	   normative	  
setting	  doesn’t	  contain	   in	   itself	   the	   terms	  of	   its	  own	  application.	  And	   furthermore,	  
the	  reason	  why	  we	  are	  often	  moved	  to	  act	  is	  not	  simply	  expressible	  in	  rational	  terms.	  	  
For	   these	   reasons	   it	   seems	   that	   politically	   speaking,	   these	   kind	   of	   mathematical	  
approaches	   are	   suffering	   from	   many	   weaknesses.	   In	   the	   end	   what	   these	   kind	   of	  
approaches35	  share	   is	   a	   top-­‐down	   (top-­‐down	   is	   also	   expressible	   in	   terms	   of	   time)	  
approach	   based	   on	   rationalistic	   presuppositions	   that	   try	   to	   predict	   and	   plan	  
development	   in	   terms	   of	   economic	   progress	   or	   legal	   and	  medical	   safety.	   But	   they	  
don’t	  succeed	  for	  ethical,	  logical	  and	  political	  reasons.	  	  
This	   generates	   the	  necessity	  of	   thinking	  an	  alternative	  way	   to	   the	  management	  of	  
different	  normative	  settings.	  However,	   the	  problem	  remains	   the	  same:	  how	  do	  we	  
manage	  to	  take	   into	  account	  different	  normative	  understandings	  without	   imposing	  
anything	  neither	  practically	  nor	  theoretically?	  	  
	  
Now	  we	   need	   to	   preserve	   some	   indications	   that	   emerged	   from	   the	   positions	   just	  
analysed.	   Furthermore	   we	   could	   say,	   that	   some	   ingredients	   are	   without	   doubt	  
necessary	   for	   developing	   a	   RRI	   framework.	   What	   is	   missing,	   or	   what	   we	   believe	  
could	  be	  constructed	  differently,	  is	  exactly	  that	  framework.	  
Before	  starting	  to	  depict	  some	  traits	  of	  that	   frame,	  we	  should	  pick	  up	  another	  few	  
important	  features	  of	  RRI.	  This	  should	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  bigger	  quantity	  and	  deeper	  
quality	  of	  key-­‐concept	  for	  our	  frame.	  	  
	  
The	   essay	   previously	  mentioned	   by	   Jack	   Stilgoe	   (Owen	   et	   al.	   2013)	   sees	   different	  
stages	  at	  which	  RRI	  could	  be	  defined	  according	  to	  the	  enhancement	  of	  deliberation,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  To	  have	  a	  quite	  clear	  scenario	  of	  these	  approaches,	  cf.	  Pestre	  (2013)	  and	  also	  Del.	  2.2.	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participation	   and	   reflexivity.	   According	   to	   him	   there	   are	   five	   stages	   that	  we	   could	  
distinguish:	  
	  
1. Safety	  (Legal)	  
2. Compliance	  (Legal,	  Code	  of	  Conduct)	  
3. Framing	  and	  Communication	  (Reflexive,	  Efficient)	  
4. Imagination	  of	  Applications	  and	  Implications	  (Anticipatory,	  Reflexive)	  
5. Hearing	  Public	  and	  Stakeholders	  Views	  (Inclusive,	  Participatory)	  	  
	  
As	   we	   can	   see	   there	   are	   different	   layers	   that	   go	   from	   the	   mere	   legal	   one	   to	   an	  
inclusive,	  participatory	  one.	  As	  anticipated	  during	  the	  analysis	  of	  responsibility,	  these	  
conceptions	  are	  not	  exclusive	  but	  rather	  summing.	  What	  we	  need	  to	  try	  and	  reach	  is	  
exactly	  a	  conception	  of	  RRI	  that	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  participatory	  and	  efficient,	  and	  
this	  means	  to	  go	  through	  different	  stages	  of	  framing	  and	  reflexivity	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  
such	  a	  stage.	  	  
Stilgoe	  summarizes	  four	  characteristics	  that	  Responsible	  Innovation	  as	  such	  requires	  







Figure	  3:	  Characteristics	  of	  responsible	  innovation	  
According	  to	  this	  explanation,	  it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  quite	  easy	  goal	  to	  reach.	  But	  there	  are	  
many	  difficulties	  that	  we	  still	  need	  to	  face	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  a	  successful	  result	  in	  our	  
purposes.	   These	   difficulties	   are	   both	   empirical,	   (why	   don’t	   we	   have	   such	   a	  
conception	   in	   reality	   if	   it	   is	   so	   easy	   to	   define	   and	   assess?)	   and	   theoretical	   (how	  
anticipation	  matches	  with	  responsiveness	  or	  reflexivity?).	  
It	  seems	  that	  also	  here,	  although	  we	  have	  some	  ingredients	  that	  seem	  to	  be	  suiting	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the	   aim	   of	   avoiding	   a	   top-­‐down,	   rationalistic	   drift	   of	   norms	   construction,	   we	   are	  
missing	  articulated	  indications	  and	  a	  time	  frame	  in	  order	  to	  enact	  such	  an	  attempt.	  
	  
Both	   sides	   leads	   us	   to	   the	   hint	   that	   RRI	   is	   a	   conception	   that	   has	   got	   deeper	  
implications	  and	  needs	  therefore	  to	  be	  investigated	  at	  another	  level,	  more	  precisely	  
the	  level	  of	  construction	  of	  norms.	  
	  
Depending	  on	  the	  specific	  field,	  on	  the	  way	  in	  which	  norms	  are	  conceived,	  and	  the	  
way	   in	   which	   they	   are	   handled,	   we	   could	   assemble	   or	   divide	   them	   in	   categories	  
useful	   in	   order	   to	   determine	   how	   responsibility,	   and	   therefore	   the	   underlying	  
normativity,	  are	  constructed.	  If	  these	  norms	  are	  more	  or	  less	  imposed	  by	  the	  specific	  
fields	   or	   if,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   actors	   or	   stakeholders	   manage	   to	   overcome	   those	  
constraints.	  Furthermore	  we	  need	   to	  understand	   in	  which	  way	  normative	  horizons	  
are	  built	  following	  or	  distancing	  themselves	  from	  the	  context,	  and	  if	  this	  process	  is	  a	  
top	  down	  approach	  or	  if	  instead	  is	  pursued	  in	  a	  participatory	  manner.	  Moreover,	  and	  
this	   will	   be	   one	   of	   the	   most	   sensitive	   points,	   how	   participation	   is	   enacted	   and	  
enhanced,	  meaning	  with	  this	  the	  great	  attention	  that	  has	  to	  be	  given	  to	  the	  danger	  
of	  its	  exploitation.	  
	  
We	  already	  have	  many	  questions	  related	  to	  responsible	   innovation	  that	  require	  an	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3.	  The	  construction	  of	  norms	  	  
The	  brief	  depiction	  outlined	  above	  leads	  us	  to	  a	  deeper	  development	  of	  the	  problem	  
and	  connects	  us	  to	  the	  real	  conundrum	  of	  the	  question.	  
As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  Del.	  2.2,	  the	  conception	  of	  responsible	  innovation	  as	  such	  is	  quite	  
new	  in	  Europe.	  But	  the	  question	  that	  rises	  spontaneously	  is	  why	  such	  a	  conception	  
was	  required	  and	  what	  is	  original	  about	  it	  in	  respect	  to	  previous	  frames?	  This	  doubt	  
turns	   out	   to	   be	   deeper	   than	   it	   appears.	   In	   fact,	   given	   that	   research	   had	   several	  
different	   structures	   to	   be	   guided	   from,	   like	  CSR,	   TA,	   PTA,	   etc.,	  why	   all	   these	  were	  
replaced	  by	  RRI	  or	  at	  least	  why	  a	  need	  seems	  to	  be	  felt	  to	  develop	  them?	  
Our	  hypothesis	   is	  that	  this	  shift	  has	  become	  necessary	   in	  order	  to	  develop	  a	   larger	  
dialectical	  frame	  due	  to	  the	  technology	  acceleration	  and	  its	  overlap.	  	  
The	  previous	  paradigms	  were	  still	  connected	  and	  created	  to	  deal	  with	  specific	  ethical	  
matters	  rising	  with	  the	  development	  of	  particular	  technologies.	  All	  of	  them	  tried	  to	  
address	  problems	  from	  a	  specific	  perspective	   in	  order	  to	  solve	  those	   issues.	  But	  as	  
we	   have	   tried	   to	   describe	   previously,	   they	   all	   turned	   out	   to	   assume	   a	   partial	   and	  
therefore	   reductive	   understanding	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   science	   and	   society.	   If	  
some	  of	   them	  assumed	  a	  one-­‐side	  perspective	  meaning	   that	   they	   considered	  only	  
consequences	   in	   particular	   perspectives	   (CSR),	   others	   tried	   to	   assess	   problems	  
adopting	  a	  aprioristic	  structure	  (TA).	  The	  result	  was	  that	  none	  of	  them	  managed	  to	  
sufficiently	   face	  neither	   the	  new	  acceleration	  of	   technology	  nor	   the	  political	   issues	  
that	  emerged	  with	  it.	  	  
RRI	   then,	   has	   been	   developed	   exactly	   in	   order	   to	   overcome	   those	   reductive	  
understandings	  of	  the	  relation	  between	  ethics	  and	  science.	  	  
However,	  far	  from	  being	  clear	  on	  what	  does	  this	  mean,	  the	  question	  that	  we	  should	  
pose	  to	  ourselves	  would	  be,	  how	  can	  we	  develop	  a	  conception	  of	  RRI	  that	  could	  be	  
valid	  for	  all	  the	  contexts	  potentially	  involved	  (even	  on	  a	  different	  time	  line,	  i.e.,	  not	  
existing	  contexts)	  considering	  that	  those	  fields	  are	  based	  on,	  and	  follow,	  different	  set	  
of	   norms,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   fact	   that	  we	   can’t	   impose	   laws	  and	   rules	   to	   the	  
context?	  
	  
The	   entire	   problem	   connected	   with	   a	   conceptual	   frame	   able	   to	   include	   all	  
perspectives	   potentially	   involved	   in	   technology	   innovation	   is	   to	   be	   able	   to	   not	   set	  
any	  a	  priori	  statement.	  If	  we	  have	  different	  perspectives,	  it	  means	  that	  we	  are	  facing	  
different	  normative	  sets	  and	  these	  sets	  have	  a	  practical	  strength,	  a	  power,	  that	  can’t	  
accept	  any	  imposition	  or	  dismissal.	  Different	  normative	  sets	  can’t	  simply	  be	  diluted	  
or	  rejected	  on	  some	  pre-­‐given	  rationalistic	  base	  but	  will	  have	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  deep	  
consideration.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   do	   this	   there	   are	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   question	   that	   we	   would	   need	   to	  
implement,	  a	  theoretical	  and	  a	  practical	  one.	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In	   fact	   on	   the	   one	   hand	  we	   have	   to	   define	   how	   a	   ‘normative	   dialogue’	   could	   and	  
should	  be	  settled	  in	  theoretical	  terms	  so	  that	  we	  can	  draw	  our	  model.	  After	  that	  we	  
need	  to	  transpose	  this	  model	  onto	  reality	  to	  prevent	  ourselves	  from	  incurring	  in	  the	  
same	  rationalistic	  mistake	  we	  are	  trying	  to	  overcome.	  
	  
When	  we	   consider	   closely	   the	   concept	   of	   responsible	   innovation	  we	   cannot	   avoid	  
seeing	   that	   we	   are	   touching	   a	   deeper	   layer,	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   every	   acception	   of	  
responsibility,	   the	  one	  of	  normativity.	  To	   refer	   to	   responsible	   innovation	  means	   to	  
address	   the	   problem	   of	   normativity	   that	   grounds	   every	   theoretical	   and	   practical	  
conception.	  	  
	  
So	  then,	  the	  main	  general	  question	  should	  be	  posed	  in	  a	  different	  and	  deeper	  form.	  
How	   can	   we	   think	   of	   a	   governance	   approach	   that	   would	   make	   different	   norms	  
implied	  in	  different	  conceptions	  of	  responsibility	  communicate	  with	  each	  other	  in	  an	  
open	  way	  aiming	  at	  reaching	  one	  shared	  normative	  horizon?	  How	  do	  we	  create	  and	  
promote	   a	  meta-­‐normative	   dimension	  without	   falling	   back	   into	   the	   paradigms	  we	  
previously	  highlighted?	  
	  
3.1.	  A	  limited	  approach	  to	  norms	  construction:	  SIM	  Presupposition	  	  
We	  need	  to	  choose	  a	  critical	  theory	  that	  could	  support	  our	  investigations	  and	  help	  us	  
in	  finding	  a	  solution	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  norms	  are	  constructed,	  used	  and	  reflected	  
upon.	  Our	  main	   concerns	  are	  exactly	   to	  not	  presuppose	  a	  normative	   frame	  but	   to	  
build	   one	   that	   manages	   to	   take	   into	   account	   single	   values	   contained	   in	   norms,	  
transforming	  them	  into	  a	  new,	  shared	  common	  normative	  horizon.	  	  
For	   this	   reason	   we	   consider	   the	   Louvain’s	   (Lenoble	   &	   Maesschalck,	   2003,	   2006)	  
contextual	  pragmatic	  theory	  to	  be	  helpful,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  underlining	  the	  
limitations	  of	  every	  theory	  that	  presupposes	  the	  conditions	  that	  makes	  the	  exercise	  
of	  reason	  possible.	  This	  is	  true	  for	  all	  the	  ethical	  approaches	  that	  are	  characterized,	  
according	   to	   Lenoble	   and	   Maesschalck’s	   terms,	   by	   “intentionalist,	   mentalist,	   and	  
schematising”	  presuppositions.	  	  
By	   this,	   the	   two	   authors	   intend	   the	  way	   in	  which	   norms	   are	   ‘constructed’,	   that	   is	  
how	  norms	   are	   intended	   to	   be	   and	  how,	   consequently,	   are	   considered	   to	  work	   in	  
practice.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  through	  the	  analysis	  of	  RRI	  scenarios,	  the	  understanding	  
of	   how	   to	   build	   a	   norm	   or	   perceive	   normative	   sets	   goes	   along	   with	   norms	  
functioning	   in	   real	   terms.	   If	   I	   think	   that	  an	   innovation	  will	  be	  safe	   I	  do	   it	  because	   I	  
privilege	   some	   kind	   of	   legal	   norms	   and	   in	   doing	   so	   I	   presume	   that	   all	   the	   related	  
effects	   in	   practice	  will	   be	  managed	   under	   the	   umbrella	   of	   safety.	   In	   other	  words,	  
what	   it	   is	   deduced	   from	   one	   normative	   set,	   are	   those	   cluster	   of	   actions	   that	   are	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believed	   to	   be	   logically	   consequential	   to	   the	   presuppositions.	   A	   mistake	   or	  
unexpected	  outcome	  is	  then	  imputed	  to	  irrationality	  of	  some	  sort.	  	  	  









The	   norms’	   effects	   are	  
supposed	   to	  be	  deducible	  
from	   the	   simple	   intention	  
to	   adopt	   the	   norm.	  
Additionally,	   we	   find	   the	  
implicit	   presupposition	  
that	  an	  actor	  will	  have	  full	  
capacity	   and	   intention	   to	  
contribute	   in	   the	  
discussion	   when	   involved	  
in	   a	   participatory	  
approach.	  
	  
The	   norms’	   application	   is	  
a	  simple	  formal	  deductive	  
reasoning	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  
rules	   themselves.	   The	  
determination	   of	   the	  
norm	   is	   linked	   to	   these	  
rules,	   such	   as	   ethical	  
guidelines,	   laws,	   or	   other	  
schemes,	   that	   is	   consider	  
able	   to	   predetermine	   the	  
effect	   and	   therefore	   the	  
application	   of	   a	   norm.	  
External	   constraints	   are	  
not	  taken	  into	  account.	  
The	   norms’	   application	   is	  
deduced	   by	   an	   imaginary	  
set	  of	   rules	   that	   the	  mind	  
is	   supposed	   to	   have.	   Also	  
here	   the	   context	   doesn’t	  
play	  any	  active	  role	  and	  a	  
process	   ‘interruption’	   is	  
considered	   as	   expression	  




Table	  7:	  S.I.M	  presuppositions	  	  
The	   reason	  of	   the	   lack	  of	  questioning	  about	   the	  effectiveness	  of	   the	  norms	   is	   that	  
implicitly	  all	   theoretical	  approaches	  presuppose	  that	  the	  conditions	  that	  determine	  
the	   effectiveness	   of	   norms	   are	   linked	   to	   rules	   presupposed	   within	   the	   mind	  
(mentalist	   presupposition)	   and	   consequently	   are	   supposed	   to	   be	   a	   function	   of	  
mental	   capacities.	   Since	   the	   mental	   capacities	   are	   independent	   of	   the	   external	  
context	   of	   the	   subject,	   the	   governance	   theories	   ignore	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
effectiveness	   of	   the	   norm.	   In	   other	  words,	   often	   governance	   theories	   presuppose	  
that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  implementation	  of	  norms	  is	  not	  a	  question,	  because	  it	  is	  
not	  dependent	  on	  external	  factors,	  but	  is	  the	  necessary	  result	  of	  the	  norm	  itself.	  The	  
mentalist	  presupposition	   is	   then	   thinking	   that	   the	  existence	  of	  norms	   is	  enough	   to	  
activate	  mechanism	  in	  the	  mind	  that	  will	  assure	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  implementation.	  
However,	  if	  the	  problem	  is	  addressed,	  the	  solution	  cannot	  be	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  norms	  
itself,	   according	   to	   the	   mentalist	   presupposition,	   because	   it	   depends	   on	   the	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condition	  of	  the	  mind,	  that	  accept	  or	  not	  the	  norm.	  
	  
The	  mentalist	   approach	   is	   often	   linked	   to	   an	   intentionalist	   presupposition,	   which	  
assumes	  that	   the	  norms	  effects	  are	  deductible	   from	  the	  only	   intention	  to	  adopt	   it.	  
That	   means	   that	   the	   intention	   of	   adopting	   the	   norm	   is	   the	   only	   factor	   that	  
determines	   the	   effect	   of	   the	   norm.	   The	   will	   of	   the	   users	   and	   developers	   to	  
implement	   the	   norm	   is	   simply	   presupposed,	   so	   the	   problem	   of	   implementation	   is	  
solved	  without	  even	  being	  addressed.	  	  
Another	   very	   common	   presupposition	   is	   the	   schematising	   presupposition,	   which	  
assume	  that	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  norm	  is	  taken	  from	  the	  norm	  itself,	  as	  a	  simple	  
deduction	   of	   the	   norm.	   There	   is	   nothing	   needed	   than	   the	   norm	   itself	   in	   order	   to	  
apply	   it.	   The	   effect	   of	   those	   presuppositions	   –	   which	   has	   been	   developed	   in	   the	  
School	  of	   Louvain	   -­‐	   is	   that	   the	  condition	  of	   the	  application	  of	   the	  norm	   is	   ignored,	  
because	   a	   lot	   of	   theories	   consider	   that	   those	   conditions	   are	   in	   the	   mind	   of	   the	  
person,	   and	   if	   they	   do	   not	   consider	   it	   to	   be	   automatic,	   at	   least,	   they	   think	   the	  
governance	  theory	  has	  no	  impact	  on	  it.	  
In	  this	  way,	  in	  presupposing	  the	  application	  of	  a	  norm	  by	  its	  formal	  justification,	  the	  
SIM	  presuppositions	   loose	  two	  main	  characteristics	  that	  should	  ground	  every	  norm	  
construction,	  even	   in	  principle,	   that	  of	   legitimacy	  and	  of	  effectiveness.	  Avoiding	   to	  
take	  into	  account	  reality	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  a	  certain	  norm	  won’t	  be	  accepted,	  
trusted	   or	   applied,	   means	   to	   empty	   that	   same	   norm	   from	   its	   content,	   the	   same	  
content	   that	   solely	   give	  every	  norm	   the	   reason	   to	  be	  and	   to	  be	   followed,	   i.e.,	   the	  
context.	  	  
This	   unveils	   the	   wider	   issue	   of	   the	   problematic	   relationship	   between	   deliberation	  
and	  participation.	  If,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  deliberation	  is	  synonymous	  of	  a	  certain	  extent	  
of	  efficiency,	  coming	  from	  procedures	  that	  permit	  deliberation	  and	  therefore	  select	  
participants,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  a	  greater	  extent	  of	  participation	  is	  required	  in	  order	  
to	   not	   loose	   the	   grip	   on	   the	   context.	   But,	   as	   commonly	   understood,	   participation	  
doesn’t	  automatically	   imply	  neither	  a	  deeper	  knowledge	  or	  understanding,	  nor	  the	  
respect	  of	  complex	  and	  intricate	  selective	  procedures.	  	  
So	  the	  dilemma	   is	  put	   in	  evidence	  again	  within	  the	  SIM	  framework.	  What	  we	  then	  
need	   it	   will	   be	   a	   new	   form	   of	   governance	   that	   will	   demonstrate	   the	   capacity,	   in	  
practical	  terms,	  of	  overcoming	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  problematic.	  
The	  criticism	  we	  level	  here	  emphasizes	  the	  necessity	  of	  understanding	  the	  reference	  
to	   the	   background	   as	   a	   speculative	   and	   transcendental	   logical	   constraint	   of	   the	  
operation.	   This	   should	   allow	  us	   to	   reach	   a	   higher	   level	   and	   better	   understand	   the	  
consequences	  and	  the	  requirements	  of	  our	  approach	  to	  the	  reflexivity	  of	   judgment	  
on	  the	  level	  of	  the	  construction	  of	  governance	  arrangements.	  
First,	  however,	  we	  need	  to	  highlight	  what	   is	  the	  theoretical	  anchorage	  that	  we	  can	  
use	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   not	   only	   the	   shortcomings,	   but	   also	   positive	   examples	   of	  
	   	  	  
Deliverable	  2.3.	  Analytical	  Grid	  Report	  to	  EC	   	   GREAT-­‐321480	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
norms	  construction	  within	  governance	  approaches.	  
3.2.	  Embedding	  the	  dialectic	  
	  
According	   to	  our	  perspective,	   it	   is	  not	  only	   important	   to	  provide	  a	  horizon	  but	  we	  
need	   to	   concentrate	   our	   efforts	   in	  providing	   the	   necessary	   tools	   for	   any	   actor	   to	  
continuously	  build	  and	  settle	  new	  normative	  horizons.	  	  
This	  is	  crucial	  as	  the	  current	  way	  of	  constructing	  norms	  fails	  in	  exactly	  this	  scope,	  the	  
one	  of	  being	  able	  to	  overcome	  contextual	  limitations	  without	  ignoring	  them.	  	  
If	  we	  recall	  briefly	  what	  the	  current	  scenario	  offers	  in	  terms	  of	  normativity	  is	  exactly	  
what	   we	   could	   call	   a	   top-­‐down	   approach,	   one	   that	   doesn’t	   allow	   for	   actors	   to	  
become	  aware	  and	  then	  freely	  choose	  the	  preferable	  option.	  	  
What	   a	   top	   down	   approach	   ignores	   is	   exactly	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   a	   norm	   in	   its	  
application.	   A	   norm,	   if	   it	   has	   to	   be	   effective,	   i.e.	   applied,	   it	   has	   be	   conceived	   and	  
build	  starting	  from	  the	  context	  that	  the	  norm	  itself	  will	  affect	  or	  address.	  
Norms,	  according	  to	  what	  we	  managed	  to	  understand	  in	  the	  actual	  scenario,	  rely	  on	  
a	   presupposition	   that	   doesn’t	   take	   into	   account	   its	   future	   application	   (Ferry	   2002,	  
Maesschalck	  &	  Lenoble	  2003).	  Being	  more	  specific,	  what	  it	  is	  always	  presumed	  when	  
a	  norm	   is	  constructed	   is	  exactly	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   legitimation	  of	  a	  norm	  will	   imply	  
and	  automatically	  pave	  the	  way	  to	  its	  application.	  	  
As	  we	  have	  shown	  for	  responsible	  innovation	  often	  the	  frames	  are	  built	  according	  to	  
a	   rationale	   that	  pretends	   to	  be	  able	   to	  describe	   the	  conditions	  of	  applicability	  and	  
from	  there	  to	  predict	  all	  the	  possible	  outcomes.	  This	  implies	  that	  different	  normative	  
sets	  that	  could	  come	  into	  a	  clash	  in	  innovations	  are	  managed	  and	  solved	  thank	  to	  a	  
rational	   draw.	   Value-­‐sensitive	   design,	   risk	   assessment,	   technology	   assessment	   are	  
only	   few	   examples	   of	   how	   these	   theoretical	   structures	   conceive	   the	   relation	  with	  
norms.	  This	  is	  exactly	  the	  kind	  of	  mistake	  we	  have	  to	  try	  to	  avoid.	  	  
What	  is	  it	  then	  in	  the	  end	  the	  context	  that	  we	  shouldn’t	  presuppose?	  What	  are	  we	  
intending	  when	  we	  take	  into	  account	  and	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  conditions	  
of	   possibility	   of	   reflexivity?	   Relying	   on	   a	  meta-­‐definition	   provided	   by	  Maesschalck	  
and	  Lenoble,	  the	  context,	  “is	  not	  a	  local	  set	  of	  factual	  constraints.	  It	  is	  not	  that	  false	  
‘representation’	   of	  Marxist	   ideology.	   It	   is	   not	   that	   particular	   culture	  which	   cultural	  
anthropologists	   could	   identify	   and	   which	   would	   be	   ‘deposited’	   in	   the	   minds	   of	  
individual	   actors	   as	   continually	   adaptable	   conventions	   that	   would	   serve	   as	  
‘capacitating’	  structures	  for	  them.	  These	  three	  ingredients	  certainly	  exist	  as	  so	  many	  
functions	   of	   context.	   But	   by	   themselves	   they	   do	   not	   exhaust	   the	   function	   of	   the	  
context.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  by	  reducing	  context	  to	  one	  or	  other	  of	  these	  functions	  one	  
misses	   the	   question	   of	   ‘potentiation	   or	   capacitation	   of	   context’	   to	   produce	   these	  
meaning	  effects.	  These	  neologism	  indicate	  the	  necessary	  reflexivity	  of	  the	  judgment	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by	  which	  the	  context,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  a	  norm	  is	  given	  sense,	  is	  ‘perceived’.	  The	  
concept	  of	   ‘context’	  must,	   indeed,	   itself	  be	   reflexively	  constructed,	  as	  has	   just	  been	  
recalled.	  Qualifying	  it	  in	  this	  way	  we	  seek	  to	  highlight	  this	  reflexivity	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
the	   context,	  which	   cannot	   be	   reduced	   to	   any	   ‘convention’	   supposed	   as	   given	   (and	  
spontaneously	   revisable	   by	   the	   cognitive	   and	   communicative	   capacities	   of	   the	  
subjects)”36.	  
In	  this	  sense,	  the	  possible	  relationships	  of	  norms	  to	  contexts	  are	  the	  following:	  	  
	  
• De-­‐contextualised	   –	   refers	   to	   the	   situation	  where	   the	   ethical	   norm	   is	   seen	  
outside	  the	  context	  of	  its	  application	  	  
• Context	   restricted	   -­‐	   refers	   to	   the	   situation	   where	   the	   ethical	   norm	   is	   seen	  
restricted	  in	  the	  context	  of	  its	  application	  	  
• Fully	  contextualised	   -­‐	   refers	   to	   the	  situation	  where	  the	  ethical	  norm	   is	  seen	  
fully	  inside	  the	  context	  of	  its	  application	  	  
	  
Criticism	  of	  this	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  reflexivity	  used	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  social	  
norm	   also	   affects	   the	   moral	   approaches	   to	   legitimacy.	   Economic	   theories	   often	  
obliterate	   the	   operation	   of	   the	   choice	   of	   possibilities	   that	   already	   condition	   the	  
effects	   of	   rational	   decisions35,	   but	   the	   deliberative	   or	   communicative	   approaches	  
also	  miss	   the	   question	   of	   the	   conditions	   for	   an	   effective	   expression	   of	   the	   ethical	  
objectives	  they	  intend	  to	  promote.	  As	  correctly	  pointed	  out:	  
“certainly	  economic	  theories	  obliterate	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  choice	  of	  possibilities	  (in	  
terms	   of	   choice	   of	   a	   way	   of	   life	   and	   not	   of	   the	   operation	   of	   maximization	   or	   of	  
‘satisficing’)	   that	   always	   already	   conditions	   the	   effectuation	   of	   a	   decision	   or	   of	   a	  
norm,	   the	   deliberative	   or	   communicative	   approaches	   miss	   the	   question	   of	   the	  
conditions	  for	  an	  efficient	  realization	  of	  the	  ethical	  objectives	  they	  intend	  to	  promote.	  
In	   this	   sense	   one	   can	   dismiss	   both	   the	   economic	   theories	   of	   efficiency	   and	   the	  
deontological	  approaches	  of	  discourse	  ethics.	  […]	  Therefore,	  this	  critique,	  provoked	  
by	  this	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  reflexivity	  at	  work	  in	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  production	  of	  a	  
social	  norm,	  is	  not	  aimed	  only	  at	  economic	  theories	  of	  efficiency.	  It	  also	  concerns	  the	  
moral	  approaches	  to	  legitimacy”37.	  	  
The	  insufficiency	  of	  proceduralism,	  for	  instance,	  is	  evident	  in	  that	  the	  arrangements	  
that	  are	  necessary	  for	  organising	  the	  reflexive	  capacity	  for	  the	  actors	  to	  identify	  the	  
various	   effective	   possibilities	   on	  which	   the	   norms	   selection	  will	   be	   carried	   out	   are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  J.	   Lenoble	   &	   M.	   Maesschalck,	   Toward	   a	   Theory	   of	   Governance:	   The	   Action	   of	   Norms,	  
Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2003,	  p.87.	  
37	  J.	   Lenoble	   &	   M.	   Maesschalck,	   Toward	   a	   Theory	   of	   Governance:	   The	   Action	   of	   Norms,	  
Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2003,	  p.93.	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problematic.	   “What	   is	   often	   presented	   to	   us	   as	   the	   only	   ‘effective’	   choice	   is	   thus	  
always	   conditioned	   by	   an	   operation	   that	   such	   a	   presentation	   does	   not	   take	   into	  
account”.	   Whether	   a	   norm	   is	   effective	   in	   modifying	   a	   way	   of	   life	   in	   a	   rationally	  
acceptable	  way	   presupposes	   an	   independence	   from	   the	   context	   that	   cannot	   be	   a	  
given	  factor.	  	  





Figure	  4:	  Norms	  &	  Context	  (Egais,	  Del.	  2.1)	  
	  
Norms	  then	  must	  be	  conceived	  and	  constructed	  taking	   into	  account	  the	  conditions	  
of	   its	   application,	   that	   is,	   with	   the	   participative	   and	   reflexive	   approach	   of	   the	  
different	  actors	  possibly	  involved.	  
How	  could	  we	  intend	  this	  in	  theoretical	  terms?	  
	  
3.3.	  Theoretical	  Paths	  for	  Norms	  Construction	  	  
We	   have	   already	   pointed	   that	   there	   are	   several	   theories	   about	   how	   to	   construct	  
norms.	  The	  most	  famous	  one	   is	  probably	  represented	  by	  the	  discourse	  ethics	  from	  
Jürgen	  Habermas.	  Discourse	  ethics,	  included	  in	  a	  trend	  in	  ethics	  called	  proceduralism,	  
link	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   a	   norm	   to	   the	   procedure	   of	   construction	   of	   that	   norm.	   The	  
norm,	   in	   this	   case,	   has	   to	   come	   from	   a	   free	   dialogue	   between	   stakeholders,	   only	  
	   	  	  
Deliverable	  2.3.	  Analytical	  Grid	  Report	  to	  EC	   	   GREAT-­‐321480	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
framed	   by	   the	   requirement	   of	   rationality	   of	   the	   argument.	   At	   the	   end	   of	   the	  
discussion,	  one	  argument	   is	   supposed	   to	  be	   judged	  more	   rational	   than	   the	  others,	  
and	   is	   chosen	   by	   everybody.	   That	   procedure	   applies	   for	   every	   argument,	   until	  
constituting	   a	   set	   of	   norms	   that	   comes	   from	   a	   free	   rational	   consensus104.	   This	  
theory	   proposes	   a	   justification	   of	   moral	   issues	   through	   a	   rational	   procedure	   of	  
discussion.	   The	   challenge,	   for	   us,	   is	   to	   include	   in	   that	   theory	   the	   context	   of	  
application	   –	   but	   of	   course	   doing	   that	   is	   changing	   the	   structure	   of	   proceduralism	  
itself.	   Our	   input	   is	   not	   only	   an	   addition	   in	   the	   trend	   of	   proceduralism,	   but	   a	  
fundamental	  change	  of	  the	  principles	  at	  the	  roots	  of	  proceduralism,	  which	  threaten	  
the	  entire	  trend,	  and	  not	  one	  particular	  author.	  
	  
As	   we	   said,	   the	   rational	   justification	   of	   a	   norm,	   does	   not	   contain	   in	   itself	   the	  
conditions	  for	  its	  application,	  the	  conditions	  for	  the	  modification	  of	  the	  relationship	  
of	   the	   norm	   to	   the	   ideal,	   and	   does	   not	   even	   ensure	   the	   norm	   construction.	   The	  
procedural	   approach	   in	  particular	   fails	   to	   guarantee	   the	   construction	  of	   the	  norm,	  
and	  presupposes	  a	  will	  to	  be	  ethical.	  The	  discussion	  is	  not	  compulsory,	  it	  is	  a	  decision	  
made	  by	  the	  individuals	  but	  the	  discussion	  has	  to	  follow	  some	  rules,	  some	  procedure,	  
such	  as	  involving	  every	  stakeholder.	  Which	  means	  that	  the	  will	  of	  people	  who	  have	  
an	   interest	   in	   the	   question,	   the	   norm	   debated	   is	   willing	   to	   participate,	   and	   even	  
more,	  is	  willing	  to	  fit	  into	  the	  rules	  of	  discussion.	  This	  critique	  joins	  the	  one	  of	  Jean-­‐
Marc	  Ferry.	  His	  criticism	  of	  procedural	  ethics	  has	  based	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
values	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  norms.	  It	  is	  impossible,	  for	  him,	  to	  deny	  the	  values	  
that	  determine	  people	  decisions.	  On	  the	  contrary,	   the	  discussion	  has	   to	   take	  them	  
deeply	   into	  account.	  However,	   say	  Ferry,	   it	  does	  not	  mean	   that	  no	  agreement	  can	  
ever	  be	  reached	  (because	  of	  the	  plurality	  of	  value).	  On	  the	  contrary,	  for	  him	  taking	  
the	   values	   into	   account	   (via	   narration,	   interpretation,	   argumentation	   and	  
reconstruction)	  doesn’t	  only	  add	  effectiveness	  to	  the	  norm,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  people	  
will	  be	  keen	  in	  following	  them,	  but	   it	  would	  be	  impossible	  to	  think	  a	  norm	  without	  
values,	   because	   the	   reason	  why	  we	   accept	   a	   norm	   is	   not	   reducible	   to	   its	   rational	  
demonstration.	  
The	  confrontation	  of	  values,	  when	  it	  does	  not	  have	  as	  a	  goal	  the	  triumph	  of	  a	  belief,	  
but	   aims	   at	   funding	   a	   norm,	   is	   then,	   as	   a	   space	   for	   practical	   discussion,	   perfectly	  
compatible	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   agreement	   (understanding).	   Procedural	   formal	  
constraints	   are	   not	   needed,	   for	   Ferry,	   in	   the	   construction	   of	   the	   norm,	   because	  
people	   can	   reach	   an	   agreement	   without	   having	   to	   discuss	   a	   scale	   of	   values.	   The	  
important	  problem	  is	  the	  practical	  problem.	  And	  it	  can	  be	  resolve	  in	  a	  discussion	  that	  
is	   open	   to	   values.	   People	   can	   reach	   argument	   because	   they	   are	   able	   to	   submit	  
themselves	   to	   a	   norm	   even	   if	   it	   is	   opposed	   to	   their	   values.	   This	   is	   a	   fundamental	  
principle,	   which	   complete	   the	   criticism	   of	   proceduralism	   made	   by	   the	   School	   of	  
Louvain,	  and	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  think	  of	  a	  way	  to	  construct	  norms	  that	  will	  be	  accepted	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by	  people	  as	  a	  norm	  they	  can	  submit	  themselves	  to.	  
Ferry	   criticizes	   the	   reductions	   and	   the	   restraints	   that	   proceduralism	   inserts	   in	  
discussion.	  But	  we	  can	  see	  that	  Ferry	  stay	  in	  the	  demarche	  of	  discussion.	  
What	  we	  are	  saying,	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  reach	  an	  agreement	  on	  the	  process	  of	  
the	  discussion	  to	  have	  a	  consensus	  that	  could	  found	  a	  norm.	  We	  have	  to	  look	  at	  the	  
construction	  of	  the	  norms	  into	  a	  context	  and	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  context	  of	  the	  
application	  of	  those	  norms.	  This	  is	  also	  why	  we	  cannot	  just	  look	  at	  the	  ethical	  norms	  
already	  used,	  but	  need	  to	  analyse	  how	  those	  norms	  have	  been	  constructed.	  
Maesschalck’s	   “pragmatique	   contextuelle”	   (contextualised	   pragmatic	   approach)	  
(Maesschalck,	  2001)	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  taking	  into	  account	  the	  specificities	  
of	   contexts	  when	   creating	   norms.	   He	   recommends	   that,	   in	   lieu	   of	   the	   democratic	  
apparatus	  set	  by	  authorities	  in	  which	  community	  members	  are	  invited	  to	  participate	  
(school	   councils,	   for	  example),	   the	  actors’	   ability	   to	  participate	   is	  mistakenly	   taken	  
for	   granted.	   Therefore,	   existing	   cooperative	   networks	   should	   be	   exploited	   and	  
supported.	  Moreover,	  he	  suggests	  that	  implementation	  of	  norms	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  
feasible	  when	  norms	  are	   created	   in	   collaboration	  with	   the	  actors	   in	   context,	   since	  
they	  are	  the	  most	  knowledgeable	  about	  the	  particularities	  and	  limits	  of	  this	  context.	  
	  
Every	   norm	   aims	   to	   institute	   a	   way	   of	   life	   that	   is	   judged	   to	   be	   rationally	   more	  
acceptable.	   The	   formal	   rules	   that	   condition	   the	   rationality	   of	   this	   choice,	   such	   as	  
calculation	   of	   optimisation,	   argumentative	   rules,	   or	   any	   formal	   mechanism,	   don’t	  
guarantee,	  by	  themselves,	  the	  transformation	  of	  existing	  ways	  of	  life.	  The	  realization	  
of	  the	  ideal	  way	  of	  life	  called	  for	  by	  the	  norm	  is	  conditioned	  by	  something	  other	  than	  
the	  simple	  formal	  validity	  of	  the	  rule.	  The	  operation	  of	  judging	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  
choice	   of	   the	   rationally	   acceptable,	   idealised	   way	   of	   life,	   that	   is,	   the	   rational	  
determination	   of	   the	   norm	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   enable	   the	   realisation	   of	   this	  
objective,	  and	  the	  effective	  transformation	  of	  the	  same	  way	  of	  life	  by	  the	  application	  
of	   the	  norm,	   is	  distinct	  and	  asymmetric.	  Asymmetry	   is	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	  social	  
meanings	  of	  a	  norm	  are	  conditioned	  by	  an	  operation	  that	  cannot	  be	  anticipated	  by	  
formal	   variables	   of	   reasoning	   (variables	   that	   condition	   the	   norm’s	   relevance).	  
Therefore	  every	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  process	  that	  was	  enacted	  by	  the	  production	  of	  
a	  norm	  itself	  mobilizes	  two	  operations,	  which	  do	  not	  respond	  to	  the	  same	  conditions	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4.	  Conditions	  for	  RRI	  
	  
So,	   at	   this	   stage	   we	   have	   briefly	   defined	   the	   general	   underlying	   justification	   of	  
current	  approaches	  and	  critically	  assess	  some	  difficulties	  related	  with	  that.	  We	  now	  
need	   to	   propose	   an	   alternative	   conception	   drawing	   from	   those	   previous	  
understandings	  and	  from	  actual	  gaps	  and	  limits.	  
The	   problem	   we	   need	   to	   address	   then	   is	   the	   problem	   of	   effectiveness	   in	   the	  
application	   of	   norms	  within	   the	   governance	   of	   responsible	   innovation	   in	   research,	  
the	   way	   that	   they	   are	   constructed	   and	   applied	   within	   innovation.	   We	   wish	   to	  
examine	  how	  research	  reflects	  and	  address	  responsible	  issues	  in	  innovation	  process,	  
understanding	  if	  it	  is	  only	  an	  add-­‐on	  process	  or	  a	  different	  and	  structurally	  grounded	  
responsible	   innovation	   process	   is	   at	   stage.	   To	   do	   this	   we	   need	   to	   rely	   on	   real	  
examples,	  and	   investigate	  them	  according	  to	  the	  structure	  and	  consequentially	  the	  
effectiveness	  of	  their	  governance.	  But,	  to	  be	  able	  to	  reach	  such	  an	  attempt	  we	  need	  
to	  define	  the	  criteria	  we	  need	  to	  look	  for	  when	  we	  carry	  an	  empirical	  research.	  	  
We	   will	   now	   start	   defining	   the	   condition	   necessary,	   in	   theoretical	   terms,	   for	   a	  
governance	  of	  RRI.	  
	  
4.1.	  A	  first	  condition	  of	  RRI:	  Participation	  	  	  
Considering	  the	  most	  frequent	  difficulties	  and	  claims	  that	  are	  nowadays	  rising	  from	  
different	  sides,	  the	  first	  stage	  in	  a	  normative	  construction	  should	  then	  be	  the	  one	  of	  
allowing	   participation	   in	   the	   research	   process.	   This	   procedure	   is	   justifiable	   from	   a	  
logic	  perspective,	   if	   the	  norms	  will	   be	  adopted	  and	   followed	  only	  by	  being	   chosen	  
then	   we	   need	   to	   allow	   agents	   to	   choose,	   and	   from	   a	   theoretical	   political	   one,	  
governance	  implies	  a	  lengthen	  of	  actors	  and	  democracy’s	   legitimation	  derives	  from	  
participation.	  
Without	  the	  need	  to	  justify	  participation	  as	  such	  in	  political	  theory38	  we	  do	  have	  to	  
explain	  why	  and	  how	  participation	  could	  and	  should	  be	  embedded	  in	  a	  deliberative	  
decision-­‐making	  process.	  
As	   we	   have	   said	   previously,	   the	   only	   way	   to	   conceive	   an	   effective	   application	   of	  
innovation	  is	  to	  avoid	  the	  premise	  that	  this	  could	  be	  imposed	  on	  the	  context.	  At	  the	  
actual	   state	   of	   things,	   frontal	   imposition	   and	   counter-­‐position	   don’t	   represent	  
anymore	  doable	  options.	  Methodologies	  that	  are	  usually	  considered	  to	  be	  top-­‐down	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  Although,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  participation	  is	  sometimes	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  myth	  or	  something	  
counterproductive	   for	   political	   management.	   This	   negative	   understanding	   of	   participation	  
will	  be	  highlight	  through	  the	  issues	  that	  a	  full	  participation	  raises	  in	  the	  relation	  with	  science,	  
indeed	  a	  particular	  one.	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approaches,	  especially	  when	  applied	  to	  scientific	  progress,	  can	  never	  obtain	  a	  public	  
legitimacy.	   Besides,	   given	   the	   shift	   that	   our	   political	   structures	   have	   undergone	   in	  
the	  last	  decades,	  the	  trajectory	  of	  the	  decision	  making	  process	  had	  to	  deviate	  from	  a	  
classical	  governmental	  way	  to	  something	  more	  blurred,	  known	  as	  governance.	  What	  
is	  the	  main	  feature	  of	  governance	  models	  at	  least	  in	  principle?	  It	  is	  the	  one	  of	  taking	  
into	   consideration	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   process	   by	   which	   decisions	   are	   taken	  
more	   than	   the	   contents	   of	   the	   decision	   itself.	   In	   this	   sense,	   in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   this	  
attempt,	   the	  main	  methodological	   core	   is	   to	   try	   to	   involve	   the	   greater	   number	   of	  
people	  in	  the	  making	  and	  implementation	  of	  policies.	  	  
Participation	  is	  then	  the	  key	  word	  to	  reach	  a	  shared	  construction	  of	  societies	  and	  the	  
center	   around	   which	   all	   the	   processes	   are	   nowadays	   developing.	   There	   are	   four	  
objectives	   that	   are	   supposedly	   pointed	   out	  when	   a	   valuable	   stress	   is	   placed	   upon	  
participation.	  “First,	  popular	  participation	  is	  the	  best	  way	  both	  for	  leaders	  and	  for	  the	  
people	   themselves	   to	   discover	   what	   the	   people	   want.	   Second,	   widespread	  
participation	   will	   ensure	   that	   all	   the	   relevant	   interests	   are	   considered.	   […]	  
Participation	  may	  increase	  the	  legitimacy,	  acceptance,	  and	  enforceability	  of	  policies,	  
in	   part	   because	  decisions	  made	   in	   light	   of	   popular	   participation	   should	   be	  more	   in	  
keeping	  with	  the	  desires	  of	  the	  people.	  Additionally	  however,	  people	  are	  more	  prone	  
to	  accept	  decisions	  they	  help	  to	  make,	  even	  if	  they	  don’t	  like	  the	  decisions	  reached”39.	  
The	  fourth	  objective	  that	  Katz	  detects	  (Katz	  1997),	  the	  one	  of	  increasing	  autonomy,	  
seems	  to	  be	  only	  partially	  fitting	  in	  the	  specific	  relation	  between	  science	  and	  politics	  
that	   is	  particularly	  highlighted	  here.	   In	   this	   sense,	  we	  can’t	   theoretically	  affirm	   the	  
primacy	  of	   participative	   approaches	   in	   democracy	   as	   there	   are	  other	   systems	   that	  
could	   be	   considered	   equally	   valuable.	   As	   we	   said,	   participatory	   approaches	  
concentrate	   more	   on	   the	   processes	   by	   which	   decision	   are	   taken	   rather	   than	   the	  
contents	  of	  the	  decision,	  and	  this	  way	  best	  fits	  the	  specific	  and	  particular	  domain	  of	  
responsible	  innovation.	  The	  products	  or	  processes	  rising	  from	  innovation	  are	  directly	  
concerning	   and	   affecting	   the	   context	   in	   which	   they	   are	   going	   to	   be	   placed	   and	  
consequently	   participation	   is	   the	   only	   way	   to	   avoid	   the	   problematics	   previously	  
shown.	   We	   don’t	   have	   to	   forget	   that	   innovation	   in	   its	   current	   understanding	   is	  
directly	  connected	  with	  marketization	  or,	  as	  we	  would	  say,	  ‘societalization’.	  	  	  
	  
However,	  the	  fact	  that	  participation	  in	  itself	  is	  not	  considered	  to	  be	  the	  panacea	  of	  
democracies	  helps	  to	  understand	  the	  slippery	  sides	  of	  this	  wide	  conception	  for	  RRI.	  
As	  pointed	  out	  also	  from	  Katz	  himself,	  “participation	  becomes	  as	  much	  a	  strategy	  of	  
manipulation	  and	  control	  as	  a	  way	  for	  the	  people	  to	  govern	  themselves	  and	  again	  is	  
congenial	  with	  the	  elitist	  popular	  sovereignty	  or	  liberal	  democratic	  approaches”.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39	  R.	  Kranz,	  Democracy	  and	  Elections,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1997.	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Participation	   in	   itself	   represents	   a	   necessary	   condition	   for	   the	   implementation	   of	  
innovation	  assessment	  but	  we	  believe	  that	  it	  can’t	  be	  taken	  also	  as	  a	  sufficient	  one.	  
This	  because	  participation	  in	  a	  very	  formal	  acception	  could	  include	  many	  strategies	  
that	   wouldn’t	   lead	   to	   what	   we	  might	   intend	  with	   ‘responsible’	   innovation.	   As	   we	  
have	   shown,	   responsibility	   cannot	   reduce	   its	   polysemy	   to	   a	  mere	   legal	   frame	   but	  
implies	  also	  and	  mostly	  an	  ethical	  one.	  So	  even	  if	  we	  don’t	  want	  to	  talk	  about	  it	  in	  a	  
wider	   political	   dimension,	   participation	   in	   research	   and	   innovation	   could	   still	   have	  
several	  layers	  and	  different,	  implicit	  or	  explicit	  meanings.	  The	  current	  definitions	  or	  
indications	   of	   RRI	   all	   rely	   more	   or	   less	   on	   participatory	   presuppositions	   but	   that	  
doesn’t	   protect	   them	   from	   being	   potentially	   negative	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   RRI 40 .	  	  
Furthermore	  there	  are	  different	  ways	  of	  participating.	  Taking	  into	  account	  Arnstein’s	  
ladder,	   the	  OECD	   scale	  or	   the	   IAP2	   structure,	  we	   find	   several	  ways	   through	  which	  
participation	  could	  be	  conceived	  and	  not	  all	  of	  them	  maintain	  what	  participation	  in	  
principle	  promises.	  
According	  to	  Arnstein41,	  we	  find	  three	  different	   layers	  on	  which	  participation	  could	  
be	  conceived	  according	  to	  effectiveness	  of	  participant	  in	  the	  decision	  making	  process.	  
So,	   we	   find	   direct	   examples	   of	   exclusive	   policies	   like	   therapy	   and	   manipulation,	  
instrumentalized	   ways	   of	   excluding	   agents	   as	   ‘information’,	   ‘consultation’	   and	  
‘placation’,	   till	   forms	  of	   real	   and	   explicit	   citizen	   participation	   namely	   ‘partnership’,	  
‘delegated	  power’	  and	  ‘citizenship	  control’.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Levels	  of	  participation	  (J.	  Arnstein,	  1969)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  See	  the	  previous	  chapter	  on	  RRI	  and	  the	  critiques	  of	  current	  approaches.	  
41	  J.	  Arnstein,	  1969.	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However,	   although	   this	   differentiation	   is	   a	   classic	   scheme	   and	   represents	   and	  
optimal	  background	  to	  understand	  different	  levels	  of	  participation,	  it	  suffers	  of	  two	  
important	  weaknesses	  connected	  also	  with	  the	  actual	  development	  of	  participation,	  
deliberation	   and	   consequent	   counter-­‐strategies.	   The	   first	   weakness	   could	   be	  
detected	   in	   being	   generic	   and	   at	   the	   same	   time	   demarcating	   clearly	   the	   different	  
layers	   without	   leaving	   space	   for	   overlaps	   or	   complexity	   that	   always	   raise	   from	  
participatory	   experiments	   (Fung	   2006).	   The	   second	   one,	   closely	   connected	   to	   the	  
first	   one,	   is	   the	   apparently	   unintentional	  mechanism	  underlying	   these	  models	   and	  
absence	   of	   a	   critical	   stance	   from	   which	   to	   assess	   them.	   It	   appears	   as	   if	   those	  
approaches	  could	  be	  easily	  detected	  and	  furthermore	  as	  if	  they	  weren’t	  susceptible	  
of	   instrumentalization.	   In	   this	  way	   it	  becomes	  difficult	   to	  assess	  and	  criticize	  more	  
ambiguous	  attempts	  to	  enhance	  participation.	  More	  over	   it	  could	   lead	  to	  a	  certain	  
degree	   of	   ‘objectivity’	   in	   the	   judgment	   confusing	   a	   descriptive	   analysis	   with	   a	  
political	  one.	  	  
	  




Figure	  6:	  IAP2	  Spectrum	  of	  Public	  Participation	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As	   we	   can	   see	   consultation	   and	   information	   are	   seen	   as	   effective	   means	   of	  
interaction	  and	  don’t	  include	  any	  sort	  of	  potential	  threat.	  	  
This	  table	  however	  represents	  an	  interesting	  step	  in	  the	  definition	  of	  tools	  useful	  to	  
enhance	  participation.	  	  
In	   short,	   several	   attempts	   to	   define	   what	   participation	   is	   and	   how	   it	   could	   be	  
conceived	  have	  been	  proposed	  across	  the	  last	  years.	  The	  following	  table	  summarizes	  
three	  important	  examples	  that	  remain	  within	  a	  similar	  conception.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  7:	  Tools	  for	  enhancing	  participation	  
	   	  	  
Deliverable	  2.3.	  Analytical	  Grid	  Report	  to	  EC	   	   GREAT-­‐321480	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.1.1.	  What	  kind	  of	  Participation?	  
However,	   these	   attempts	   do	   not	   exhaust	   the	   nuances	   and	   complexity	   connected	  
with	  the	  concept	  of	  participation.	  All	  the	  relations,	  implicitly	  or	  explicitly	  ambiguous,	  
are	  not	  inferable	  from	  these	  tables	  (Fung,	  2006).	  Neither	  are	  described	  the	  different	  
dimensions	   in	  which	  participation	  could	  be	   intended	  taking	   into	  account	  plans	  that	  
are	  often	  interlaced.	  Furthermore,	  we	  do	  not	  have	  many	  indications	  with	  regard	  to	  
the	   concrete	   exemplifications	   of	   this	   taxonomy.	  What	   is	  missing	   according	   to	   our	  
analysis	   is	   an	   overall	   normative	   perspective	   from	   which	   we	   could	   determine	   the	  
contingent	   forms	  of	   participation.	   Consequently	   it	   becomes	   impossible	   to	   critically	  
assess	  participation	  as	  an	  exploitation	  tool42.	  	  
Participation	  is	  a	  really	  wide	  and	  formal	  concept	  that	  could	  include	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  
options	  that	  go	  from	  being	  informed	  of	  something	  to	  deciding	  everything.	  But	  how	  
do	  we	  cope	  with	  the	  problems	  obviously	  connected	  with	  these	  particular	  modalities	  
and	   all	   the	   other	   intermediate	   stages,	   considering	   that	   participation	   is	   a	   multi-­‐
layered	  conception?	  	  
Who	   are	   the	   ‘participants’	   (agent/actors/stakeholders/experts)	  we	   are	   considering	  
or	   who	   should	   they	   be?	   How	   do	   we	   establish	   the	   level	   and	   limit	   of	   participation	  
(deliberation/direct	   participation?)	   considering	   the	   communication	  modes	   and	   the	  
power	  influences	  that	  are	  strictly	  connected	  to	  different	  modalities	  of	  participation?	  	  
All	  these	  questions	  are	  connected	  with	  a	  main	  one,	  how	  do	  we	  intend	  the	  process	  of	  
interaction	  between	  participants	   from	  a	  normative	   standpoint?	  This	  question,	   that	  
implies	  participation	  in	  itself,	  cannot	  however	  ignore	  that	  participation	  needs	  to	  be	  
shaped	  and	  determined	  according	  to	  a	  frame.	  	  
	  
As	  we	  have	  said,	  we	  consider	  a	  frame	  for	  responsible	  research	  and	  innovation	  to	  be	  
one	  that	  doesn’t	  impose	  any	  specific	  normativity	  to	  the	  context	  but,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  
one	  that	  makes	  the	  contexts	  interact	  and	  develop	  with	  each	  other.	  At	  the	  same	  time	  
in	   science	   is	   almost	   impossible	   to	   fully	   involve	   non	   experts	   due	   to	   the	   level	   of	  
knowledge	  required	  to	  understand	  and	  debate	  on	  some	  specific	  issues.	  
It	  seems	  quite	  obvious	  then	  that	  participation	  needs	  some	  further	  condition	  in	  order	  
to	  result	  effective	  for	  our	  attempt.	  	  
As	   we	   can	   see	   from	   one	   of	   the	   most	   developed	   investigations	   on	   participatory	  
approaches43,	   in	   such	  a	  wide	   container	  we	   find	   three	   intertwined	  dimensions,	  one	  
concerning	   authority	   and	   power,	   a	   second	   one	   related	   to	   communication	   and	  
decision	  mode,	  and	  a	  third	  dimension	  defining	  the	  kind	  of	  possible	  participants.	  	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42	  	  B.	  Cooke ,	  U.	  Kothari ,	  Participation:	  the	  New	  Tyranny? ,	  Zed	  Books	  2001.	   	  
43	  Fung	  (2006).	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   Figure	  8:	  Participatory	  approaches	  dimensions	  (Fung,	  2006)	   	  	  
	  
In	   all	   the	  possible	   combinations	  of	   these	   three	   interlacing	  dimensions	  we	   can	   find	  
every	   particular	   mode	   of	   participation.	   Each	   line	   goes	   from	   a	   really	   external	   or	  
marginal	   position	   to	   a	   directly	   effective	   role.	   This	   doesn’t	   imply	   that	   the	   ideal	  
situation	   would	   be	   that	   of	   experts	   expressing	   a	   direct	   authority	   thanks	   to	   their	  
expertise.	  As	  well	   it	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  the	  worse	  situation	  in	  a	  participatory	  frame	  
would	   be	   represented	   by	   the	   one	   in	  which	   everyone	   could	   only	   be	   a	   spectator.	   It	  
means	   only	   that	   these	   are	   the	   possible	   degrees	   detectable	   in	   a	   participative	  
interaction.	   Moreover,	   the	   rate	   of	   participation	   has	   to	   depend	   according	   to	   the	  
specific	   situation.	  As	  Fung	  puts	   it,	   “public	  participation	  advances	  multiple	  purposes	  
and	   values	   in	   contemporary	   governance.	  Master	   principles	   such	   as	   equal	   influence	  
over	  collective	  decisions	  and	  respect	  for	  individual	  autonomy	  are	  too	  abstract	  to	  offer	  
useful	   guidance	   regarding	   the	   aims	   ad	   character	   of	   citizen	   participation”44.	   A	   real,	  
thick,	   participation	   requires	   certain	   conditions	   that	   are	   not	   only	   often	   difficult	   to	  
reach	  but	  also	  sometimes	  not	  desirable.	   In	  order	  to	  avoid	  what	  Pasolini	  thought	  to	  
be	   the	   greatest	   danger	   implicit	   in	   participation	   that	   “the	   participant	   mass	   is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  A.	   Fung,	   ‘Varieties	   of	   Participation	   in	   Complex	   Governance’,	   in	   Public	   Administration	  
Review,	  December	  2006,	  Special	  Issue,	  p.	  66.	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manipulated	   by	   power	   through	   the	   imposition	   of	   “other”	   values	   and	   “other”	  
ideologies:	  imposition	  that	  happens	  in	  life	  and	  in	  life	  will	  also	  be	  adopted”	  (Trans.	  of	  
the	  writer)45.	  
	  
4.1.2.	  How	  much	  participation?	  
To	  respond	  to	  the	  question	  what	  is	  the	  level	  of	  participation	  we	  need	  is	  not	  easy	  as	  it	  
always	   depends	   on	   the	   context	   in,	   and	   the	   reason	   for,	   which	   this	   participation	   is	  
required.	  If	  we	  analyze	  it	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  RRI,	  and	  we	  also	  limit	  our	  field	  to	  
ICTs,	   it	   appears	   sensible	   to	   establish	   a	   frame	   for	   participation	   or	   better	   say	   an	  
empowerment.	  	  
Participation	  could	  serve	  different	  purposes.	  It	  could	  be	  adopted	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  
efficiency	   in	   small	   policies	   developments	   or	   could	   be	   useful	   for	   gauge	   the	   public	  
perception	  with	  particular	  events	  occurring	  and/or	  being	  far	  from	  elections.	  It	  could	  
have	  a	  structural	  role	  in	  policy-­‐making	  or	  could	  be	  seldom	  encouraged.	  	  
What	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  participatory	  effort	  is	  the	  need	  for	  legitimation	  that	  every	  
decision-­‐making	  organ	  requires.	  Of	  course,	  this	   legitimation	  could	  be	  substantial	  or	  
formal	   and,	   in	   this	   second	   case,	   could	   be	   quantitatively	   and	   qualitatively	  
differentiated.	  	  
As	  we	  said,	  and	  as	  Fung	  suggests,	  direct	  participation	  is	  not	  always	  the	  best	  answer,	  
rather	  participation	  should	  be	  intended	  as	  a	  complementing	  function	  of	  deliberative	  
structures	   (Fung	   2006).	   Direct	   participation	   in	   its	   real	   core	   is	   a	   mean	   useful	   to	  
express	  concerns,	  wishes	  and	  claims,	  an	  instrument	  that	  frees	  an	  affirmative	  energy.	  
It	  represents	  a	  fundamental	  tool	  in	  order	  to	  make	  people	  express	  their	  perspective.	  
At	   the	   same	   time	   we	   are	   not	   sure	   that	   direct	   participation,	   due	   to	   the	   time	   and	  
freedom	   from	  constraints,	   could	  be	  useful	  also	   in	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dialogue.	  
More	  than	  its	  passive	  side,	  direct	  participation	  enhances	  the	  active,	  imposing	  side	  of	  
action.	   Little,	   if	  none,	   space	   seems	   to	  be	   left	   to	   listening,	   to	  understanding,	   to	   the	  
reflexive	   side	   of	   a	   political	   discussion.	   And	   this	   represents	   a	   great	   danger	   exactly	  
because	   it	   represents,	   in	  other	   terms,	   the	  same	  expression	  of	  partial	   imposition	  of	  
normative	  perspectives.	  Therefore	  it	  lacks	  all	  the	  counterbalances	  useful	  to	  settle	  an	  
open	  discussion	  with	  all	  the	  potentially	  affected	  people.	  	  
So	  to	  understand	  how	  much	  participation	  do	  we	  need	  means	  to	  pose	  the	  question	  in	  
another	  way,	  that	  is	  in	  which	  way	  we	  need	  to	  make	  people	  participate,	  that	  implies	  a	  
more	  basilar	  question,	  who	  are	  the	  participants	  we	  need	  to	  take	  into	  account	  if	  we	  
want	  to	  avoid	  a	  partial	  understanding	  and	  consequently	  want	  to	  enact	  a	  dialectical	  
and	  reflexive	  process?	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45	  Pasolini,	  Scritti	  Corsari,	  Garzanti,	  Milano	  1975.	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4.1.3.	  Participants:	  Stakeholders,	  Agents	  and	  Actors	  
These	  questions	  then,	  who	  are	  the	  participants	  or	  who	  should	  they	  be,	  brings	  us	  to	  
an	   interesting	   aspect	   underlying	   participation.	   In	   fact	   we	   usually	   assist	   to	  
participatory	   efforts	   built	   in	   a	   certain	   way,	   conceived	   through	   similar	   structures,	  
tending	   to	   get	   stuck	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   decision	   making	   process.	   What	  
usually	   happens	   in	   fact	   is	   that	   or	   one	   position	   soars	   as	   the	   main	   one	   (justified	  
through	  rational	  or	  power	  reasons)	  or	  the	  entire	  process	  is	  stuck	  in	  the	  impossibility	  
of	   assigning	   priority	   to	   one.	   We	   believe	   that	   this	   cul	   de	   sac	   is	   also	   due	   to	   the	  
discourse	   in	   which	   participation	   tends	   to	   remain	   embedded.	   Such	   a	   discourse,	  
according	  to	  our	  perspective,	  already	  establish	  a	  priori	  what	  are	  the	  ways	   in	  which	  
participation	   will	   be	  managed	   by	   defining	   who	   are	   the	   participants	   and	   what	   are	  
they	  are	  called	  to	  express.	  
This	   language	   starts	   from	   the	   definition	   of	   participants	   and	   the	   consequent	  
expression	   they	   are	   supposed	   to	   provide.	   We	   can	   define	   the	   different	   kind	   of	  
participants	   relying	   on	   Fung’s	   list	   or	   onto	   other	   similar	   investigations.	   There	   are	  
three	   main	   figures	   that	   are	   usually	   adopted	   when	   participants	   are	   described,	  
stakeholders,	  agents	  and	  actors.	  	  
The	  most	  common	  one	   is	  without	  doubt	  stakeholders	   for	   the	   reason	  that	   they	  are	  
felt	  to	  be	  representative	  of	  civil	  society	  and	  because	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  bring	  all	  
the	  different	  interests	  as	  a	  guarantee	  of	  balance.	  The	  term	  stakeholder,	  coming	  from	  
an	   economic	   ground	   (Freeman	   1984,	   2010),	   suggests	   that	   a	   subject	   is	   tightly	  
connected	  to	  an	  interest46,	  often	  economic,	  already	  willing	  to	  participate	  in	  order	  to	  
defend	  or	   strategically	  promote	   that	   interest.	   Stakeholders	  are	  usually	   figures	   that	  
have	  already	  an	  expertise	  but	  often	  a	  partial	  one	  and	  are	   likely	  tended	  to	  preserve	  
that	   single	   perspective.	   The	   maximum	   that	   is	   expected	   from	   such	   a	   participatory	  
structure	  is	  then	  the	  possibility	  of	  starting	  a	  bargaining	  procedure	  that	  should	  lead	  to	  
some	   strategic	   (often	   readable	   from	   a	   game-­‐theory	   perspective)	   compromise	   or	  
agreement.	  But	  if	  we	  look	  closely	  at	  the	  process	  of	  participation	  where	  stakeholders	  
are	   involved,	   this	   is	   a	   process	   in	  which	   they	   contribute	  with	   a	   specific	   reason,	   an	  
interest,	  that	  implies	  or	  that	  they	  already	  went	  through	  a	  reflective	  moment	  or	  they	  
are	  just	  willing	  to	  defend,	  dogmatically	  or	  irrationally,	  a	  position.	  It	  appears	  unlikely	  
that	  stakeholders	  could	  give	  up	  their	  beliefs	  and	  reframe	  their	  understanding	  of	  the	  
process.	  Therefore	   it	   looks	   like	   that	   this	  whole	   structure	  can’t	  overcome	   the	   limits	  
implicit	   in	  a	  strategic	   interaction.	  The	  stakeholders	  are	   in	  some	  sense	  actors	  with	  a	  
specific	   pre-­‐given	   script	   that	   are	   not	   willing	   or	   able	   to	   change.	   A	   participatory	  
structure	  based	  on	   involving	   stakeholders	   could	   then	   lead	   to	   a	   situation	  where	   all	  
the	  participants	  know	  the	  reciprocal	  interests	  but	  are	  not	  keen	  in	  giving	  up	  them.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46	  The	  same	  term	  interest	  is	  recent,	  of	  technical-­‐countable	  origins:	  “interest”,	  latin,	  that	  used	  
to	  be	  written	  in	  accounts	  ledgers,	  in	  front	  of	  the	  incomes	  to	  draw.	  (Mauss	  1950)	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What	   are	   the	   possible	   options	   in	   such	   a	   situation	   then?	   A	   first	   one	   would	   be	  
represented	   by	   the	   stagnation	   of	   the	   discussion;	   no	   one	   can	   make	   an	   explicit	  
decision	  against	  someone	  else’s	  interests	  otherwise	  participation	  looses	  its	  sense.	  	  
A	  second	  one	  would	  be	  to	  pursue	  a	  decision	  and	  to	  do	  it	  due	  to	  some	  practical	  and	  
often	  hidden	  agreement	  that	  entails	  a	  wider	  frame.	  
A	  third	  one,	  subtler,	  would	  be	  to	  embed	  from	  the	  beginning	  participation	  in	  certain	  
formal	   structures	   by	   which,	   for	   instance,	   the	   ‘best	   argument’	   will	   be	   chosen.	  We	  
don’t	  need	  to	  repeat	  how	  a	   logical	   justification,	  apart	  from	  suffering	  of	  a	  discourse	  
kind	  of	  domination,	  doesn’t	  help	  us	  in	  our	  task	  of	  defining	  a	  suitable	  structure	  for	  RRI.	  
We	   have	   defined	   already	   how	   the	   justification	   of	   a	   position	   doesn’t	   imply	   the	  
application	  of	  that	  very	  position	  by	  someone	  else.	  
In	   general,	   however,	   if	   we	   limit	   participants	   to	   stakeholders	   and	   therefore	   their	  
perspectives	  to	  interests,	  it	  will	  be	  hardly	  impossible	  from	  them	  to	  be	  able	  to	  change	  
them.	  An	  interest	  is	  already	  a	  settled	  and	  crystallized	  position	  that	  can’t	  be	  changed	  
unless	  the	  material	  position	  would	  change	  as	  well.	  
In	   this	   way	   all	   the	   problems	   connected	  with	   the	   discursive	   ideal	   situation,	   that	   is	  
inclusion/exclusion,	   terms	   of	   the	   discourse,	   etc.,	   remain.	   Accordingly	   then,	  
participation	  based	  only	  on	  stakeholders	  tends	  to	  appear	  as	  an	  already	  driven	  one.	  
Given	   that	   we	   are	   looking	   for	   a	   structure	   that	   manages	   to	   avoid	   imposition	   and	  
succeeds	   in	   coping	   with	   conflicting	   perspectives	   without	   ignoring	   them,	   a	  
stakeholder-­‐based	  process	  is	  not	  the	  best	  candidate.	  
	  	  
This	   stakeholder-­‐modality	   indirectly	   leads	  us	   to	  one	  of	   the	  problems	   connected	   to	  
participation,	  especially	  when	  connected	  to	  research	  and	  innovation.	  The	  economic	  
stress	   that	   underlies	   such	   a	   reasoning	   and	   that	   reduces	   participation	   to	   a	   bargain	  
shows	  us	  how	  the	  timing	  of	  participation	  is	  fundamental	  in	  two	  ways.	  If	  on	  the	  one	  
hand	  here	  participation	  could	  be	  also	  enacted	  at	  an	  earlier	  stage	  of	  the	  research,	  on	  
the	   other	   hand	   if	   those	   participants	   are	   already	   formed	   as	   stakeholders	   along	   the	  
participatory	  process	  the	  stage	  at	  which	  they	  will	  start	  to	  participate	  won’t	  affect	  the	  
innovation	   in	   ethical	   terms.	   This	   means	   that	   normative	   contrasts	   and	   conflicts	   in	  
general	   will	   be	   handled	   in	   a	   strategic	   or	   rationalistic	   way	   or	   dismissed.	   But	   this	  
doesn’t	   fit	   the	   research	   and	   innovation	   field	   where	   certain	   kind	   of	   products	   or	  
processes	  will	  be	  followed	  only	  if	  they	  respect	  the	  exceeding	  of	  reason.	  Furthermore,	  
the	   rules	   of	   participation	   are	   already	   established	   and	   there	   is	   no	   space	   for	  
questioning	  them.	  So	  it	  is	  not	  only	  the	  time	  at	  which	  participants	  are	  included	  in	  the	  
process	   but	   also	   at	  what	   stage	  participants	   are	  made	   such,	   that	   is	   how	  we	   intend	  
them	  to	  be	  an	  active	  part	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  the	  process.	  	  
If	   we	   would	   like	   to	   express	   this	   in	   other	   terms	   we	   could	   say	   that,	   within	   a	  
stakeholder	  conception,	  participants	  are	  already	  actors	  whether	  they	  should	  still	  be	  
agents.	   The	   distinction	   between	   the	   two	   lies	   in	   the	   intentionality	   by	   which	   they	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participate.	  Agents	  could	  be	  merely	  driven	  figure	  that	  haven’t	  developed	  yet	  a	  sort	  
of	   consciousness	   on	   how	   and	   why	   they	   would	   prefer	   to	   participate.	   It	   is	   not	   by	  
chance	   then	   that	   also	   the	   language	   directs	   our	   hypothesis	   towards	   this	  
understanding.	  If	  in	  English	  agent	  could	  also	  be	  used	  in	  natural	  sciences,	  actor	  always	  
implies	  some	  kind	  of	  human	  quality	  that	  firmly	  distinguishes	  it	  from	  the	  former.	  An	  
actor	   is	   someone	   that	   has	   to	   play	   a	   role	   based	   on	   a	   script.	   It	   is	   a	   subject	   that	  
constructs	  and	  defines	  himself	  by	  acting	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  a	  canvas.	  After	  all	  if	  to	  act	  is	  a	  
verb	   easily	   understood,	   on	   the	   other	   side	   to	   age	   could	   only	  mean	   to	   be	   passively	  
standing	   a	   necessity	   of	   nature.	   Therefore	   we	   can	   affirm	   that	   while	   agents	   are	  
unintentional	  figure	  driven	  on	  the	  scene,	  actors	  are	  consciously	  moving	  on	  the	  stage.	  
Being	   the	   two	   terms	   usually	   interchanged	   without	   any	   particular	   difference	   we	  
understand	   how	   such	   a	  marked	   distinction	   could	   be	   object	   of	   doubt,	   but	   we	   still	  
believe	   that	   there	   is	   a	   difference	   in	   the	   way	   particular	   figures	   enter	   in	   the	  
participatory	  frame	  and	  we	  think	  that	  this	  difference	  could	  be	  well	  expressed	  by	  the	  
agent/actors	  figures.	  	  
According	   to	  our	  perspective	   then,	   the	   two	  major	   risks	  connected	   to	  participation,	  
especially	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  RRI,	  are	  to	  involve	  agents	  or	  actors/stakeholders	  with	  an	  
already	  fixed	  role.	  What	  we	  believe	  should	  be	  the	  case,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  is	  to	  create	  
the	  conditions	  in	  order	  to	  form	  an	  actor	  from	  an	  agent,	  that	  is,	  to	  enact	  a	  reflexive	  
process.	  
So,	  what	  we	   tried	   to	   say	   is	   that	   participation	   is	   a	  wide	   an	   empty	   conception	   that	  
could	  be	  intended	  and	  adopted	  in	  different	  ways	  not	  all	  appropriate	  for	  the	  declared	  
scope.	  Therefore,	  participation	  needs	  to	  be	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  real	  influence	  in	  the	  
decision-­‐making	   process.	   Furthermore,	   in	   order	   to	   not	   reduce	   the	   different	  
normativities	   to	   a	   general	   economic	   perspective,	   that	   will	   maintain	   the	  
crystallization	   of	   position,	   we	   need	   to	   think	   of	   participants	   as	   pursuing	   specific	  
preferences	  or	  better	  say	  vision	  of	  the	  worlds	  and	  not	  merely	  interests.	  
This	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  a	  reflexive	  process	  that	  we	  now	  have	  to	  define.	  
	  
4.2.	  Reflexivity	  and	  the	  Cognitive	  framing	  
Stressing	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  preference	  instead	  of	  an	  interest	  implies	  the	  possibility	  
of	  change	  that	  every	  preference	  automatically	  carries	  with.	  A	  preference	  can	  always	  
be	  modified	  if	  new	  conditions	  are	  brought	  to	  light.	  A	  preference	  could	  be	  intended	  in	  
in	  different	  ways	  and	  different	  gradations.	  It	  could	  go	  from	  a	  simple	  and	  superficial	  
choice	  made	   in	  every	  day	   life	   to	  a	  conception	  of	   the	  world.	  Being	  usually	   tied	   to	  a	  
cultural	   and	   spiritual	   dimension,	   by	   acting	   on	   this	   side,	   a	   preference	   could	   be	  
modified.	   This	  particular	   action	  of	  modification,	   far	   from	  being	  an	   imposed	  one,	   is	  
what	  we	  call,	  reflexivity.	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Obviously	  each	  conception	  of	  the	  world	  is	  related	  to	  a	  specific	  framing.	  Neutrality,	  or	  
a	   ‘perspective	   from	   nowhere’,	   as	   much	   as	   a	   certain	   positivist	   stream	   pretend	   to	  
adopt,	   seems	   to	   be	   quite	   an	   unrealistic	   position,	   especially	   if	   we	   are	   questioning	  
ethical	  matters47.	  We	  believe	  that	  when	  an	  actor	  tries	  to	  consider	  an	  ethical	  issue,	  he	  
does	   so	   within	   some	   pre-­‐conceptions,	   or,	   otherwise	   called,	   visions	   of	   the	   world.	  
These	   can	   be	   derived	   from	   the	   tradition	   (Habermas,	   Gadamer),	   or	   can	   simply	  
represent	  our	  source	  of	  practical	  assessment	   (Husserl,	  Parsons).	  What	   is	   important	  
here	  is	  not	  as	  much	  the	  understanding	  of	  a	  specific	  determination	  of	  the	  framing	  but	  
rather	  the	  comprehension	  that	  there	  is	  always	  a	  frame.	  	  
Through	   the	   framing	   concept,	  we	   can	   highlight	   the	   necessary	   contextualisation	   of	  
every	  judgment	  and	  how	  it	  relies	  on	  the	  routines	  that	  an	  interpretive	  approach	  will	  
continually	  adapt	  to	  new	  contexts.	  Cognitive	  framing	  consists	  of	  the	  way	  the	  actors	  
conceive	   a	   situation.	   And	   this	   cognitive	   framing	   means	   that	   an	   actor	   is	   already	  
embedded,	  constraint	   in	  a	  specific	  understanding	  of	   things,	  we	  could	  say,	  he	  has	  a	  
normative	   framing.	   Framing	  constraints	   could	  be	  economic,	   scientific,	   technical,	  or	  
similar,	  and	  have	  a	  major	  effect	  on	  the	  decisions	  made	  by	  the	  actors	  involved.	  	  
The	  issue	  of	  the	  frame	  has	  been	  debated	  for	  a	  long	  time	  in	  social	  sciences.	  Although	  
there	   are	   several	   different	   perspectives	   on	   the	   structure	   –	   agent/actor	   (Giddens,	  
Archer,	  Habermas)	  we	  consider	  Bourdieu’s	  one	  to	  suit	  best	  our	  understanding	  of	  it.	  
Bourdieu’s	  approach	  to	  the	  agency-­‐structure	  linkage	  is	  usually	  known	  as	  the	  theory	  
of	   habitus	   and	   field.	   Bourdieu	   sought	   to	   bridge	   subjectivism	   (the	   individual)	   and	  
objectivism	   (society)	   with	   a	   perspective	   called	   constructivist	   structuralism.	  
Structuralism	  focuses	  on	  the	  objective	  structures	  of	   language	  and	  culture	  that	  give	  
shape	   to	   human	   action.	   Constructivism	   looks	   at	   the	   social	   genesis	   of	   schemes	   of	  
perception,	  thought,	  and	  action.	  Bourdieu	  wants	  to	  examine	  the	  social	  construction	  
of	  objective	  structures	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  how	  people	  perceive	  and	  construct	  their	  
own	   social	   world,	   but	   without	   neglecting	   how	   perception	   and	   construction	   are	  
constrained	  by	  structures.	  An	  important	  dynamic	  in	  this	  relationship	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  
individual	  actors	  to	  invent	  and	  improvise	  within	  the	  structure	  of	  their	  routines.	  
The	  habitus	  is	  the	  mental	  structure	  through	  which	  people	  deal	  with	  the	  social	  world.	  
It	   can	   be	   thought	   of	   as	   a	   set	   of	   internalized	   schemes	   through	  which	   the	  world	   is	  
perceived,	   understood,	   appreciated,	   and	   evaluated.	   A	   habitus	   is	   acquired	   as	   the	  
result	  of	   the	   long-­‐term	  occupation	  of	  a	  position	   in	   the	   social	  world.	  Depending	  on	  
the	  position	  occupied,	  people	  will	  have	  a	  different	  habitus.	  The	  habitus	  operates	  as	  a	  
structure,	  but	  people	  do	  not	  simply	  respond	  to	  it	  mechanically.	  When	  people	  change	  
positions,	   sometimes	   their	   habitus	   is	   no	   longer	   appropriate,	   a	   condition	   called	  
hysteresis.	  Bourdieu	  argues	  that	  the	  habitus	  both	  produces	  and	  is	  produced	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  See	  Bernard	  Reber,	  La	  démocratie	  génétiquement	  modifiée,	  Laval,	  2011.	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social	  world.	  People	  internalize	  external	  structures,	  and	  they	  externalize	  things	  they	  
have	   internalized	   through	   practices.	   The	   concept	   of	   field	   is	   the	   objective	  
complement	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  habitus.	  A	  field	  is	  a	  network	  of	  social	  relations	  among	  the	  
objective	   positions	   within	   it.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   set	   of	   interactions	   or	   intersubjective	   ties	  
among	   individuals.	  The	  social	  world	  has	  a	  great	  variety	  of	  semi-­‐autonomous	   fields,	  
such	   as	   art,	   religion,	   and	   higher	   education.	   The	   field	   is	   a	   type	   of	   competitive	  
marketplace	   in	  which	  economic,	  cultural,	  social,	  and	  symbolic	  power	  are	  used.	  The	  
preeminent	   field	   is	   the	   field	   of	   politics,	   from	   which	   a	   hierarchy	   of	   power	  
relationships	   serves	   to	   structure	   all	   other	   fields.	   To	   analyze	   a	   field,	   one	  must	   first	  
understand	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  political	  field.	  The	  next	  step	  is	  to	  map	  the	  objective	  
positions	   within	   a	   field	   and,	   finally,	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   habitus	   of	   the	   agents	   who	  
occupy	   particular	   positions	   can	   be	   understood.	   These	   agents	   act	   strategically,	  
depending	  on	  their	  habitus,	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  their	  capital.	  Bourdieu	  is	  particularly	  
concerned	   with	   how	   powerful	   positions	   within	   a	   field	   can	   perpetrate	   symbolic	  
violence	  on	   less	  powerful	  actors.	  Cultural	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  education	   impose	  a	  
dominant	   perspective	   on	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   population	   in	   order	   to	   legitimate	   their	  
power.	   In	   this	   sense	   then	   we	   need	   to	   carefully	   take	   into	   account	   what	   a	   context	  
could	  mean	  and	  imply	  in	  social	  interaction.	  
As	   we	   have	   said	   different	   positions,	   conflicting	   ones,	   are	   always	   at	   stake	   in	   a	  
dialogue.	  Different	  perspectives	  are	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  for	  which	  participation	  itself	   is	  
required.	  What	  we	  need	  to	  do	  is	  not	  to	  dismiss	  them	  or	  to	  be	  kept	  prisoner	  by	  them.	  
“A	  democracy	  is	  not	  a	  political	  regime	  without	  conflict	  but	  a	  regime	  in	  which	  conflicts	  
are	  open	  and	  negotiable	  […].	  Under	  this	  regime,	  conflict	  is	  neither	  an	  accident	  nor	  a	  
misfortune;	   it	   is	  expression	  of	  the	  character	  of	  public	  good	  that	   is	  not	  determinable	  
dogmatically	  or	  in	  a	  scientific	  way”48.	  
What	  we	  need	  to	  do	  is	  to	  ‘listen’	  to	  these	  frames	  and	  try	  to	  overcome	  them	  in	  order	  
to	  find	  a	  common	  horizon.	  And	  in	  order	  to	  do	  that	  we	  need	  to	  open	  the	  frames,	  but	  
to	  open	  a	  frame	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  consciousness	  is	  needed.	  If	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  this	  
awareness	   wouldn’t	   require	   too	   much	   effort,	   we	   know	   that	   we	   have	   a	   specific	  
perspective	   in	  most	   of	   the	   case,	   it	   does	   become	  much	  more	   complicated	  when	   it	  
comes	  to	  a	  deeper	  level	  of	  the	  question.	  
We	   enter	   in	   this	   way	   into	   the	   problem	   of	   reflexivity	   with	   its	   related	   issues,	   the	  
problem	  of	  capacitation	  of	   the	  actors49.	  The	  problems	  connected	  with	  capacitation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  P.	  Ricoeur	  (1991),	  p.166-­‐167.	  
49	  In	  philosophy,	  and	  in	  School	  of	  Louvain’s	  theory	  in	  particular,	  the	  term	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  
the	  coming	  to	  capacity	  of	  an	  actor,	  the	  process	  by	  which	  the	  actor	  acquires	  a	  new	  capacity	  
(here	  the	  second-­‐order	  reflexivity,	  i.e.	  the	  capacity	  of	  being	  conscious	  and	  critical	  about	  his/	  
her	   own	   framing).	   The	   term	   is	   used	   to	   underline	   the	   process	   by	  which	   the	   actor	   gain	   the	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are	  several	  and	  of	  different	  nature.	  We	  believe	  it	  still	  represents	  the	  main	  unsolved	  
general	  dilemma	  of	  a	   critical	   tradition	  and	  perhaps	  even	   the	   suggestions	  we	  grasp	  
from	   other	   authors	   analyzed	   by	   Lenoble	   &	   Maesschalck	   won’t	   represent	   a	  
satisfactory	  answer.	  However	  we	  can	   say	   that	   this	  uncertainty	   is	   connected	   to	   the	  
specific	  field	  in	  which	  we	  are	  moving	  our	  considerations.	  Because	  if	  it	  is	  true	  on	  the	  
one	   hand	   that	   a	   general	   and	   necessary	   countermovement	   to	   domination	   seems	  
impossible	  to	  be	  set	  in	  motion,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  we	  believe	  that	  
a	  change	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  things	  represents	  a	  feasible	  way	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  the	  
relation	   between	   science	   and	   society.	   Responsible	   Innovation	   is	   a	   dimension	   that	  
requires	   exactly	   such	   awareness	   in	   order	   to	   make	   sense.	   And	   we	   think	   that	   this	  
awareness	  could	  be	  raised	  or	  highlighted	  by	  different	  means.	  It	  could	  be	  an	  historical	  
one	   (GMO,	   Nanos),	   could	   be	   political	   (change	   in	   the	   political	   structure)	  
epistemological	   (change	   in	   the	   paradigm)	   or	   pedagogical	   (a	   theory	   of	   learning)50	  	  
Probably,	  according	  to	  specific	  issues	  an	  hybrid	  represents	  the	  best	  answer,	  but	  what	  
really	  counts	  here	  is	  to	  enact	  this	  capacitation	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  an	  awareness	  on	  
issues	  related	  to	  RRI.	  	  
	  
Currently,	   given	   the	   participatory	   efforts	   that	   we	   mentioned,	   it’s	   likely	   to	   find	   a	  
reflexive	  approach.	  To	  participate	  means	  after	  all	  to	  reflect	  on	  something	  in	  order	  to	  
offer	   an	   opinion.	   But	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   there	   are	   many	   slippery	   or	   better	   say	  
ideological	  attempt	  to	  establish	  certain	  procedures	  without	  making	  them	  effective.	  
In	  this	  sense	  the	  reflexivity	  that	  we	  often	  encounter	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  reflexivity	  that	  focus	  
on	   specific	   issues	   that	   are	   as	  well	   already	   pre-­‐determined	   and	   shaped.	   The	   risk	   is	  
then	   to	   fall	   in	   a	   rationalistic	   dimension	   or,	   even	   worse,	   in	   an	   instrumentalized	  
participatory	  process51.	  	  
From	   an	   epistemological	   viewpoint,	   this	   linkage	   between	   social	   actors	   and	   their	  
context	   has	   been	   widely	   neglected	   by	   procedural	   (but	   also	   pragmatist)	   political	  
philosophy.	   Finally,	   a	   sound	   epistemological	   theory	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  
actors,	   the	   formation	   of	   norms	   and	   their	   context	   it	   still	   missing	   in	   a	   way	   that	  
threatens	   the	   possibility	   of	   implementing	  norms	   in	   an	   efficient	  way.	  At	   a	   cognitive	  
level,	  in	  order	  to	  conceive	  in	  a	  more	  appropriate	  way	  our	  relation	  to	  the	  context,	  we	  
need	  to	  introduce	  the	  possibility	  for	  the	  agents	  to	  be	  reflexive	  and	  to	  revise	  not	  only	  
their	   judgments,	   but	   also	   the	  way	   in	  which	   they	   size	   and	   understand	   the	   problem	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ability	  to	  do	  something,	  which	  is	  a	  bit	  different	  from	  the	  term	  “empowerment”,	  which	  refers	  
to	  a	  power	  that	  the	  actor	  already	  have	  in	  potentiality,	  and	  need	  to	  be	  reinforce	  or	  allow	  to	  
be	  expressed.	  
For	   a	   more	   detailed	   explanation	   see,	   J.	   Lenoble	   &	   M.	   Maesschalck,	   Toward	   a	   Theory	   of	  
Governance:	  The	  Action	  of	  Norms,	  Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2003.	  
50	  Lenoble	  &	  Maesschalck,	  Democracy,	  law	  and	  governance.	  Farnham,	  Ashgate	  2010.	  	  	  	  	  
51	  Foucault	  M.,	  Les	  mots	  et	  les	  choses,	  Paris,	  Gallimard	  1966.	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(epistemic	   and	   normative).	   The	   possibility	   of	   revision	   is	   an	   important	   bet	   in	  
deliberative	   theory	   of	   democracy.	   Indeed	   if	  we	   don’t	   agree	   to	   change	   our	  mind	   in	  
front	   of	   better	   arguments	   it	   is	   useless	   to	   enter	   in	   such	  process.	   Better	   continue	  on	  
other	  ways	  using	  bargaining,	  or	  force	  reports.	  	  
In	   order	   to	   avoid	   such	   a	   danger	   we	   need	   to	   distinguish	   between	   two	   kinds	   of	  
reflexivity,	  a	  first	  and	  a	  second	  order	  one.	  
	  
The	  reflexivity	  of	  a	  responsible	  approach	  is	  often	  reduced	  to	  a	  first-­‐order	  reflexivity,	  
i.e.	   a	   reflexivity	   that	   let	   its	  own	   framing	  unquestioned.	  The	   first-­‐order	   reflexivity	   is	  
not	  an	  absence	  of	  reflexivity,	  but	  a	   limited	  reflexivity,	  a	  reflexivity	  that	  comes	  from	  
the	   framing	   itself	   and	   avoids	   asking	   questions	   on	   the	   framing.	   The	   novelty	   of	  
modernity	   is	   to	   bring	   in	   front	   of	   the	   tribunal	   of	   reason	   itself,	   its	   objectives,	   its	  
functioning,	   the	  side	  effect	  of	   its	  grow	  and	  functioning,	  and	  so	  on.	  This	   is	  what	  we	  
call	  first-­‐order	  reflexivity.	  	  
The	   second-­‐order	   reflexivity	   instead	   is	   a	   reflection	   on	   how	   society,	   and	   modern	  
rationality	  in	  particular,	  work,	  and	  reflect	  on	  itself,	  and	  how	  those	  reflections	  can	  be	  
limited	  by	  presupposition.	  A	  second-­‐order	  reflexivity	   is	  not	  only	  a	  reflection	  on	  our	  
own	  actions	  (as	  individual	  or	  as	  society),	  but	  a	  reflection	  on	  how	  the	  presupposition,	  
the	  governance	  principles	  and	  the	  values	  determine	  our	  way	  of	  acting.	  We	  could	  also	  
say	   that	   the	   second-­‐order	   reflexivity	   is	   the	  mean	  by	  which	  we	   can	   reach	   the	   first-­‐
order	  one.	  We	  need	  to	  understand	  the	  institutional	  frame	  that	  surrounds	  us	  and	  in	  
which	  we	  are	  embedded	  before	  we	  could	  start	  questioning	  sensibly	  about	  us.	  
Here,	  we	   see	   that	  an	  appropriate	   conception	  of	   reflexivity	  will	   rely	  on	  a	   theory	   of	  
learning.	   We	   refer	   to	   the	   capacity	   of	   actors	   to	   identify	   the	   various	   effective	  
possibilities	  on	  which	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  norm	  will	  be	  carried	  out.	  
Actors	  not	  only	  reflect	  on	  the	  adequacy	  of	  their	  norms	  and	  values,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  
way	  in	  which	  they	  construct	  these	  norms	  and	  values.	  These	  norms	  and	  values	  can	  
be	  focused	  on	  what	  is	  right	  –	  or	  false-­‐	  (epistemic	  norms)	  or	  what	  is	  good,	  just	  or	  evil,	  
unjust.	  
	  
The	   following	   table	   recaps	   the	   distinction	   between	   a	   first	   and	   a	   second	   order	  
reflexivity.	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Figure	  9:	  First	  and	  Second	  order	  Reflexivity	  
(inspired	  by	  Argyris,	  Chris,	  1993,	  Knowledge	  for	  Action:	  a	  Guide	  to	  Overcoming	  Barrier	  to	  Institutional	  Change,	  
San	  Francisco:	  Jossey	  Bass)	  
	  
In	   terms	   of	   RRI	   a	   first-­‐order	   and	   a	   second-­‐order	   reflexivity	   could	   have	   different	  
meanings.	   However	   we	   could	   say	   that,	   considering	   an	   innovation	   (GMO,	   for	  
instance)	   on	   which	   participants	   are	   called	   to	   express	   an	   opinion,	   a	   first	   order	  
reflexivity	   would	   be	   a	   reflection	   on	   that	   specific	   innovation	   in	   its	   consequences,	  
effects,	   need,	   etc.	   A	   second-­‐order	   instead	  would	   require	   thinking	   about	   the	   same	  
conditions	  that	  allowed	  us	  to	  think	  and	  to	  think	   in	  a	  certain	  way.	  What	  could	   it	  be	  
the	   interest	   behind,	   who	   is	   financing	   the	   project,	   who	   settled	   the	   participatory	  
structure,	   why,	   etc.	   Of	   course	   this	   second-­‐order	   could	   go	   from	   questions	   of	   a	  
practical	  nature	  to	  more	  abstract	  and	  ambiguous	  matters	  as	  the	  discourse	  itself.	  	  
	  
So,	   to	   recap,	   a	   second	   condition	   to	   ensure	   that	   a	   participatory	   effort	   is	   made	  
respecting	  its	  intentions	  and	  aims	  at	  modifying	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  to	  enact	  a	  reflexive	  
process.	  Even	  here	  the	  reflexivity	  doesn’t	  have	  to	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  pre-­‐framed	  one	  but	  
needs	  to	  question	  the	  frame	  itself.	  
	  
The	   norm	   can	   only	   be	   expressed	   in	   reality	   by	   establishing	   reflexivity	   both	   on	   the	  
perceptions	  of	   the	  ways	  of	   life	   that	  are	   lived	  and	  promoted	  by	  those	  to	  whom	  the	  
norm	   is	   addressed,	   and	   the	   institutional	   frames	   that	   allow	   those	   perceptions.	   To	  
suppose	   that	   the	   adaptation	   to	   the	   dominant	   perception	   and	   the	   corresponding	  
ways	   of	   life	   will	   happen	   automatically,	   or	   is	   directly	   linked	   to	   the	   simple	  
implementation	  of	  a	  formal	  mechanism	  conditioning	  the	  acceptability	  of	  the	  norm,	  
means	  a	  great	  misunderstanding	  of	   this	   reflexivity	   contribution.	  We	  need	   to	  move	  
Action	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from	   a	   simple	   deliberative	   or	   participative	   approach	   that	   develops	   throughout	   a	  
naturalistic	   assumption.	   As	   resumed	   by	   Maesschalck	   and	   Lenoble:	   “This	   advance	  
involves	   a	   ‘reflexive’	   construction	   of	   collective	   actors	   and	   of	   negotiation	  
arrangements.	  It	  is	  only	  on	  this	  condition	  that	  one	  will	  move	  beyond	  either	  the	  belief	  
in	  a	  natural	  capacity	  of	  collective	  actors	  to	  ensure	  a	  ‘rationally	  efficient’	  regulation	  of	  
risk,	  or	  the	  equally	  formal	  belief	   in	  a	  natural	  capacity	  of	   individual	  actors	  to	  define,	  
with	   the	   contribution	   of	   ‘experts’,	   the	   condition	   of	   an	   admissible	   common	   world.	  
Participation	  cannot	  presuppose	  this	  capacity	  as	  given.	  Such	  a	  presupposition	  ignores	  
the	  reflexive	  operation	  upon	  which	  this	  ‘potentiation’	  of	  the	  capacity	  to	  ‘rationalize’	  
the	  world	  and	  to	  establish	  a	  common	  world	  depends.	  This	  reflexive	  formation	  of	  the	  
conditions	  of	  collective	  negotiation	  occurs	  through	  a	  double	  reflexivity.	  At	  the	  level	  of	  
the	  actor,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  control	  the	  institution	  of	  internal	  arrangements	  required	  
to	  ensure	  reflexive	  construction.	  Only	  on	  this	  condition	  can	  the	  ‘confrontation’	  of	  the	  
diverse	  ‘contexts’	  involved	  be	  constructed.	  It	  is	  also	  necessary	  to	  organize	  a	  reflexive	  
‘return’	  to	  the	  first	  level	  at	  the	  level	  of	  negotiating	  arrangements	  itself,	  particularly	  in	  
determining	  the	  problems	  to	  be	  discussed	  and	  of	  their	  possible	  solutions”52	  
Especially,	   and	   accordingly,	   a	   fundamental	   problem	   is	   the	   one	   of	   enacting	   this	  
reflexivity	   as	   this	   cannot	   come	   on	   its	   own,	   neither	   from	   an	   epistemological	  
perspective	  nor	  from	  a	  practical	  one.	  This	  kind	  of	  matter	  has	  been	  characterizing	  the	  
history	  of	  critical	  thoughts	  throughout	  the	  twentieth	  century.	  If	  already	  this	  problem	  
has	  been	   face	  with	   scarce	   success	   and	   several	   difficulties	  by	   the	  Western	  Marxian	  
tradition,	  now	  the	  proposal	  or	  the	  possible	  solution	  is	  grounded	  in	  a	  more	  a	  practical	  
dimension.	  Notoriously,	   the	  established	  net	  of	  power	   that	  provokes	  and	  maintains	  
social	   conditions	   of	   dominion,	  materialized	   in	   effects	   like	   reification	   or	   alienation,	  
could	  be	  overthrown	  through	  a	  reaction	  that	  starts	  with	  a	  gain	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  so-­‐
called	   awareness	   or	   self-­‐consciousness.	   The	   problems	   raising	   from	   this	   kind	   of	  
necessary	  perceptions	  of	  history	  were	  enclosed	  in	  the	  reason	  by	  which	  the	  subjects	  
considered	  to	  be	  reified	  could,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  for	  some	  magic	  or	  transcendental	  
structure,	  and	  all	  of	  a	  sudden,	  start	  to	  get	  aware	  of	  this	  process	  and	  find	  the	  means	  
by	  which	  to	  react.	  	  
But	  again	  a	  main	  question	  is	  how	  to	  translate	  this	  theoretical	  attempt	  in	  a	  practical	  
structure?	  What	  we	  need	  is	  a	  model	  of	  governance	  that	  allows	  such	  reflexivity.	  	  
Aware	  of	  these	  epistemological	  and	  political	  difficulties,	  now	  the	  solution	  should	  be	  
one	   that	   assumes	   a	   different	   shape	   due	   to	   the	   particular	   governance	   situation	   in	  
which	  nowadays	  a	  norms	  construction	  is	  always	  embedded.	  Therefore,	  although	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  J.	   Lenoble	   &	   M.	   Maesschalck,	   Toward	   a	   Theory	   of	   Governance:	   The	   Action	   of	   Norms,	  
Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2003,	  pp.	  261-­‐262.	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main	  aim	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  unaltered,	  the	  form	  by	  which	  to	  reach	  the	  same	  goal	   is	  a	  
more	   ‘intrusive’	   one.	   According	   to	   Lenoble	   and	   Maesschalck,	   “the	   efficiency	   of	   a	  
norm	  (or	  a	  rule	  in	  general)	  will	  be	  measured	  according	  to	  the	  incentives	  required	  to	  
enable	  the	  reflexive	  reconstruction	  by	  the	  actors	  mobilized	  of	  what	  will	  motivate	  their	  
effective	  institution	  of	  a	  concrete	  new	  way	  of	  life”53.	  
To	   summarize	   the	   two	   kinds	   of	   reflexive	   governances	   we	   could	   propose	   the	  
following	  definitions:	  
	  
First-­‐order	  reflexive	  governance	  
First-­‐order	   reflexive	   governance	   is	   the	   level	   at	   which	   issues	   are	   identified	   and	  
solutions	   enacted.	   This	   is	   done	   through	   interaction	   between	   the	   governing	  
organization	   and	   its	   citizens,	   which	   helps	   to	   identify	   what	   the	   problem	   is,	   who	   is	  
experiencing	   it	   and	   what	   an	   appropriate	   solution	   may	   be.	   There	   can	   be	   differing	  
opinions	   in	  an	  organization	  as	  to	  what	  constitutes	  a	  problem	  and	  there	  is,	  to	  some	  
extent,	  a	  degree	  of	  subjectivity	   in	  coming	  up	  with	  an	   ‘ordered	  problem	  definition’.	  
The	  interaction	  with	  those	  being	  governed	  helps	  in	  this	  respect	  as	  it	   legitimizes	  the	  
definition.	  Once	  a	  problem	  is	  identified,	  a	  solution	  usually	  comes	  in	  the	  form	  of	  laws	  
and/or	  regulations	  passed	  by	  the	  governing	  body.	  
	  
Second-­‐order	  reflexive	  governance	  
Second-­‐order	   reflexive	   governance	   is	   the	   level	   at	   which	   the	   institutional	  
arrangements	   are	   provided	   within	   which	   first	   order	   governing	   takes	   place.	  
Institutional	   arrangements	   can	   take	   many	   forms	   in	   both	   the	   public	   (a	   regulatory	  
agency)	   and	   private	   (the	   financial	   market)	   sectors.	   What	   is	   important	   is	   that	   a	  
framework	  is	  provided	  that	  enables	  first-­‐order	  governance	  to	  take	  place.	  There	  is	  a	  
distinct	   ‘two-­‐way	   role’	   at	   this	   level	   with	   both	   those	   being	   governed	   and	   those	  
governing	   having	   input	   into	   the	   process	   to	   provide	   an	   effective	   and	   legitimate	  
institutional	   setting.	   This	   approach	   enables	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   analysis	   of	  
governing	   interactions,	   as	   actors	   can	   often	   be	   influenced	   by	   institutions	   (and	   the	  
way)	  these	  help	  or	  hinder	  them	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  goals.	  
	  
Table	  8:	  Kinds	  of	  reflexive	  governances	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  J.	   Lenoble	   &	   M.	   Maesschalck,	   Toward	   a	   Theory	   of	   Governance:	   The	   Action	   of	   Norms,	  
Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  2003,	  p.92.	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4.3.	  A	  third	  condition:	  ethics	  as	  a	  guiding	  principle	  
After	   understanding	   why	   a	   reflexive	   participatory	   governance	   is	   the	   one	   best	  
suitable	  to	  fulfill	  the	  implicit	  claims	  embedded	  in	  the	  conception	  of	  RRI	  we	  need	  to	  
highlight	   a	   third	   condition	   that	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   represents	   an	   overarching	  
reference.	  In	  fact	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  participation	  is	  necessary	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  allows	  
the	   possibility	   for	   participants	   to	   create	   a	   common	   horizon	   this	   formal	   structure	  
doesn’t	  tell	  us	  much	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  target	  we	  want	  to	  achieve.	  What	  we	  believe	  
it	   is	   fundamental	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	   is	  not	   the	   content	  of	   that	   reflection	   intended	   in	  
thick	  terms.	  The	  norms	  and	  values	  provided	  by	  the	  different	  contexts	  represent	  the	  
material	   on	  which	   to	  work.	  Our	   conception	   can’t	   be	   shaped	  differently	   than	   in	   an	  
immanent	  way.	  The	  context	  with	  its	  unpredictable	  issues	  will	  determine	  the	  matter	  
at	  stake.	  But,	  at	  the	  same	  time	  our	  structure	  is	  also	  a	  transcendental	  one.	  In	  fact	  if	  
the	   material	   is	   always	   unknown	   the	   form	   that	   will	   contain	   that	   material	   and	   the	  
guiding	  principle	  are	  known.	  So,	  if	  the	  form	  in	  RRI	  is	  a	  reflexive	  participatory	  one,	  the	  
guiding	  principle	  has	  to	  be	  represented	  by	  ethics.	  	  
	  
There	   is	   a	   substantial	   difference	   between	   morality	   and	   ethics	   for	   the	   fact	   that	  
morality	   involves	   an	   intimate	   relation	   with	   some	   rules	   that	   could	   be	   considered	  
universal 54 	  whether	   ethics	   concerns	   an	   overarching	   dimension	   that	   contains	  
different	   spheres	   and	   regulate	   contextual	   issues.	   Ethics	   is	   the	   container	   of	   all	   the	  
different	   normative	   sets	   that	   are	   expressed	   in	   a	   particular	   community	   without	  
preferring	  one.	  Ethics	  is	  the	  addition	  but	  still	  not	  the	  sum	  of	  economic,	  cultural	  and	  
moral	  reasons.	  But	  ethics	   is	  also	  something	  more	  than	  a	  simple	  frame,	   is	  a	  guiding	  
principle	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  does	  not	  only	  preserve	  certain	  kinds	  of	  universal	  values	  
like	   freedom	   or	   equality	   but	   has	   also	   to	   enhance	   the	   general	   wellbeing	   of	   that	  
community.	   Ethics	   has	   a	   positive	   and	   proactive	   side	   that	   keeping	   together	   all	   the	  
subsets	   tries	   to	   show	   how	   their	   cooperation	   leads	   to	   an	   improvement,	   a	  
development	  of	  the	  general	  and	  therefore	  the	  single	  dimensions.	  Ethics	  is	  the	  effort	  
of	  dialoguing,	  is	  the	  dialectic	  of	  immanent	  forces	  towards	  a	  better	  future.	  Therefore	  
ethics	  is	  never	  given,	  it’s	  not	  something	  that	  could	  be	  detected,	  isolated	  or	  reached	  
once	  for	  all.	  Ethics	  is	  a	  constant	  movement.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  sense,	  ethics	  should	  represent	  the	  common	  guiding	  principle	  and	  the	  shared	  
effort	   in	   any	   reflexive	   participatory	   process.	   And	   it	   is	   not	   by	   chance	   that	   this	  
structure	  represents	  the	  perfect	  one	  for	  responsible	  research	  and	  innovation.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54	  Of	  course	  the	  description	  of	  this	  distinction	  is	  quite	  superficial	  due	  to	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  text.	  
For	   a	   better	   clarification,	   that	   implement	   single	   aspects,	   see	   Ritter,	   J.,	   (1968),	  Metaphysik	  
und	  Politik.	  Studien	  zu	  Aristoteles	  und	  Hegel,	  Frankfurt	  a.M.	  Suhrkamp.	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Responsible	  research	  and	  innovation	  represents	  a	  new	  paradigm	  in	  order	  to	  enforce	  
the	   relation	   between	   science	   and	   society.	   Society	   is	   composed	   by	   different	  
normativities	  and	  RRI	  can	  represent	  the	  perfect	  frame	  to	  take	  them	  all	  into	  account	  
given	  the	  polysemy	  of	  responsibility.	  But	  this	  term	  in	  RRI,	  as	  we	  have	  shown,	  should	  
maintain	  this	  polysemy	  through	  a	  complementary	  approach	  to	  innovation.	  Not	  only	  
one	  acception	  of	  it	  can	  exhaust	  the	  implications	  embedded	  in	  RRI.	  To	  act	  responsibly	  
in	   front	   of	   the	   shareholders	   can	   never	   represent	   a	   condition	   both	   sufficient	   and	  
necessary	   to	   obtain	   the	   legitimation	   of	   a	   responsible	   kind	   of	   innovation.	   Only	   the	  
attention	  to	  all	  of	   those	  sides,	  all	   the	  normativities	  embedded	   in	  responsibility	  can	  
provide	  the	  above	  mentioned	  legitimation.	  And	  this	  is	  what	  we	  define	  as	  an	  ethical	  
understanding	   of	   RRI.	   Therefore	  what	   RRI	   should	  mean	   is	   exactly	   that	   ethical	   side	  
that	  we	  have	  to	  preserve	  from	  being	  downgraded	  or	  diluted.	  	  
In	  short,	  RRI	  needs	  to	  be	  structured	  along	  a	  reflexive	  participatory	  process	  that	  is	  led	  
by	   ethical	   principles.	   By	   ethical	   principles	  we	   intend	   all	   those	   transcendental	   lines	  
filled	  by	  contingent	  issues	  belonging	  to	  specific	  communities.	  	  
	  
At	  this	  stage	  we	  need	  to	  provide	  a	  practical	  proposal	  in	  order	  to	  enact	  such	  a	  target	  
and	  after	  we	  will	  provide	  a	  grid	  that	  could	  be	  useful	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  and	  detect	  RRI.	  
To	   do	   this	  we	   have	   to	   analyze	   the	   political	   level	   of	   the	   question	   and	   define	  what	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5.	  Governance	  Approaches	  and	  Limitations	  	  
To	   question	   how	   a	   norm	   is	   constructed	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   context	   means	  
automatically	  asking	  how	  is	  the	  decision-­‐making	  organ	  coping	  with	  this	  construction.	  	  
The	  goal	  of	  our	  project	   is	  the	  “Governance	  of	  Responsible	  Innovation	  in	  Research”.	  
We	  have	  mentioned	  what	   innovation	   could	   be	   and	   the	   different	   understanding	   of	  
responsibility	   across	   the	   different	   fields.	   We	   detected	   the	   main	   common	  
shortcoming	  with	  regard	  to	  norms	  construction	  as	  the	  absence	  of	  reflexivity	  coming	  
from	   a	   sort	   of	   naturalistic	   presupposition.	   Now	   we	   need	   to	   address	   directly	   the	  
problem	   that	   we	   consider	   of	   fundamental	   importance	   in	   order	   to	   develop	   our	  
parameters,	   the	   one	   of	   how	   governance	   cope	   with	   this	   particular	   relationship	  
between	  norms	  and	  context.	  
	  
The	  notion	  of	  governance	  appears	  more	  and	  more	  at	  every	  stage	  of	  political	  matters.	  
It	   is	  a	  very	  generic	  term	  that	  could	  be	  easily	  misunderstood	  or	  undertaken	  in	  all	   its	  
significance.	  
The	  most	  recent	  developments	  of	  the	  concept,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
for	   example,	   qualify	   this	   mode	   of	   coordination	   as	   democratic,	   participative	   and	  
pragmatic,	  with	  a	   focus	  on	  supporting	  collective	  action	   (Maesschalck,	  unpublished,	  
p.3-­‐4).	   According	   to	   Jessop,	   governance	   is	   now	   seen	   as	   an	   "important	   means	   to	  
overcome	   the	   division	   between	   rulers	   and	   ruled	   in	   representative	   regimes	   and	   to	  
secure	  the	   input	  and	  commitment	  of	  an	   increasingly	  wide	  range	  of	  stakeholders	   in	  
policy	  formulation	  and	  implementation"	  (Jessop,	  2002,	  p.3).	  
This	  new	  governance	  model	  requires	  both	  groups	  (rulers	  and	  ruled)	  to	  engage	   in	  a	  
social	   learning	   process	   (Schön,	   1983).	   Indeed,	   joined	   participation	   in	   collaborative	  
problem-­‐solving	  can	  lead	  to	  critical	  scrutinizing	  of	  governing	  variables:	  goals,	  values,	  
plans	   and	   rules.	   In	   this	   perspective,	   "reflexive	   governance"	   (Lenoble	   and	  
Maesschalck,	   2003)	   reviews	   its	   own	   mechanisms	   to	   insure	   institutional	   learning.	  
Hence,	   it	   results	   in	   the	   co-­‐design	   of	   institutions	   and	   the	   elaboration	   of	   common	  
social	  representations.	  
Therefore,	  as	  we	  mentioned	  above,	  and	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  ‘contextual	  pragmatics’,	  we	  
are	  interested	  in	  what	  governance	  approaches	  we	  can	  find.	  	  
	  
These	  governance	  models,	  or	  better	  said,	  typologies,	  are	  the	  following:	  
	  
Standard	   Model:	   In	   this	   model,	   the	   disagreements	   between	   the	   experts	   and	   the	  
public	   are	  perceived	  as	   irrational	   due	   to	   the	  public’s	   lack	  of	   knowledge.	   There	   are	  
various	  reasons	  for	  the	  public	  being	  considered	  irrational,	  such	  as	  cognitive	  bias,	  the	  
lack	  of	  comprehension	  of	  technical	  subjects,	  and	  aversion	  to	  novelties	  and	  risk.	  This	  
model	  fits	  perfectly	  into	  the	  classical	  distinctions	  between	  facts	  and	  values.	  Experts	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have	  an	  objective	  ethical	  approach	  to	  risk	  whereas	  the	  risks	  perceived	  by	  the	  public	  
are	   marked	   by	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   subjectivity.	   Several	   essential	   elements	  
characterise	  the	  functioning	  of	  this	  model:	  
It	   is	   necessary	   to	   preserve	   the	   purity	   of	   expertise	   by	   not	   combining	   the	   facts	   and	  
value	   judgments.	   Expertise	   is	   generally	   independent	   from	   political,	   economic	   and	  
social	  influence.	  Trust	  is	  a	  central	  element	  for	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  system.	  It	  is	  the	  
condition	  of	   the	  delegation	  of	  a	  decision	   to	   institutions.	  Different	  mechanisms	  can	  
contribute	  to	  the	  construction	  of	  trust.	  In	  this	  model,	  it	  is	  considered	  that	  trust	  gives	  
credibility	   to	   institutions	   and	   that	   it	   is	   better	   to	   contain	   problems	   rather	   than	   to	  
draw	   attention	   to	   them.	   	   The	   difference	   in	   perceptions	   between	   experts	   and	   the	  
public	  can	  be	  reduced	  by	  means	  of	  education.	  It	  is	  supposed	  that	  people	  who	  have	  
more	   advanced	   knowledge,	   especially	   in	   ethical	   disciplines,	   understand	  better	   and	  
adopt	  experts’	  arguments.	  In	  this	  model,	  risk	  communication	  plays	  an	  important	  role.	  
It	  is	  related	  to	  a	  one-­‐way	  method	  of	  communication	  since	  the	  experts	  have	  little	  to	  
learn	  from	  the	  public.	  The	  objective	  is	  to	  reassure	  the	  public	  to	  perceive	  the	  benefits	  
concealed	  behind	  the	  risks.	  
	  
Consultation	  Model:	  	  
This	   model	   brings	   into	   question	   the	   fundamental	   thesis	   of	   the	   standard	   model,	  
namely	   the	   opposition	   between	   the	   irrational	   public	   and	   the	   rationality	   of	   the	  
experts.	   The	  distance	  between	  experts	   and	  non-­‐experts	   is	   not	   connected	  with	   the	  
level	  of	  knowledge,	  but	  with	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  perception	  of	  risk.	  The	  public	  asks	  
wider	   questions	   with	   regard	   to	   risk	   because	   they	   are	   no	   longer	   confronted	   with	  
abstract	   scientific	   theoretical	   risk,	   but	   with	   real	   risk.	   It	   is	   no	   longer	   correct	   to	  
consider	   that	   only	   experts	   are	   rational.	   Moreover	   the	   experts’	   perception	   of	   risk	  
takes	  into	  account	  their	  connections	  with	  industry	  and	  commercial	  interests	  etc.	  
The	  elements	  which	  constitute	  this	  model	  are:	  
• Voluntary	   or	   involuntary	   exposure	   to	   responsibility.	   A	   responsibility	   taken	  
voluntarily	   is	   more	   likely	   to	   be	   accepted.	   Conversely,	   an	   involuntary	  
responsibility	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  be	  accepted.	  
• The	   unknown	   character	   of	   responsibility.	   The	   responsibilities	   which	   are	  
invisible,	  unknown,	  or	  new,	   are	   less	   acceptable	   than	   those	  which	  are	  more	  
familiar.	   Here	   the	   notion	   of	   uncertainty	   becomes	   central	   and	   opposes	   the	  
notion	  of	  danger.	  
• The	   number	   of	   people	   affected	   by	   consequences.	   The	   responsibility,	  which	  
may	   affect	   only	   a	   small	   specific	   group	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  be	   accepted	  by	   the	  
wider	  population.	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The	  solutions	  of	  this	  model	  are	  different	  from	  those	  of	  the	  first.	  Risk	  communications	  
and	   risk	  management	   are	   based	   on	   a	   two-­‐way	   process.	   Both	   the	   experts	   and	   the	  
public	   have	   valid	   views	   and	   opinions	   to	   contribute.	   Each	   side	   respects	   the	  
opposition’s	  insights.	  
In	  this	  model,	  trust	  is	  incompatible	  with	  a	  closed,	  confined,	  or	  secretive	  attitude.	  To	  
establish	   trust	   the	   public	   needs	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   decision	   process.	   Only	   by	  
engaging	  the	  public	  can	  regulatory	  institutions	  gain	  legitimacy.	  In	  practice,	  there	  is	  a	  
clear	   distinction	   between	   public	   opinion	   and	   the	   ethical	   opinion	   of	   experts.	   The	  
public,	   still	   seen	   as	   irrational,	   is	   engaged	   only	   in	   risk	   management	   but	   not	   in	  
responsibility	  definition.	  
	  
Revised	   Standard	   Model:	   The	   first	   two	   models	   are	   based	   on	   the	   atomistic	  
perception	  of	  society.	  The	  public	  opinion	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  data	  –	  the	  aggregation	  
of	  individual	  opinions,	  and	  not	  like	  a	  social	  production,	  the	  result	  of	  confrontation	  of	  
different	   social	   groups	  on	   the	  public	   arena.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	  question	  of	   the	   social	  
construction	  of	  a	  problem	  is	  omitted.	  
In	  this	  model,	  which	  is	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  standard	  model,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  placed	  
on	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  regulation	  process,	  social	  groups	  and	  media.	  Breyer’s	  
model	  of	  vicious	  circle	  of	  risk	  regulation	  is	  a	  good	  illustration	  of	  this	  model.	  For	  him,	  
the	   legislative	   process	   is	   caught	   in	   a	   vicious	   circle	  with	   the	   source	   of	   the	   problem	  
being	  the	  public	  attitude	  towards	  risk	  and	  uncertainty	  created	  by	  the	  media.	  Breyer	  
claims	   that	   public	   perception	   of	   risk	   is	   usually	   inadequate.	   Risks	   are	   often	  
overestimated,	  however	  the	  efforts	  to	  educate	  the	  public	  about	  scientific	  risks	  have	  
failed	  and	  will	  fail	  in	  future.	  Consequently,	  responding	  to	  public	  attitude,	  legislature	  
itself	  will	  exaggerate	  the	  risks	  and	  “[…]	  combined	  with	  an	  institutional	  inability	  to	  set	  
detailed,	  scientific	  standards,	  will	  cause	  inconsistent,	  random,	  and	  often	  irrational	  ...	  
lawmaking”.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  public	  will	  feel	  unprotected	  by	  law	  and	  decision-­‐makers,	  
which	  will	  lead	  to	  more	  political	  pressure	  to	  take	  action.	  
In	  this	  model,	  public	  influence	  and	  participation	  in	  risk	  management	  are	  considered	  
with	  great	  suspicion.	  Accordingly,	  risk	  management	  includes	  the	  following	  elements:	  
1.	   Delegation	   of	   risk	   management	   to	   a	   competent	   and	   independent	  
administrative	   body	   (in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   influence	   of	  media,	   pressure	   groups	  
and	  politics)	  
2.	   Clear	  distinction	  between	  risk	  assessment	  and	  responsibility	  management.	  
3.	   Risk	  cannot	  be	  measured	  in	  an	  abstract	  way	  but	  rather	  analysed,	  comparing	  
various	  action	  scenarios,	  respecting	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  coherence	  and	  
4.	   Trust	   is	   not	   connected	   with	   openness,	   but	   rather	   with	   reputation	   and	  
competence.	  Consequently,	  this	  model	  corresponds	  with	  the	  technocratic	  vision.	  
The	  bias	  against	   industrial	   lobbying,	  polarisation	  of	  public	  opinion	  and	  groups	  of	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interests,	   and	   reinforcement	   of	   independent	   scientific	   expertise,	   represent	   the	  
elements	  of	  the	  traditional	  top-­‐down	  approach.	  
Co-­‐construction	  Model:	  	  
This	   model	   distinguishes	   itself	   by	   questioning	   the	   way	   in	   which	   technological	  
development	   projects	   use	   experts.	   Representations	   of	   technology	   come	   from	  
numerous	  collected	  case	  studies.	  The	  works	  of	   the	  new	  sociology	  of	   sciences	  have	  
progressively	  come	  to	  blame	  the	  traditional	  conception	  of	  science	  as	  a	  revelation	  of	  
universal,	   independent	   truths	   of	   the	   social	   system	   they	   produce.	   This	   important	  
work	  results	  from	  taking	  the	  methodological	  path	  proposed	  by	  Latour.	  It	  is	  therefore	  
a	   criticism	   of	   sound	   science,	   which	   „melts‟	   the	   analysis	   of	   risks	   in	   the	   preceding	  
models,	  and	  which	  invites	  us	  to	  place	  it	  into	  a	  pragmatic	  perspective.	  	  
In	   this	   model,	   both	   facts	   and	   values	   being	   taken	   into	   account,	   as	   underlined	   by	  
Stirling	   (1999),	   is	   not	   only	   a	   democratic	   matter;	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   analytical	   rigor	  
because	  it	  is	  the	  only	  way	  of	  treating	  these	  essential	  points	  seriously.	  If	  not,	  how	  can	  
we	   criticize	   and	   validate	   the	   framing?	   Why	   hide	   and	   withdraw	   from	   the	   debate	  
which	   will	   discuss	   what	   may	   eventually	   be	   changed?	   The	   Co-­‐construction	   Model	  
usually	   fits	   in	   the	   participatory	   paradigm,	   since	   it,	   too,	   requires	   a	   participatory	  
approach,	  and	  particularly	  the	  “weak	  proceduralism”	  of	  Latour	  (which	  we	  will	  return	  
to	  in	  Chapter	  6).	  Once	  again,	  this	  model	  has	  legitimacy,	  but	  not	  efficiency.	  
	  
According	   to	   this	   description	   and	   having	   already	   articulated	   how	   the	   relation	  
between	  norms	  and	  context	  could	  be,	  we	  can	  then	  match	  them	  together	  as	  follows:	  
	  
Relation	  to	  the	  norm	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Governance	  Typology	  
Efficiency	   Participatory	  
Contextualised	   Revised	  Standard	   Co-­‐Construction	  
Decontextualised	   Standard	   Consultation	  
	  
Table	  9:	  Relation	  between	  norms	  and	  context	  	  
Having	  all	  the	  pieces	  of	  our	  picture	  we	  now	  need	  to	  translate	  it	  into	  a	  grid	  of	  analysis	  
useful	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  empirical	  cases.	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6.	  Analytical	  Grid	  of	  Analysis:	  a	  logical	  translation	  of	  the	  
theoretical	  landscape	  for	  the	  empirical	  investigations	  	  
(All	  the	  contents	  are	  just	  examples,	  the	  real	  data	  will	  have	  to	  be	  collected)	  
Given	   all	   the	   justificatory	   explanation	   and	   the	   hints	   we	   harvested	   from	   our	  
investigation,	  we	   think	   that	   the	   following	   guidelines	   could	  be	   a	   good	  draft	   for	   the	  
grid.	  
In	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   mentioned	   theoretical	   gaps,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   organise	   the	  
reflexive	  capacity	  of	  the	  actors	  by	  constructing	  the	  capacities	  of	  reflexivity	  in	  such	  a	  
way	   as	   to	   not	   presuppose	   it	   as	   already	   existing	   due	   to	   a	   formal	  method,	   such	   as	  
argumentation,	   deliberation,	   debate	   or	   discussion.	   All	   of	   these	   formal	   methods	  
presuppose	   their	   own	   required	   conditions	   and	   as	   such	   do	   not	   necessarily	   involve	  
reflexivity.	  	  
We	   then	   now	   propose	   the	   steps	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   an	   analytical	   grid	  
containing	   the	  parameters	   that,	   according	   to	  our	   frame,	   are	  necessary	   in	   order	   to	  
investigate	  and	  empirically	  assess	  responsible	  innovation	  in	  research.	  
The	   first	   step	   along	   the	   development	   of	   parameters	   useful	   to	   assess	   research	  
projects,	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  understanding	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  governance	  approach	  
is	   used	   within	   the	   project.	   Of	   course,	   this	   choice	   would	   be	  motivated	   only	   by	   an	  
intuition	  given	   in	  accordance	  with	   the	  explanation	  of	  different	  sorts	  of	  governance	  
typologies.	   At	   this	   stage	  no	   scientific	   certainty	   can	  be	  provided	   in	   the	   choice,	   also	  
because	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  find	  one	  research	  project	  that	  embeds	  completely	  one	  
and	  only	  one	  typology	  of	  governance.	  	  
Therefore	  this	  will	  represent	  a	  starting	  point	  that	  will	  have	  to	  be	  fed	  by	  the	  following	  
table	  in	  which	  we	  provide	  the	  parameters	  necessary	  to	  assess	  every	  research	  project	  
that	  want	  to	  be	  labeled	  as	  a	  responsible	  innovation	  one.	  
The	  parameters	  that	  we	  developed,	  though	  perhaps	  we	  could	  even	  renamed	  them	  
or	  add	  other	  issues,	  are	  8	  and	  summarize	  the	  most	  important	  aspects	  that	  need	  to	  
be	  detected,	  both	  in	  qualitative	  and	  quantitative	  terms,	  in	  the	  chosen	  case.	  
	  
6.2.	  Explanation	  of	  Parameters	  
	  
Tools:	  
What	  are	  the	  tools	  that	  are	  settled	  in	  every	  research	  project	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  and	  
enhance	  reflexivity	  and	  therefore	  an	  ethical	  approach	  to	  the	  project	  and	  its	  potential	  
consequences?	   (Ethical	   board,	   ethical	   review,	   committee,	   etc.).	   We	   will	   try	   to	  
evaluate	  them	  in	  order	  to	  understand	  what	   is	  preferable	  according	  to	  our	  reflexive	  
approach.	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Product:	  
What	  kind	  of	  product	  the	  research	  project	  is	  aiming	  to	  create?	  What	  are	  the	  ethical	  
implications	  of	  such	  a	  product	  and	  what	  are	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  this	  product	  has	  
been	  felt	  necessary.	  For	  this	  we	  could	  rely	  in	  part	  to	  what	  suggested	  by	  Stilgoe	  and	  
add	  other	  questions,	  connected	  to	  our	  investigation	  on	  norms	  construction.	  
	  
Process:	  
What	   is	   the	   procedure	   or	   procedures	   that	   are	   used	   within	   the	   project	   to	   pursue	  
reflexivity	  and	  therefore	  an	  adequate	   level	  of	  participation?	  We	  have	  to	  assess	  not	  
only	   the	  quantitative	  aspects	  of	   these	   issues	  but	  also	   the	  qualitative	  ones.	  Are	   the	  
procedures	  influencing	  the	  process	  or	  they	  have	  an	  ideological	  aim?	  
	  
Epistemic	  Tools:	  
Is	   the	   project	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   using	   a	   risk	   assessment	   or	   precautionary	  
principle?	  This	  should	  maybe	  could	  be	  thought	  in	  terms	  of	  knowledge	  percentage	  of	  
risks,	  i.e.,	  are	  all	  the	  consequences	  foreseeable,	  partially,	  or	  completely	  unknown?	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  better	  what	  an	  epistemic	  tool	  could	  represent	  and	  which	  are	  
the	  most	  adopted	  ones	  lets	  just	  briefly	  report	  them.	  
In	   RRI	   there	   are	   two	   main	   underlying	   principles	   that	   are	   commonly	   driving	  
resolutions	  or	  methodological	  justifications,	  that	  of	  risk	  assessment	  and	  the	  so	  called	  
precautionary	  principle.	  We	  will	  now	  briefly	  analyze	  them	  in	  order	  to	  put	  in	  evidence	  
shortcomings	  and	  limits	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  a	  wider	  and	  deeper	  understanding	  of	  RRI.	  	  	  
Risk	  Assessment	  
Risk	   assessment,	   as	   the	   following	   precautionary	   principle,	   could	   be	   considered	  
epistemological	   tools	   adopted	   implicitly	   or	   explicitly	   in	   most	   of	   the	   current	  
governance	   approaches.	   Furthermore,	   it	   wouldn’t	   be	   false	   to	   affirm	   that	   risk	  
assessment	  is	  the	  most	  common	  one	  due	  to	  its	  highly	  practical	  and	  strategic	  spirit.	  	  
There	  are	  several	  possible	  application	  of	  risk	  assessment	  depending	  on	  the	  field	  that	  
we	  take	  into	  account.	  
In	   information	   security,	   risk	   assessment	   can	   be	   qualitative	   or	   quantitative.	  
Quantitative	  assessment	   is	  based	  on	  mathematical	   calculations	  of	   security	  metrics,	  
and	   takes	  a	   large	  number	  of	   resources,	  whereas	  qualitative	  assessments	  are	  more	  
personal	   and	   involve	   experts	   interviewing	   personnel	   and	   inspecting	   the	   setup	   of	  
organisational	  infrastructure.	  	  
The	   fallback	   of	   using	   expert	   opinion	   when	   pure	   mathematical	   and	   systemic	  
approaches	   cannot	   be	   performed	   is	   important	   to	   note	   here:	   as	   we	   argue,	   expert	  
opinion	   is	   not	   a	   sufficient	   mechanism	   for	   assessing	   the	   impact	   of	   a	   system	   upon	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society.	   In	   this	  case,	   the	   impact	   is	  more	   likely	   to	  be	  a	   financial	   impact	   than	  that	  of	  
societal	  or	  ethical	  implications	  of	  the	  activity.	  
One	  of	  the	  biggest	  problems	  with	  risk	  assessment	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  its	  vagueness	  and	  
informality	   forces	   policy-­‐makers	   to	   conform	   to	   procedural	   strictness.	   Sets	   of	  
procedures	  are	  used	  in	  this	  uncertain	  environment,	  immediately	  establishing	  a	  set	  of	  
values	   that	   are	   dominant	   in	   the	   situation,	   limiting	   the	   debate	   to,	   for	   example,	  
scientific,	   technological,	  or	  economic	  perspectives.	  This	   leads	  to	  a	  traditional,	  “top-­‐	  
down”	  governance	  of	  risky	  activities	  reliant	  on	  expertise	  that	  is,	  as	  previously	  argued,	  
separated	  from	  the	  ethical	  and	  social	  impacts	  of	  the	  activity.	  This	  in	  turn	  leads	  to	  a	  
removal	   of	   the	   democratic	   process	   from	   the	   approach.	   Thus	   the	   rich	   debate	   on	  
differences	  in	  knowledge	  and	  experiences	  of	  different	  people	  in	  society	  is	  lost,	  and	  a	  
positivist	   (and	   often	   reductionist)	   approach	   is	   established,	   leading	   to	   cognitive	  
closure	  in	  the	  disguise	  of	  a	  deliberative	  democratic	  framework.	  
	  
Precautionary	  Principle	  
The	  precautionary	  principle	  is	  a	  principle	  used	  in	  policy	  making	  to	  shift	  the	  burden	  of	  
responsibility	   to	  prove	   that	  a	  potentially	  harmful	  action	   is,	   in	   fact,	  non-­‐harmful,	   to	  
those	  wishing	   to	   take	   the	   action.	   In	   other	   words,	   if	   scientific	   evidence	   exists	   that	  
shows	  that	  the	  action	   is	  potentially	  harmful,	   there	   is	  a	  responsibility	  on	  the	  policy-­‐
makers‟	   behalf	   to	   protect	   those	   affected	   by	   preventing	   that	   action,	   unless	   those	  
wishing	  to	  take	  the	  action	  can	  provide	  more	  robust	  support	  (usually	  scientific)	  for	  an	  
alternative	   future.	   Although	   many	   definitions	   exist,	   most	   reduce	   to	   the	   idea	   of	  
practicing	   caution	  within	   risky	   or	   uncertain	   contexts,	   that	   is,	   that	   it	   builds	   on	   risk	  
assessment	  in	  order	  to	  inform	  policy	  and	  legal	  decisions.	  It	  is	  currently	  a	  major	  focus	  
for	   policy-­‐making	   in	   the	   European	   Union,	   where	   it	   is	   used	   in	   a	   greater	   risk-­‐
management	  program	  for	  public	  policy	  and	  where	  it	  is	  a	  compulsory	  principle	  of	  law	  
(Raffensperger	  &	  Tickner,	  1999).	  	  
It	   is	   a	   relatively	   new	   concept,	   however,	   and	   is	  most	   commonly	   practiced	   in	   policy	  
that	  affects	  the	  environment	  or	  society.	  It	  arose	  from	  the	  West	  German	  “foresight”	  
principles	   in	   water	   protection	   law	   in	   the	   1970s,	   which	   assessed	   future	   plans	   for	  
potential	   harms.	   This	   principle	   was	   then	   applied	   to	   other	   environmental	   contexts	  
including	   acid	   rain,	   contamination	   of	   bodies	   of	   water,	   and	   other	   industrial-­‐
environmental	  contexts.	  It	  has	  since	  been	  introduced	  around	  the	  world,	  with	  several	  
major	   treaties	   and	   conventions	   employing	   it	   (such	   as	   the	   Maastricht	   Treaty,	   the	  
Barcelona	   Convention,	   and	   the	   Global	   Climate	   Change	   Convention),	   as	   well	   as	  
outside	  the	  European	  Union	  in	  the	  policies	  of	  the	  US	  Food,	  Drug,	  and	  Cosmetic	  Acts	  
and	  other	  US	  acts,	  culminating	  in	  the	  UN	  Rio	  Declaration	  of	  1992	  which	  called	  for	  all	  
member	  states	  to	  adopt	  the	  Precautionary	  Principle	  (Raffensperger	  &	  Tickner,	  1999).	  
Since	   then	   it	   has	   been	   prominent	   in	   other	   policy	   measures,	   particularly	   in	   trade	  
agreements	  with	  the	  European	  Union.	  It	  favors	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  as	  used	  in	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two	  ways:	  risk	  management,	  where	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  acts	  as	  a	  risk	  factor,	  
bringing	   more	   conservatism	   to	   risk	   assessment,	   and	   as	   a	   “primary	   precautionary	  
approach”,	   where	   it	   is	   used	   to	   force	   testing	   of	   activities	   before	   wide-­‐scale	  
implementation	   (such	   as	   requiring	   a	   chemical	   to	   be	   tested	   and	   proved	   harmless,	  
rather	  than	  requiring	  an	  instance	  of	  harm	  before	  it	  is	  removed)	  (Goldstein	  &	  Carruth,	  
2004).	  	  
The	  Rio	  Declarations’	  definition	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  is	  as	  follows:	  
“Where	   there	   are	   threats	   of	   serious	   or	   irreversible	   damage,	   scientific	   uncertainty	  
shall	   not	   be	   used	   to	   postpone	   cost-­‐effective	   measures	   to	   prevent	   environmental	  
degradation”	  (United	  Nations	  Conference	  on	  Environment	  and	  Development,	  1992).	  
It	   fits	   into	   public	   health	   and	   environmental	   policy	   as	   that	   of	   a	   primary	   prevention	  
mechanism:	  preventing	  the	  carrying	  out	  of	  some	  harmful	  action	  before	  it	  occurs,	  and	  
its	  relationship	  with	  risk	  assessment	  as	  a	  secondary	  prevention	  mechanism	  is	  that	  it	  
provides	   the	   initial	   approval	   for	   the	   action	   to	   be	   assessed.	   This	   part	   of	   the	   “three	  
level	   prevention	   program”	   and,	   as	   all	   forms	   of	   primary	   prevention,	   “suffers	   from	  
both	   a	   lack	   of	   certainty	   that	   a	   preventive	   effect	   will	   occur,	   and	   a	   difficulty	   in	  
quantifying	   the	  benefit	   side	  of	  a	  cost-­‐benefit	  analysis”.	  Despite	   its	  noble	  goals,	   the	  
invocation	   of	   the	   precautionary	   principle	   in	   EU	   policy	   is	   criticized	   for	   being	   based	  
more	   on	   politics	   that	   on	   scientific	   findings,	   and	   particularly	   as	   a	   block	   for	   trade	  
agreements	  or	  international	  obligations	  (Goldstein	  &	  Carruth,	  2004).	  It	  is	  also	  highly	  
criticized	   as	   being	   imprecise,	   and	   unable	   to	   be	   easily	   operationalized,	   with	   critics	  
claiming	   it	   is	  more	   ideological	   than	   practical,	   requiring	   high	   level	   of	   interpretation	  
and	  clarification	  (Kaiser,	  2008).	  
Kaiser	  also	  argues	  for	  the	  use	  of	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  along	  with	  a	  supplement	  
of	   participatory	   policy	   tools.	   He	   argues	   that	   this	   allows	   for	   greater	   public	  
consultation	   and	   thus	   a	   greater	   democratic	  mandate	   for	   the	   decisions,	   institution	  
and	   implementation	   of	   outcomes	   of	   the	   assessment	   process.	   “No	   ethicist	   has	   a	  
higher	  authority	  in	  basic	  value	  matters	  than	  the	  people	  themselves.	  […]	  If	  the	  public	  
is	  given	  a	  voice	  and	  listened	  to	  in	  the	  final	  decisions,	  then	  the	  public	  is	  also	  willing	  to	  
take	  on	   co-­‐responsibility	   for	   the	  outcome”	   (Kaiser,	   2008).	  Although	  Kaiser’s	   claims	  
are	  a	   little	  bold,	  he	  also	  does	  not	  address	  the	  methods	  for	  which	  the	  public	  should	  
become	   involved	   or	   how	   they	   should	   be	   chosen.	   Another	   issue	   at	   stake	   is	   what	  
constitutes	   an	   “acceptable	   risk”,	   or	  makes	   something	   “potentially	   harmful”.	   There	  
are	   no	   strict	   rules	   about	   the	   determination	   of	   acceptability	   of	   risks.	   This	   is	   highly	  
problematic	   and	   somewhat	   paradoxical,	   since	   the	   precautionary	   principle	   is	   most	  
commonly	  used	  when	  there	  is	  little	  knowledge	  about	  what	  the	  outcomes	  might	  be.	  
As	   von	   Schomberg	   states,	   “Scientific	   and	   public	   controversies	   often	   remain	  
inconclusive	  when	   there	   is	   a	   lack	   of	   consensus	   on	   the	   normative	   (ethical)	   basis	   of	  
such	  assessment	  mechanisms.	  In	  the	  development	  of	  nanotechnologies,	  there	  is	  not	  
yet	   a	   shared	   understanding	   of	   how	  we	  might	   define	   the	   acceptability	   of	   possible	  
	   	  	  
Deliverable	  2.3.	  Analytical	  Grid	  Report	  to	  EC	   	   GREAT-­‐321480	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
risks	   or	   of	   how	  we	  would	   weigh	   them	   against	   possible	   benefits”	   (von	   Schomberg	  
2010).	  The	  precautionary	  principle	  may	  rely	  on	  values,	  but	  these	  values	  are	  not	  part	  
of	  the	  principle	  itself,	  instead,	  for	  the	  precautionary	  principle	  to	  give	  good	  guidance	  
on	  ethical	  issues,	  it	  requires	  the	  principle	  to	  rely	  on	  ethical	  conceptions	  at	  its	  basis.	  
Therefore	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  think	  about	  specific	  ethical	  governance	  that	  could	  allow	  




In	  which	  way	  participation	  is	  enacted	  and	  conceived?	  At	  what	  level	  would	  you	  assess	  
it	   considering	   5	   possible	   level?	  According	   to	  Archon	   Fung	   analysis	   on	  participation	  
we	   can	   find	   five	   different	   manners	   of	   participating	   into	   a	   development	   process.	  
These	  5	  possibilities	  vary	  according	  to	   level	  of	  effectiveness	   in	   the	  decision	  making	  
process.	  
	  
Level	  of	  influence	   Typology	  
Manifestly	  Absent	  	   Spectator	  
Ambiguously	  Absent	   Commentator	  
Medium	   Influence	  
High	   Co-­‐costruction	  
Too	  High	   Binding	  
	  
Table	  10:	  Manners	  of	  participating	  into	  a	  development	  process.	  
	  
Assessment:	  
In	  which	  way	   the	   technology,	   the	  developments	  and	   results	  are	  actually	  assessed?	  
Do	   they	   involve	  any	   reflexive	  process?	   If	   so,	   focused	  on	  which	  aim?	   Is	   it	   a	  general	  




Are	   the	   cultural	   differences,	   meaning	   also	   in	   a	   certain	   way	   among	   the	   others	  
organisational	  culture,	  potentially	  affecting	  the	  territory	  taken	   into	  account?	   If	  yes,	  
in	  which	  way?	  
	  
Norm/Law	  relation:	  
The	  internal	  conduct	  is	  driven	  only	  by	  laws	  or	  also	  by	  norms	  and	  if	  so,	  what	  kind	  of	  
normativity	   is	   pursued?	   It	   will	   be	   important	   to	   understand	   how	   normativity	   is	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conceived	  with	   regards	   to	   specific	   dimensions.	   Norms	   possess	   a	   power	   for	   action	  
that	  cannot	  be	  limited	  to	  a	  legal	  commitment.	  	  
	  
Once	   assessed,	   these	   parameters	   need	   to	   be	   confronted	   and	   matched	   with	   the	  
corresponding	  norm	  presupposition	   in	  order	   to	  understand	   in	  which	  category	   they	  
pertain.	  	  
At	  the	  end	  of	  this	  matching	  process	  we	  should	  have	  a	  certain	  amount	  of	  similarities	  





Standard	   Revised	  Standard	   Consultation	   Co-­‐
construction	  
Case	  X	   	   	   	   	  
Case	  Y	   	   	   	   	  
Case	  Z	   	   	   	   	  
	  
Table	  11:	  Governance	  typologies	  matrix	  for	  case	  studies.	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Table	  12:	  Parameters’	  matrix	  for	  case	  studies	  analysis	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Product	   	   	   	  
Process	   	   	   	  
Tools	   	   	   	  
Epistemic	  Tools	   	   	   	  
Assessment	   	   	   	  
Cultural	  	  	  	  	  Contexts	  
	  
Differences	   	   	   	  
Norms/Law	  relation	   	   	   	  	   	   	   	  
	  
Table	  13:	  Analytical	  grid	  	  
Collecting	  information	  on	  cases	  as	  established	  in	  the	  DOW	  will	  lead	  us	  to	  certain	  kind	  
of	   conclusions.	   In	   fact,	   as	   mentioned,	   we	   should	   discover	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	  
similarities	  that	  will	  help	  us	  in	  defining	  common	  practices	  and	  consequently	  models	  
useful	  to	  be	  simulated	  through	  the	  SKIN	  program.	  	  
	  
6.2.	  Implementation	  	  
It	   is	   not	   sufficient	   to	   assess	   the	  preconception	  and	  presupposition	   at	   a	   theoretical	  
level	  –even	  if	  those	  presuppositions	  are	  revealed	  by	  our	  empirical	  enquiry.	  	  
The	   implementation	   of	   the	   norms,	   the	   models	   and	   the	   presupposition	   are	   very	  
important	  to	  assess.	  
For	   instance	  we	  could	  ask	  ourselves,	  what	  are	   the	   tools	   that	  are	  used	  or	   could	  be	  
used	  in	  order	  to	  make	  innovation	  responsible?	  
It	   is	   still	   difficult	   to	   indicate	   precisely	  what	   kind	   of	   tools	  we	   could	   use	   in	   order	   to	  
implement	   the	   norms	   construction	   under	   a	   co-­‐constructive	   governance	   typology.	  
The	  only	  sure	  statement	  we	  could	  move	  	  
We	  have	  plenty	  of	  suggestions	  in	  regard	  to	  RRI,	  not	  all	  of	  them	  fruitful	  according	  to	  
our	  overall	  perspective.	  
For	   instance,	   Arie	   Rip	   suggests	   a	   set	   of	   “soft	   intervention	   practices”	   (Fisher,	   Rip,	  
2013)	   that	   should	   be	   taken	   at	   different	   levels.	   He	   takes	   into	   account	   legislative	  
initiatives,	  Research	  Funding	  Agencies,	  Intermediary	  Organizations	  &	  Consortia,	  and	  
also	   really	  concrete	  activities	   that	  could	  be	  carried	  on.	  Not	  all	  of	   them	  seem	  to	  be	  
the	   useful	   in	   order	   to	   implement	   the	   construction	   of	   norms	   as	   we	   shown	   it	  
previously.	   STIRing	   for	   instance	   is	   a	   really	   interesting	   case	   in	   order	   to	   show	   our	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perspective	  in	  actual	  terms.	  	  “STIR	  is	  a	  form	  of	  collaborative	  inquiry	  between	  natural	  
scientists	   and	   engineers	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   and	   social	   scientists	   and	   humanities	  
scholars	  on	  the	  other,	  that	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  broaden	  and	  enhance	  R&D	  decision-­‐
making	   processes”55.	   The	   results	   of	   this	   process	   “are	   then	   assessed	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  
framework	   of	   ‘midstream	  modulation’	  which	   charts	   sequential	  modes	   of	   reflexivity	  
and	  action”.	  The	  result	  is	  that	  you	  have	  a	  series	  of	  modulation	  that	  involve	  reflection	  
and	  deliberation	  across	  scientists,	  bringing	  an	  “increased	  awareness	  of	   the	  broader	  
context	  within	  which	  an	  individual	  or	  an	  organization	  is	  acting”.	  Although	  it	  could	  be	  
considered	  a	  good	  starting	  point	  or	  an	  increase	  in	  tools	  production,	  however	  there	  is	  
a	  high	  percentage	  of	  risk	  that	  this	  kind	  or	  interactions	  are	  played	  on	  the	  ‘expertise’	  
level	  analyzing	  the	  context	  from	  above.	  	  
Coming	   to	   speak	   about	   general	   governance	   tools,	   Jack	   Stilgoe	   determines	   a	  
distinction	  between	  some	  issues	  that	  are	  already	  at	  stake	  in	  governance	  approaches,	  
and	  some	  others	  that	  could	  be	  defined	  as	  ‘experimental’.	  
	  	  
MAKING	  INNOVATION	  RESPONSIBLE	  
Governance	  Experiments	   De	  facto	  Governance	  
• Life-­‐cycle	  analysis	  
• Risk	  assessment	  
• Ethics	  committees	  
• Public	  dialogue	  
• Foresight	  






Training	  and	  capacity-­‐building	  
Institutional	  structures	  





Political	  economy	  of	  science	  
	  
	  
Table	  14:	  Making	  Innovation	  Responsible	  (Based	  on	  what	  presented	  by	  J.	  Stilgoe	  at	  the	  “Methodological	  
Meeting”	  in	  Paris,	  April	  2013)	  
Some	  arrangements	  that	  we	  could	  propose	  but	  surely	  won’t	  exhaust	  them	  are:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  STIR	  has	  been	  taken	  up	  in	  over	  30	  public	  and	  private	  laboratories	  in	  a	  dozen	  nations	  across	  
North	  America,	  Europe	  and	  East	  Asia.	  An	  initial	  project	  in	  2009	  was	  funded	  at	  just	  over	  US	  $1	  
Million,	  with	  half	  coming	  from	  the	  National	  Science	  Foundation	  and	  the	  rest	  from	  a	  dozen	  or	  
so	   collaborators.	   The	  NSF	   award	   helped	   support	   research	   and	   training	   activities,	   including	  
workshops	  in	  the	  US,	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  for	  an	  international	  network	  of	  science	  and	  innovation	  
scholars	  based	  in	  a	  dozen	  nations.	  It	  also	  established	  STIR	  as	  associated	  project	  of	  the	  CNS-­‐
ASU.	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Societal	   Issue	   Panel	   (SIP)	   in	   the	  wake	   of	  what	   has	   been	   done	   by	   the	  UK	   Research	  
Council	  within	  the	  Engineering	  and	  Physical	  Research	  Council	  (ESPRC)	  
Ethical	  Committees:	  A	  group	  of	  external	  experts	  that	  form	  a	  committee	  to	  deal	  with	  
ethical	  issues	  within	  the	  project.	  These	  experts	  can	  come	  from	  a	  variety	  of	  disciplines,	  
usually	   related	   to	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   project.	   The	   experts	  may	  or	  may	  not	   have	   had	  
explicit	  ethical	  training,	  or	  be	  dedicated	  ethicists	  (STIR).	  
Focus	  Groups:	  A	  moderator	  works	  with	  a	  small	  group	  of	  people	  at	  whom	  the	  project	  
is	  targeted.	  There	  is	  structured	  discussion	  with	  full	  transcripts	  recorded	  and	  analysed	  
by	  specialists.	  
Ethical	  Expert	  Analysis:	  Ethical	  experts	  consult	  for	  the	  project	  on	  potential	  and	  actual	  
ethical	  issues.	  Some	  sort	  of	  analysis	  of	  the	  project	  aims,	  effects,	  and	  development	  is	  
made	  and	  results	  drawn	  from	  this.	  
Hybrid	   Panels:	   Similar	   to	   an	   ethical	   committee,	   but	  with	   internal	   participants.	   This	  
panel	  involves	  representatives	  from	  different	  sets	  of	  stakeholders	  to	  give	  their	  input	  
into	  the	  ethical	  impact	  and	  governance	  processes	  to	  be	  used.	  
Living	   lab	   approach	   and	   field	   trial	   could	   also	   represent	   examples	   of	   arrangements	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7.	  Internal	  Glossary	  
	  
Reflexivity:	  	  
• Internal	   Reflexivity	   (subjective)	   calling	   a	   self-­‐regulating	   system	   (re-­‐
representation	  in	  Latour,	  re-­‐regulation	  in	  Habermas)	  
• External	   Reflexivity	   (objective)	   calling	   a	   tendency	   of	   correcting	   the	  
incomplete	  reflexivity	  of	  self-­‐regulating	  systems	  p.17	  
	  
Context:	  	  
“Context”	   is	   a	   key	   component	   of	   any	   interpretation:	   In	   order	   to	   understand	   a	  
phenomenon	   or	   give	   sense	   to	   it,	   social	   scientists	   and	   anthropologists	   gather	   its	  
surrounding	   features.	   In	   other	   words,	   contextualization	   “involves	   making	  
connections	  and,	  by	  implication,	  disconnections”	  (Dilley	  2002:	  438-­‐439).	  For	  instance,	  
a	  context	  can	  be	  “political	  or	  “economic”,	  but	  the	  concept	  can	  also	  indicate	  different	  
levels	  of	  (micro	  or	  macro)	  analysis,	  such	  as	  the	  “situation”,	  a	  particular	  “society”,	  a	  
specific	  state	  or	  even	  the	  “world-­‐system”	  (Dilley	  2002:	  438).	  	  
	  
Thus,	   contextualization	   is	   also	   problematic	   because	   it	   results	   from	   prior	  
interpretation,	   and	   from	   already	   existing	   theoretical	   perspectives:	   How	   are	   the	  
surrounding	   features	   selected?	  Which	   connections	   are	   regarded	   as	   relevant,	  while	  
others	  are	  ignored?	  Hence,	  various	  scholars	  have	  developed	  the	  “view	  that	  context	  
is	  generated	  and	  negotiated	  in	  the	  course	  of	  social	  interaction	  and	  exchange”	  (Dilley	  
2002:	   439).	   For	   instance,	   Harold	   Garfinkel	   (1984)	   put	   forward	   what	   was	   seen	   in	  
sociology	  as	  a	  radical	  re-­‐specification	  of	  context,	  saying	  that	  it	  is	  locally	  created	  and	  
sustained	   by	   participants.	   This	   was	   from	   an	   ethno-­‐methodological	   perspective.	  
Furthermore,	   in	   conversation	   analysis,	   Heritage	   (2004:	   223)	   elaborates	   upon	   how	  
utterances	   participants	   make	   are	   “context	   shaped”,	   and	   how	   participants	   also	  
“create	   (or	  maintain	   or	   review)	   a	   context	   for	   the	  next	  person’s	   talk”	   (emphases	   in	  
the	  original).	  	  
	  
Governance:	  
Although	   there	   are	   several	   different	   possible	   definitions	   of	   governance,	   we	   could	  
choose	   the	   following:	   Innovative	   practices	   of	   networks	   or	   horizontal	   forms	   of	  
interaction,	  in	  which	  actors,	  political	  and	  non-­‐political,	  arrive	  at	  mutually	  acceptable	  
decisions	  by	  deliberating	  and	  negotiating	  with	  each	  other.	  
	  
Responsibility:	  
A	  polysemic	  term	  that	  includes	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  acceptions	  going	  from	  accountability	  
to	  care.	  For	  an	  extended	  explanation:	  (Vincent	  2013,	  Ricoeur	  2007)	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Innovation:	  	  
Innovation,	   the	   creation	   of	   new,	   technologically	   feasible,	   commercially	   realisable	  
products,	   processes	   and	   organisational	   structures	   (Schumpeter,	   1912;	   Fagerberg,	  
Mowery	  and	  Nelson,	  2006),	  is	  the	  result	  of	  the	  continuous	  interactions	  of	  innovative	  
organisations	   such	   as	   universities,	   research	   institutes,	   firms	   such	   as	  multi-­‐national	  
corporations	  and	  small-­‐to-­‐medium-­‐sized	  enterprises,	  government	  agencies,	  venture	  
capitalists	   and	   others.	   These	   organisations	   exchange	   and	   generate	   knowledge	   by	  
drawing	  on	  networks	  of	   relationships	   (innovation	  networks)	   that	   are	  embedded	   in	  
institutional	   frameworks	   on	   the	   local,	   regional,	   national	   and	   international	   level	  
(Ahrweiler	   2010).	   For	   innovations	   to	   emerge,	   agents	   require	   not	   only	   financial	  
resources	   to	   be	   invested	   in	   R&D,	   but	   the	   ability	   to	   recombine	   their	   own	   with	  
external	   knowledge,	   to	   design	   interfaces	   to	   related	   knowledge	   fields	   and	   to	  meet	  
customer	   needs.	   Because	   agents	   engaged	   in	   innovation	   processes	   are	   confronted	  
with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  complexity,	  which	  is	  related	  to	  their	  competitors’	  behaviours,	  
the	  overall	  knowledge	  development,	  and	  dynamic	  changes	  in	  their	  customer	  needs,	  
it	   is	   very	   unlikely	   that	   single	   firms	   will	   master	   all	   relevant	   knowledge	   fields	   in	  
isolation,	   not	   to	   mention	   pushing	   ahead	   the	   technological	   frontier	   in	   all	   relevant	  
areas.	   Innovation	   networks	   are	   considered	   to	   be	   an	   organizational	   form	   of	   R&D	  
which	  allows	   for	  mutual	   knowledge	  exchange	  and	  cross-­‐fertilization	  effects	  among	  
the	  heterogeneous	  actors	  involved.	  As	  innovation	  is	  recognized	  as	  the	  driving	  factor	  
of	   economic	   growth,	   an	   important	   part	   of	   economic	   policy	   today	   focusses	   on	  
innovation.	  Not	  surprisingly	  political	  instruments	  often	  attach	  significant	  importance	  
to	  supporting	  innovation	  networks	  as	  they	  are	  considered	  to	  be	  an	  ideal	  framework	  
for	  creative	  knowledge	  development	  without	  well	  specified	  (technological)	  goals.	  
	  
Normativity:	  
Norms	   are	   sentences	   or	   sentence	   meanings	   with	   practical,	   i.e.	   action-­‐oriented	  
(rather	   than	   descriptive,	   explanatory,	   or	   expressive)	   import,	   the	  most	   common	   of	  
which	   are	   commands,	   permissions,	   and	   prohibitions.	   Another	   popular	   account	   of	  
norms	  describes	  them	  as	  reasons	  to	  act,	  believe	  or	  feel.	  
Orders	  and	  permissions	  express	  norms.	  Such	  norm	  sentences	  do	  not	  describe	  how	  
the	  world	   is,	   rather	   they	  prescribe	  how	  the	  world	  should	  be.	   Imperative	  sentences	  
are	  the	  most	  obvious	  way	  to	  express	  norms,	  but	  declarative	  sentences	  also	  do	  it	  very	  
often,	   as	   is	   the	   case	  with	  many	   laws.	   Generally,	  whether	   an	   expression	   is	   a	   norm	  
does	  not	  depend	  on	  its	  form,	  on	  the	  type	  of	  sentence	  it	  is	  expressed	  with,	  but	  only	  
on	  the	  meaning	  of	  the	  expression.	  
Those	  norms	  purporting	  to	  create	  obligations	  (or	  duties)	  and	  permissions	  are	  called	  
deontic	   norms	   (see	   also	   deontic	   logic).	   The	   concept	   of	   deontic	   norm	   is	   already	   an	  
extension	  of	  a	  previous	  concept	  of	  norm,	  which	  would	  only	  include	  imperatives,	  that	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is,	  norms	  purporting	  to	  create	  duties.	  The	  understanding	  that	  permissions	  are	  norms	  
in	  the	  same	  way	  was	  an	  important	  step	  in	  ethics	  and	  philosophy	  of	  law.	  
In	  addition	  to	  deontic	  norms,	  many	  other	  varieties	  have	  been	  identified.	  For	  instance,	  
some	   constitutions	   establish	   the	   national	   anthem.	   These	   norms	   do	   not	   directly	  
create	  any	  duty	  or	  permission.	  They	  create	  a	  "national	  symbol".	  Other	  norms	  create	  
nations	  themselves	  or	  political	  and	  administrative	  regions	  within	  a	  nation.	  The	  action	  
orientation	   of	   such	   norms	   is	   less	   obvious	   than	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   command	   or	  
permission,	  but	   is	  essential	   for	  understanding	  the	  relevance	  of	   issuing	  such	  norms:	  
When	  a	  folk	  song	  becomes	  a	  "national	  anthem"	  the	  meaning	  of	  singing	  one	  and	  the	  
same	  song	  changes;	  likewise,	  when	  a	  piece	  of	  land	  becomes	  an	  administrative	  region,	  
this	   has	   legal	   consequences	   for	  many	   activities	   taking	   place	   on	   that	   territory;	   and	  
without	   these	   consequences	   concerning	   action,	   the	   norms	  would	   be	   irrelevant.	   A	  
more	   obviously	   action-­‐oriented	   variety	   of	   such	   constitutive	   norms	   (as	   opposed	   to	  
deontic	  or	   regulatory	  norms)	  establishes	   social	   institutions	  which	  give	   rise	   to	  new,	  
previously	   inexistent	   types	   of	   actions	   or	   activities	   (a	   standard	   example	   is	   the	  
institution	   of	   marriage	   without	   which	   "getting	   married"	   would	   not	   be	   a	   feasible	  
action;	  another	  is	  the	  rules	  constituting	  a	  game:	  without	  the	  norms	  of	  soccer,	  there	  
would	  not	  exist	  such	  an	  action	  as	  executing	  an	  indirect	  free	  kick).	  
Any	  convention	  can	  create	  a	  norm,	  although	  the	  relation	  between	  both	  is	  not	  settled.	  
There	  is	  a	  significant	  discussion	  about	  (legal)	  norms	  that	  give	  someone	  the	  power	  to	  
create	   other	   norms.	   They	   are	   called	   power-­‐conferring	   norms	   or	   norms	   of	  
competence.	   Some	   authors	   argue	   that	   they	   are	   still	   deontic	   norms,	   while	   others	  
argue	   for	   a	   close	   connection	   between	   them	   and	   institutional	   facts	   (see	   Raz	   1975,	  
Ruiter	  1993).	  
One	   major	   characteristic	   of	   norms	   is	   that,	   unlike	   propositions,	   they	   are	   not	  
descriptively	  true	  or	   false,	  since	  norms	  do	  not	  purport	  to	  describe	  anything,	  but	  to	  
prescribe,	   create	   or	   change	   something.	   Some	   people	   say	   they	   are	   "prescriptively	  
true"	  or	  false.	  Whereas	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  descriptive	  statement	  is	  purportedly	  based	  on	  
its	   correspondence	   to	   reality,	   some	   philosophers,	   beginning	   with	   Aristotle,	   assert	  
that	   the	   (prescriptive)	   truth	   of	   a	   prescriptive	   statement	   is	   based	   on	   its	  
correspondence	   to	   right	   desire.	   Other	   philosophers	   maintain	   that	   norms	   are	  
ultimately	  neither	  true	  or	  false,	  but	  only	  successful	  or	  unsuccessful	  (valid	  or	  invalid),	  
as	  their	  propositional	  content	  obtains	  or	  not	  (see	  also	  John	  Searle	  and	  speech	  act).	  
Another	   purported	   feature	   of	   norms,	   it	   is	   often	   argued,	   is	   that	   they	   never	   regard	  
only	   natural	   properties	   or	   entities.	   Norms	   always	   bring	   something	   artificial,	  
conventional,	  institutional	  or	  "unworldly".	  This	  might	  be	  related	  to	  Hume's	  assertion	  
that	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  derive	  ought	  from	  is	  and	  to	  G.E.	  Moore's	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
naturalistic	  fallacy	  when	  one	  tries	  to	  analyse	  "good"	  and	  "bad"	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  natural	  
concept.	   In	   aesthetics,	   it	   has	   also	   been	   argued	   that	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   derive	   an	  
aesthetical	   predicate	   from	   a	   non-­‐aesthetical	   one.	   The	   acceptability	   of	   non-­‐natural	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properties,	   however,	   is	   strongly	   debated	   in	   present	   day	  philosophy.	   Some	  authors	  
deny	  their	  existence,	  some	  others	  try	  to	  reduce	  them	  to	  natural	  ones,	  on	  which	  the	  
former	  supervene.	  
Other	   thinkers	   (Adler,	   1986)	   assert	   that	   norms	   can	   be	   natural	   in	   a	   different	   sense	  
than	   that	   of	   "corresponding	   to	   something	   proceeding	   from	   the	   object	   of	   the	  
prescription	   as	   a	   strictly	   internal	   source	   of	   action".	   Rather,	   those	   who	   assert	   the	  
existence	  of	  natural	  prescriptions	  say	  norms	  can	  suit	  a	  natural	  need	  on	  the	  part	  of	  
the	   prescribed	   entity.	   More	   to	   the	   point,	   however,	   is	   the	   putting	   forward	   of	   the	  
notion	   that	   just	   as	   descriptive	   statements	   being	   considered	   true	   are	   conditioned	  
upon	  certain	  self-­‐evident	  descriptive	  truths	  suiting	  the	  nature	  of	  reality	  (such	  as:	  it	  is	  
impossible	   for	   the	  same	  thing	   to	  be	  and	  not	  be	  at	   the	  same	  time	  and	   in	   the	  same	  
manner),	  a	  prescriptive	  truth	  can	  suit	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  will	  through	  the	  authority	  of	  
it	   being	   based	   upon	   self-­‐evident	   prescriptive	   truths	   (such	   as:	   one	   ought	   to	   desire	  
what	  is	  really	  good	  for	  one	  and	  nothing	  else).	  
Recent	  works	  maintain	   that	   normativity	   has	   an	   important	   role	   in	   several	   different	  
philosophical	  subjects,	  not	  only	  in	  ethics	  and	  philosophy	  of	  law	  (see	  Dancy,	  2000).	  
	  
Precautionary	  Principle:	  
Where,	   following	   an	   assessment	   of	   available	   scientific	   information,	   there	   are	  
reasonable	   grounds	   for	   concern	   for	   the	   possibility	   of	   adverse	   effects	   but	   scientific	  
uncertainty	   persists,	   provisional	   risk	   management	   measures	   based	   on	   a	   broad	  
cost/benefit	   analysis	   whereby	   priority	   will	   be	   given	   to	   human	   health	   and	   the	  
environment,	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	   chosen	   high	   level	   of	   protection	   in	   the	  
Community	  and	  proportionate	  to	  this	  level	  of	  protection,	  may	  be	  adopted,	  pending	  
further	   scientific	   information	   for	   a	   more	   comprehensive	   risk	   assessment,	   without	  
having	  to	  wait	  until	  the	  reality	  and	  seriousness	  of	  those	  adverse	  effects	  become	  fully	  
apparent.	  (Von	  Schomberg	  2006)	  
	  
Responsible	  Innovation:	  
It	   sounds	   paradoxical	   to	   provide	   a	   definition,	   as	   our	   main	   aim	   is	   exactly	   to	  
demonstrate	  how	  a	  definition	  fails	   in	  the	  exact	  aim	  of	  a	  crosscutting	  conception	  of	  
Responsible	   Innovation	   in	   Research.	   However	   we	   could	   provide	   the	   well-­‐known	  
definition	  provided	  by	  René	  von	  Schomberg	  Responsible	  Research	  and	  Innovation	  is	  
a	   transparent,	   interactive	  process	  by	  which	   societal	   actors	   and	   innovators	  become	  
mutually	   responsive	   to	   each	   other	   with	   a	   view	   on	   the	   (ethical)	   acceptability,	  
sustainability	   and	   social	   desirability	   of	   the	   innovation	   process	   and	   its	   marketable	  
products	   (in	   order	   to	   allow	   a	   proper	   embedding	   of	   scientific	   and	   technological	  
advances	  in	  our	  society).”	  (Von	  Schomberg	  2011).	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